Reneth Mano

Further contribution

Response to question 4.1

Given that past SGR where rather passive expressions of annual production situations rather than strategically managed outcomes, it is unfair to use the past experience of Zimbabwe for example (even Malawi and Zambia) to down play the potential rrole that a well managed SGR program could play in food security management. Whether government agencies are the right institutions to offer such strategic functions as managing SGR given their bad track record in recent past is a question that needs separate attention especially in light of the apparent role that Botswana and RSA free market based food security management program has accomplished with only facilitatory and compelmentary roles being played by government (Well, I understand that RSA government is now seeking greater control and management of food market for food security). In Zimbabwe at present it would be politically naive to believe that government would entrust the strategic grain reserve management to the private market players or sub-contract it to the private sector! At present it is not even politically acceptable for farmers to hold on to their grain for more than 30days after harvesting as government wants own and control food security crops such as staple grains. This tendency gives credence to the hypothesis that open systems of management of food security aare feasible only under politically stable and mature open political systems of democracy. Given this reality one has to find ways in which state agencies can develop strategic links with agencies which can undertake some of the core SGR management functions efficiently and cost effectively eg food production support ala revised grain loan scheme and contract farming on resettlement farms, grain acquisition using specialist middlemen (accredited dealers) to buy maize from communal aareas on behalf GMB.

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Observations by Charles Mann, stimulated by Rob Tripp’s and Malcolm Blackie's contributions.

The whole issue of whether or not smallholders can be a major force in improving both food security and raising incomes turns on the availability of a feasible technology that is more productive than smallholders are currently using. In Malawi, Government and International researchers developed improved varieties of maize that roughly doubled the gearing, the ratio, of output to critical input - the ratio of units of maize produced per unit of nitrogen applied. Traditional varieties yield roughly ten units of maize to one of N. The improved semi-flint hybrids developed in a concerted collaborative research effort yield roughly twenty units of maize per unit of N. Companion research showed how effectively some of that N (and better soil conditioning) could be derived from rotation/intercropping - soy, groundnuts, agro forestry, etc (see Blackie comment). Something like 1700 farmer trials over 5 years both permitted regional "best bet" recommendations, and demonstrated widely that the improved seed and cropping combinations worked.

These results made it clear that if smallholders could access the improved inputs, there was no question that smallholder led food security and poverty alleviation was feasible, full stop. It was equally clear that at Malawi's desperate poverty levels and with a dysfunctional credit system, few smallholders had cash even to experiment with these improved systems. It was equally clear that without the gearing of hybrids (20/1 replacing 10/1) Malawi could not produce enough food to feed its people. Widespread starvation or massive food aid could be mathematically demonstrated as things stood in the late nineties even though an adequately productive system was available.

Faced with the certainty of large food aid were nothing done on the production side, DFID, EU, and WB responded positively to Government's request for the Starter Pack program. This put small demonstration packs of improved seed (maize and nitrogen fixing legumes), fertilizer, and information into the hands of every small farmer. All could experiment with seed that would generate twice as much maize per unit of N, be it from a bag or from green manures. The essence of the strategy was to get a small bit of this more efficient technology into every farmer's hands quickly - demonstration packs, not the free distribution of seed and fertilizer in quantities that would displace commercial sales. (Norsk Hydro, seller of half of Malawi's fertilizer was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of Starter Pack,) The goal was not just to get a quick burst of production from the new varieties with some fertilizer, but also to begin the education and hands-on process of building up sources of organic N via the legumes with the maize. These rotations take several years to become convincing, and for farmers to learn and see results (especially agro forestry), hence the concept of SP for 5 - 10 years, but always as small packs too small to distort commercial purchases.

Alas, this smallholder productivity program was hijacked by the donor determination to transform it into a safety net program, targeted to the poorest. This shift in emphasis had several disastrous consequences for the productivity objectives. First, the resulting haggling delayed distribution past the date for the packs to be effective. Second, it split villages into haves and have-nots. Instead of everyone being on the same page in terms of transforming towards a common proven target set of improved practices, the poorest had inputs with which to experiment, the not quite so poor had no improved inputs nor rotation crop seed. The natural leaders who could help the poorest use the inputs effectively instead were bitter that they had none. The targeting proved extremely divisive.

