Zambia

Key actors

Responsibility for the response to the 2001-03 crisis lay with the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (DMMU) in the Office of the Vice President. The government's response to the crisis was held back owing to a number of factors. The anti-corruption campaign in Zambia takes up large amounts of government resources and time. Policies affecting food security are found in various different ministries and there is no committee within government that brings together all the key stakeholders and policy-makers to co-ordinate the policy process, though some government officials and parliamentarians are taking steps towards this. Implementation of policy is restricted by fiscal constraints and by the impact of HIV/AIDS on public sector labour productivity.

The statistical indicators produced through the National VAC are the main source of information for the emergency response. The Food Reserve Agency (FRA) produces estimates of import requirements and harvest forecasts. The food aid pipeline has, thus far, been distributed through the WFP EMOP and CSAFE, with (mainly international) NGOs as district-level distributors of food who are responsible for targeting. The major donors are USAID, EU and DFID.

Food security issues and debates

• There is a lack of understanding of the accessibility of food to poor people. At the start of the 2002-03 EMOP, the figure for assistance agreed between the Zambian Government and World Food Programme was more than 600,000 MT, whilst the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) had asked for 200,000 MT. Some sources were forecasting maize surpluses for 2002-03 in all provinces except Southern Province, whilst others were contemplating an EMOP extension until June 2003. By early 2004, the good harvest of 2002-03 had allowed the Food Reserve Agency to stockpile over 60,000 ton of maize and WFP had made purchases from farmers, millers and the government of 100,000t for distribution in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Whilst estimates of numbers requiring food assistance fell from 2.7m in February 2002 to 430,000 in early 2004, there is concern that, in some provinces, food aid is not necessary and will have negative impacts on production in the coming season and prices at the impending harvest.
  
• The food aid pipeline has been subject to severe delays. By end of December 2002, the pipeline in Zambia had delivered less than one third of the requirement for the period August and December 2002. One main cause of this problem was the Zambian Government's refusal to accept GM maize into the country. The delay getting food aid into Zambia also highlights the need to understand more about the alternative strategies for finding food and the coping mechanisms that people relied upon when the arrival of food aid was delayed.
  
• There is uncertainty over the relationship between HIV/AIDS and food. The February 2003 National VAC found survey evidence of strong linkages between HIV/AIDS and food insecurity. However, whilst there is a growing understanding of the relationships between HIV/AIDS, household labour and food access, it is not clear how these link to community-level processes, social networks and coping mechanisms. All of these are important in the development of options for long-term social protection. Deaths from AIDS are not just amongst food producing households in rural areas. For example, it is estimated that more than 2,000 teachers were lost to AIDS in 2002. In the same period, only 1,000 new teachers were trained. There is also a need to better understand changing rural-urban relations, both in the context of HIV/AIDS and the industrial decline and structural changes that have brought about rising urban unemployment.
  
• Other impacts on maize production and prices include processes of agricultural liberalisation (such as the privatisation of veterinary services making draught oxen more expensive to treat) and the cessation of maize subsidies.
  

Food security stakeholders

• Parliament: via MP Kalifungwa
  
• Government departments: especially VP's office (Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit); Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives; Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Health; Food Reserve Agency
  
• Monitoring networks: Famine Early Warning System Network; Vulnerability Assessment Committee
  
• Consortia
  
• Private sector: e.g. through Food Reserve Agency
  
• International NGOs: e.g. Oxfam; SC; Care; Concern; Action Aid; Family Health International and through the Forum for International NGOs
  
• Civil society and local NGOs: e.g. HODI; Programme Against Malnutrition
  
• Research organisations: e.g. UNZA (especially FANRPAN country node in the Department of Agricultural Economics), INESOR
  
• Donors: e.g. DFID; EU; USAID; World Bank
  
• UN/Humanitarian agencies: e.g. WFP; FAO; UNAIDS
  
• Farmers: e.g. through Agricultural Consultative Forum
  

The Forum for Food Security in Southern Africa is contributing to national high level food security policy options seminars taking place in each focus country (ie Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe) in 2004. Click here for details of the meeting in Zambia.

The Zambia CFSO Paper will be available mid December 2004. Click on the link for documents under Zambia section in information centre.

Contributions to and comments on the work of the Forum for Food Security relating to Zambia are warmly welcomed. Please contact Elizabeth Cromwell for country specific comments on Zambia.