The shift to safely net also muted the focus on productivity. Composite maize with lower gearing (maize/N) was substituted for the hybrids. Thus the poorest were provided with one set of inputs whilst the package recommended to those purchasing inputs remained focused (correctly in my view) on hybrids, with their higher gearing.

Malcolm Blackie has summed it up nicely. The African solution was distorted substantially as filtered through donor lenses - targeting replaced universal coverage smallholder coverage; an untested system was substituted for the proven one.

The smallholders could be the engines of productivity growth in Malawi. In the process of achieving that, safety net objectives are achieved. However, donor pressures to make the safety net the key focus have seriously compromised the promise of the original long-term productivity program.

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Malcolm Blackie

If I am an African smallholder in a remote village and I am looking at ways in which to protect my livelihood, a stable, preannounced price regime for both inputs and outputs would be brilliant. No doubt, many of my neighbours would go the same way. But then how do I balance that with the fact that the national budget consequences are so dire in many years (there is an excellent paper in draft on this by a bunch from Noragric) that there won't be resources for health, education etc??? So there does need to be some sensible, coherent technical intervention.

But the discussion has also shown how so much of that technical intervention is driven externally - both by donors and by NGOs - with fairly short term and often very limited objectives. The reality is that too few really carry the responsibility for following through on their actions. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to look at the many changes in donor fashions to realise this. So, in my view, the critical missing element in all this is a strong local technocratic voice, necessarily moderated but not obliberated by external perspectives. We know many at this level are involved in various activities - often market related in diverse industries - so they also are not entirely disinterested. But they have a direct interest in building a stable and thriving economy - and this modest base has significant potential for growth if nurtured and encouraged. See, for example, the farm input programme scheme (FIPS) in Kenya as a way in which markets are developed by selling farm inputs in small packages to smallholders - commercially viable as it uses existing outlets as far as possible, farmers buy what they can afford (0.5kg fertiliser if necessary), they are sold the right stuff for the right conditions and helped to experiment and learn as they go. So you get the emergence of a trading network and a private advisory service - both expanding livelihood opportunities.

It can be done - but we need to make much more use of local expertise and experience and build mechanisms whereby that expertise can be expanded and developed. An ideal world perhaps - and there are lots of pitfalls - but the current process doesn't offer much as an alternative. Let's give it a go - some of the most thoughtful interventions in this discussion have been from committed nationals.

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A sample of two is not huge, but my reading of these contributions is that they call for: - letting markets work more freely, where they are currently hampered by restrictions (export bans) or distorted by rich-world subsidies - local solutions where possible (e.g. local grain reserves), rather than assuming that any intervention should come from the centre - interventions to raise efficiency (rather than compensate for low efficiency). The point that better information helps not only markets, but also well-intentioned public interventions, is well taken.

Western subsidies are rightly the subject of much debate and challenge at present. However, it is probably worth noting that they do serve to lower food prices, which, in the short-term at least, is good for net food deficit households (i.e. the majority of the poor).

The issue of the maize cycle is one that has not been raised in this e-discussion up to now. Personally, I need to reflect on it further to decide what the implications are for strategies to guarantee national food availability!

At the end of today, I don't think we can claim to have arrived at a consensus on the way forward. However, I trust that there has been something in the contributions (possibly even the paper!) that has stimulated your thinking and proved useful.

Thank you all for your contributions.

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1- reiterate the critical need to stop dumping western excesses and give local producers a chance - may be some progress in Cancun but likely to be a slow one.

2- support local grain reserves for price stabilisation function (ie village given credit to hold a reserve from local purchase). This is useful where, as in Malawi, maize is sold after harvest for low cost and repurchased later in the year by the same rural poor at high cost. What is in effect happening is it serves a very expensive micro-credit function. Oxfam have some experience with village grain banks in Mulanje, Malawi. Alternatively, support rural micro-finance for rural poor (e.g. CUMO project in Dedza, Malawi) and so offset need to sell and buy back.

3- I would support promotion of labour based roads and tracks/paths. Where well implemented, this stimulates cash flow in the local economy and opens access routes. In particular, try to access funding from the fuel levy in Malawi (or other regional equivalents) to finance this in a sustainable manner. Graders are currently widely used with no secondary benefits to the rural poor. Access to cash in rural areas can also stimulate informal credit services.

On a final point, wrt to state interventions and grain reserves, I think the question of information and data availability is critical. Without good crop and market info, it is difficult to manage an optimal reserve or promote production. Even where states and donors are genuinely committed to helpful intervention, bad information can undermine efforts. For example, a small cash-based grain reserve would work if there were adequate warning of a production shortage or speculation.

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George Allison

2.) National Governments in SSA need to reduce their borrowings on the domestic market, as these result in very high interest rates, that discourage any kind of investment in agriculture. Base interest rates in Zambia have been in excess of around 40% for the last 12 years.

3.) Following a good growing season and decent maize crop, Zambia with a small domestic economy, will have to absorb some 30,000 MTS of WFP sponsored food, together with a further 30,000 MTS brought in by various NGO's. The timing of these actions, a year after the serious drought, cannot really help. If all of this food was purchased in the region one could argue that regional markets were being supported, but the majority of this food is imported from overseas. With the high domestic interest rates, the Zambian crop will face very low prices through June, July, August, at the same time as the various NGO's helpfully dole out the food. Thus commercially motivated plantings for the next season will be down, and the next year supply will again be very tight and prices extremely high.

Here in Zambia we have the maize cycle. A boom bust every other year.

4.) Government could help the immediate situation by allowing exports, into neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe and Congo, which will both be net importers this year. However one can understand that they could be a little confused on this one, when on the one hand WFP is merrily importing foodstuffs and various NGO's making the case for continued relief, and on the other commercial farmers hollering for export licences.

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Colin Poulton

Looking back over the range of contributions received so far, we have been surprised by the apparent degree of consensus on: - the importance of agricultural development - the relative lack of alternative, non-farm activities that could drive growth - the coordination problems encountered in liberalised markets. However, we also note that few, if any, of our more provocative statements have been seriously challenged, so suspect that some people have not yet told us what they really think! We, therefore, suggest that, for our last day, we take a slightly different tack. Instead of setting questions, we encourage you to send in short contributions on what you think the real priority actions are for stimulating pro-poor growth in the focus countries. If we say no more than three ideas per contributor, that should force us to prioritise a little!

We look forward to hearing from you all this one last time (within this e-discussion).

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Response to Q1: In Malawi, central coordination and investment is very important for rapid and widespread progress in smallholder food crop production. Basing on the history of crop production, it is apparent that the intervention of the government had a tremendous effect on ensuring the growth and widespread smallholder food crop production. In the last two decades, smallholders were at the hub of national food crop production as well as the overall GDP growth through conserted efforts in the agricultural activities. This was ensured through central coordination by the government. Credits and subsidies were put in place to foster agricultural growth however, in addition to some restrictive measures. In the long run this ensured stable prices and food security at both household level and national level. In return we saw enhanced economic development in industries due to growth in agriculture which was coordinated by the government. Food crises were things of the past and only attributed to natural phenomena.

Response to Q2: After market liberalization, it is extremely difficult to pin point any progress in the economy. There has been a wide outcry from the rural populace about the removal of subsidies on agricultural inputs that they were enjoying for a long time. The coming in of private traders has diluted the puchasing power of the rural farmers who are the majority in the cultivation of the staple crop-maize. Higher fertilizer prices have hindered them to apply inorganic nutrients to their crops in amidst of rapid soil fertility degradation. Low incomes have rendered them susceptible to exploitation when it comes to facing the produce market. In Malawi and hopefully in the whole SADC region, the issue of liberalization is highly politicised so much so that when things fail, the governments become too proud to accept the failures and adopt corrective measures. During the late 1990s, President Muluzi has been blaming the MCP regime for stealing the money that was mearnt for free fertilizer to the people instead of fighting the aftermath of the IMF - World Bank led Structural Adjustment Programmes which in atual sense undermined the ability of this country to continue supporting the credit schemes that by then were pillar stones for Malawi's agriculture.

Response to Q3: There were lots of good examples in the poor sectors of the economy that were triggered by the central coordination. During the time of state intervention in hte market mainly the agricultural one, we saw a rapid and increase in not only national food self sufficiency but also in the household food security. This was because the government was controlling the produce market through the marketing board-ADMARC. Through this board, the government was able to instill the price bands which made sure that neither farmers nor buyers are expolited in one way or another. Unlike today where individual traders are left to determine the prices in the market. The end loosers are the poor people who are unable to bargain in the market.

Response to Q4: In poor and small economies like Malawi, it is however difficult to isolate the state intervention from the markets and yet expect to achieve improvement and growth. Still I am of the view that the state need in one way or the other take a leading role in the markets to mainly ensure food availability and progress in our smallholder farmers. It is time that the SADC countries stopped dancing to the tunes of the Bretton Woods Institutions at the expense of millions destute people. Why should poor countries be asked to remove subsidies while the European Union is heavily subsidising its member states in the agricultural field? How would you expect to have competitive markets when the EU is protecting its already developed members?

So we cannot be talking about liberalization of the markets without firstly removing the irregularities that affect the efficiency of these markets. By only leveling the field of play in these markets are going to achieve food security and good investment in SADC countries as well as in the global arena.

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Malawi is an interesting "test case" for this theme because, in 1992, smallholders were presented with access to the market for a lucrative cash crop, burley tobacco. This was promoted as an engine of growth for the rural economy, chiefly by USAID and WB. Anyone not "on the team" was ideologically suspect.

Ten years on, smallholders now grow most of Malawi's burley but burley has not turned out to be the engine of growth for the rural economy. Its instructive to ask why. Many smallholders have benefitted from burley but they live in the centre and north of the country, not in the poverty-stricken south.

The main reason burley hasn't worked in the south is because holdings are too small for smallholders to grow both burley and maize, the staple foodcrop. This isn't just a question of land, there is also the labour that must be diverted from maize to burley, particularly in the first six weeks after planting, which are critical for maize yields. Some smallholders do grow burley but they will often say its because it gives them access to fertiliser they need for maize. Growing burley would mean growing less maize and relying on the market for maize purchases. Given price instability (aggravated by market liberalisation), this is not an option for most poorer farmers.

This premium on food security means that "markets" per se will not work, and crops have to be carefully chosen to fit in with household objectives. Smallholders are adept at this and the farming system is studded with small market niches that they exploit to earn cash. These include field peas, vegetables, dairying, sweet potato, and pigeonpea. None of these threaten food supply. Sweet potato supplements maize, requires relatively little labour, and can be grown in the off-season if needed. I still believe we need to know more about these niches and their potential for market-based growth. They may never offer the returns from burley but then burley has been a non-starter for most of the poor.

Commercialisation is sometimes difficult to combine with off-farm income. Burley farmers have higher incomes from crops but often they don't have the time to commit to higher-paying forms of off-farm income (eg trading maize). One of the things that surprised me was that vegetable growers had lower incomes than others, partly because the area they could irrigate was so small (no treadle pumps) so income from vegetables was low, but also because the family couldn't spare time off for anything other than farming. No off farm income + low returns from farming = poverty. So markets don't necessarily make you richer, either.

Too much is probably expected of the non-farm sector in the way that too much was expected from burley. We did quite a detailed study of the returns from non-farm activities for southern Malawi (European Jnl. Dev Research, 13, 2001). If you disaggregate, only a few activities can really provide the financial returns that can lift households out of poverty. And for these activities (trading maize, brewing, market stalls) you need business savvy and working capital. So, when we talk about the non-farm sector, which activities do we have in mind? I think that, as in Asia, the real growth in off-farm income will come from unskilled jobs in transport and processing - and that will depend on growth in agricultural output that spurs demand for these services.

We need to reassert the importance of "familiar truths". Less focus on magic bullets (miracle crops, non-farm etc) and get back to the basics. Farmers select market options carefully in ways that don't compromise food security. Knowing the options and how to make them work better is requires some knowledge of the farming system in which farmers operate. Otherwise, policy advice can easily promise more than it delivers.

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For those participants registered with the 'markets' theme but not with the 'policy' theme, I have just noticed that Charles Mann's additional comments on the Malawi Starter Pack programme were posted to the policy theme - you may like to check them out on the policy theme website
(http://www.odi.org.uk/Food-Security-Forum/Comments_Policy.html).

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These questions are closely related to the topic of our next session: MARKETS AND COORDINATION. This picks up issues raised by in contributions over the weekend (David Rohrbach and Malcolm Blackie), on the difficulties in getting markets to work. The paper argues that central coordination of different market players (such as input and output traders, savings and lending services) is an essential ingredient in getting growth going in the economies of the forum countries. In the past this has been attempted and sometimes achieved through state intervention but, the paper argues, widespread rapid growth in poor rural economies has not been achieved WITHOUT some central coordination. This is a bold claim. Is it true in the forum countries (or elsewhere)? Please share examples of situations where rapid widespread growth has been achieved, with or without such coordination. If we are to move forward with practical understanding of what is needed to get market based growth going, then we need to learn more about the conditions necessary for such growth to occur. What are the different ways that coordination can be achieved?

The detailed questions are listed below, and we look forward to more discussion as we try, towards the end of this theme, to identify the most promising options for market based development in the forum countries.

We look forward to your contributions. Please also feel free to contribute to any of the other debates that have started over the past few days. Please send all contributions to: ffssa-markets@odi.org.uk Thank you!

Markets and Coordination
The discussion paper claims (in section 5, pages 41-42), that "Central coordination and investment to address market failures .... is critical for rapid and widespread progress in smallholder food crop production, in urban and industrial development, and in the stabilization of food availability and prices. In each of these cases there are strong a priori reasons for only slow and narrow progress in poor and stagnant rural economies if the market is largely left to fend for itself, even if large investments are made in improved infrastructure and institutional development according to current conventional policy thinking. However, the historical record of central coordination and investment, despite many examples of dire failure, includes dramatic instances of success, albeit in more inherently favourable conditions than those faced in many parts of the Forum countries. On the other hand market development in poor rural economies, without some form of central coordination and risk bearing investment, has few, if any, significant success stories to its name. Given the serious governance issues facing many of the forum countries, one of the major challenges we now face is to develop new models for central coordination and risk bearing investment to kick start markets."
5.1 How important is central coordination and investment for rapid and widespread progress in smallholder food crop production, in urban and industrial development, and in the stabilization of food availability and prices?
5.2 Are there examples of rapid and widespread progress in these areas in poor and stagnant economies that have relied on liberalised markets without some central coordination and investment (by state or other agencies)? What can the Forum countries learn from these examples, and from examples of failure or lack of progress?
5.3 What examples are there of rapid and widespread progress in these sectors in poor and stagnant economies with central coordination and investment (by state or other agencies)? What can the Forum countries learn from these examples, and from examples of failure?
5.4 How can coordination be improved without the old problems of patronage, political interference and inefficiency so often associated with state intervention?

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Fire away!

It is also not too late to comment on the relative importance of investment in health and education. Sustainable livelihoods thinking has perhaps encouraged some of us to think outside of our sectoral boxes, but does our thinking on development pathways and strategies yet encompass everything from agriculture to health and education?

So, our next topic is: State Interventions to Secure National Food Availability. Questions that you may wish to address include:

1.1 The discussion paper claims (in section 4.3, page 39), that "that there is a case to be made for a degree of state intervention in staple food markets that goes beyond the minimal contingency stock to protect against delays in private importation". Can this claim be defended in the light of the poor record of past state interventions designed to secure national food availability?

1.2 Does the paper under-estimate the capacity of liberalised markets to reliably supply food (at both national and local levels) in the forum countries? How effective might private investment be in stabilising food prices over time? Does the answer depend on progress with regional trade liberalisation (as the paper suggests)?

1.3 Is the policy of only maintaining a minimal strategic grain reserve (the basic level of intervention considered by the paper) either politically feasible or socially acceptable? How about a policy of not maintaining any form of SGR at all?

1.4 Can "state failure" in SGR management be overcome within the forum countries and, if so, how? What, if any, is the role of donors in this?

Please also feel free to contribute to any of the other debates that have started over the past few days. As always, we look forward to your contributions!

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For a country like Malawi, which is predominantly rural with no access infrastructure, we cannot talk of market-based development without putting an emphasis on the development of transport and communication infrastructure. The Priorities Framework for Agriculture (PFA) puts infrastructure as the third key issue after inputs and markets.

Good quality physical infrastructure is key to rapid agricultural growth because it opens up and links the potential areas with the rest of the economy. When Malawi adopted the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the rural feeder and village access roads were put in place and constantly maintained. The associated network of bridges, footpaths including those for bicycles and ox-drawn carts were well maintained. This resulted in greatly opening up most of the areas where this programme was implemented. Even up to now (after almost two decades) the rural roads that were constructed then are still being relied upon by the farmers to transport their crops to markets (albeit being in a poor state because of lack of maintenance).

The country used to have a well focused roads improvement programme (then called the District Roads Improvement Programme - DRIMP and the Village Access Roads and Bridges Unit - VARBAU) in the Ministry of Works. Since all these were donor funded programmes, they could not be sustained by the government. But what we see now is that the curtialment of such programmes has resulted in a heavy fiscal burden for the country. The poor state of rural infrastructure is affecting all activities both social and economic. For example, a high proportion of the wedge between farm-gate and market prices for commodities is due to the high transport costs. This implies that farmers cannot get better prices for their produce (neither can they afford to buy food) because of the poor state of rural infrastructure. The lack of markets in the rural areas will still continue to be a problem because buyers cannot venture into high risk areas. The delivery of health, education and other social services is als

Currently the government has put in place a National Roads Authority (NRA) initially funded by the European Union but subsequently to be sustained through a fuel levy. This programme is mostly assisting in maintaining and constructing main roads linking districts and towns. However, the rural access roads still remain as poor. The food-for-work and the public works programmes implemented through the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) and the donors notably EU and WFP are really assisting in putting up rural access infrastructure. The only problem is that these are largely piecemeal and may also not be sustained by the government.

Where should the money come from?

If we are talking of long-term development, the issue of heavy investments is inevitable. There is no better option to long-term development than, first and foremost, the infrastructure which is much like the vessels and arteries that transport the blood that nurtures life. It is therefore important that on such critical issues, individual countries should be prepared to invest a great deal of commitment and dedication. There are obviously no short-cuts to such an important issue as much as there are trade-offs. But we cannot continue to rely on donors. The donors should come in only to assist in terms of start-up human and financial capital (where necessary) but the onus remains on individual countries to allocate relentlessly adequate resources for the construction and maintenance of rural feeder roads, giving priority to the most potential areas in terms of both agricultural and non-agricultural activities. An example in Malawi is the NRA which is basically using a fuel levy paid by

Equally important is the development of a transport system. UNDP funded a Rural Transport Programme (MRTP) which has been phased-out. This system, along with the liberalization of the transport system in the country has seen an increase in the number of both passenger and goods vehicles. The government also relaxed the duty on trucks and light goods vehicles. All these initiatives have helped to develop the transport sector at a relatively faster rate. However, for these initiatives to flourish in business there is need to develop a network of good roads. The developments in the transport sector in Malawi have illustrated that improvements in roads directly result in increasing the supply of transport services and this also opens up the areas to all sorts of economic activities. The improvement of transport services is purely a private sector endevour which responds quite instantenously to the availability of good road network (mostly a public domain).

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Pulling together the discussion of both farm and non-farm sectors, poor macro-economic conditions (e.g. very high interest rates) and poor markets for inputs and outputs and food are major problems preventing both growth in individual sectors (and more productive practices in agriculture) and the wider, simultaneous multi-sectoral growth needed to sustain individual sectors' growth (although there are historical and current examples of success). This pattern is expressed in different ways by contributions from Tanzania, Malawi and Zimbabwe. Having discussed the potential for and the constraints on growth, contributors began to consider what can be done. Local development and ownership of new and locally relevant and practical solutions were stressed by contributions on Zimbabwe and Malawi, the latter detailing proposals put forward but not taken forward when the Starter Pack programme was originally conceived of, and seeking to support new ways of developing markets and a variety of technologies tailored to farmers needs and situations, together with support to poor farmers to enable them to take advantage of the opportunities these initiatives would offer.

We hope that in the next few days we will take these discussion forward to consider some of these ideas, and others, in more detail, in a search for locally relevant and practical solutions to the problems constraining broad based growth.

But how far could many of the market problems be solved by better infrastructure? And how far do problems of poor health and education constrain growth across the different sectors? In our next session we focus on Infrastructure and Social Sectors.

We list below above questions that we might like to address - but please do not feel that your contributions need to address all, or even any, of these specific questions, and no doubt discussion will continue from the previous sessions (on agricultural and non-agricultural growth.

Specific Questions: The discussion paper notes the poor state of transport systems and their associated infrastructure in the forum countries, but - some would argue - places insufficient emphasis on infrastructural development as a policy and investment priority. It also has relatively little to say on the role of social sectors such as health and education in future growth.
3.1 How high a priority should be given to infrastructural investment? What are the priorities within this?
3.2 Given that 1km of newly tarred road can cost US$250,000, and roads also need maintenance, where should the money come from?
3.3 What should be the balance between investment in development of regional transport routes and in improving rural roads? How does this relate to opportunities for stimulating rural employment through more labour intensive infrastructural investments?
3.4 What should the paper have said about the contribution of social sectors to the future development of the forum countries? Over what time period can a developmental return from investments in these sectors be expected? How do these relate to the paper's emphasis on more market-based economic development?

Thank you for today's contributions, and those of you who are 'dipping in' but have not yet 'written in', please share your experience and views. We look forward to greater involvement in discussion over the next few days!

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For Malawi it is really difficult at the moment to point out any promising non-agricultural sources of growth. Starting from the 1990s the country experienced an increase in the number of small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs) and manufacturing companies. But the growth of these has been curtailed because of the poor performance of the macroeconomic fundamentals such as escalating interesting rate ,high inflation and increased unemployment. The micro-finance base is not adequate to support the development of SMEs. From the demand side, due to the worsening macroeconomic problems, it is difficult for the SMEs to find flourishing domestic markets for their products. Due to the unconducive economic environment, the country has of late experienced the greatest close-down of companies and private businesses.

Despite efforts by the Ministry of Trade and Industry to promote the SMEs sector, it still remains so small, employing less than 12% of the labour force, mostly in the urban and peri-urban areas. This explains why the sectoral composition of GDP in Malawi has not changed much.

Agro-processing should have been another area which would have created demand for agricultural commodities thereby create the necessary link with the farming sector.However, due to the reasons outlined above, the already existing and up-coming agro-processing companies are struggling to remain in business. While they complain of the effects from the macroeconomic problems, they also find it difficult to source commodities because apart from the access problems, farmers are not able to produce enough volumes.

Even if these succeed in stimulating GDP growth, can this be translated into rapid poverty reduction?

Given that only a small proportion of the population are employed in the non-agricultural sector, and given the poor links between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, it is difficult for growth emanating from the non-agricultural sectors to adequately trickle down to the poor masses. Thus growth in non-agricultural sectors cannot be relied upon as a source of poverty reduction.

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Theme 1 SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE AS A DRIVER FOR GROWTH? leading to theme 2: NON AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY, FOOD SECURITY AND POVERTY REDUCTION

The importance of smallholder agriculture is acknowledged in all the comments received thus far, but there have been mixed views on how realistic it is to look to it as a potential driver for growth. Are the constraints on its growth overwhelming? The challenge is great in all the forum countries and arguably greater in some countries (e.g. Malawi) than others. In the second session (running over the weekend and on Monday), there is a chance to thrash out possible alternative drivers - where they exist …
A couple of the contributions today have touched on the difficulty in coming up with a coherent set of policies for smallholder agricultural development (or even for particular areas within this, such as technology development and extension). Incoherent donor approaches to policy development have been noted and it has been suggested that the implementation of the "starter pack" scheme in Malawi involved a major missed opportunity to establish a process of policy dialogue between donors and local policy makers where there was significant local input and ownership.

Over the weekend a further contribution stressed the importance of but difficulties with smallholder agriculture, with particular need for but difficulties in improved soil fertility management without much more efficient and sophisticated markets working with inherently difficult, costly and risky conditions.

For those interested in these issues, please stick with us, but also keep an eye on the Policies, Politics, Governance and Accountability debates.

Meanwhile, our next session offers a chance for agri-sceptics to offer some alternative ways forward: NON AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY, FOOD SECURITY AND POVERTY REDUCTION. It might be helpful also to consider examples of how agricultural and non-agricultural activities can support and build each other up (even if that does still leave us with something of a "chicken and egg" problem!).

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It seems obvious that smallholder agriculture must contribute to growth if only given the proportion of people/labor and production assets invested here. Food production, at a minimum, should drive down the cost of food to the wage employed, and to farmers facing deficits. For a few farmers with better rainfall and/or market access, grain production will be profitable. For many, if not most others, higher value returns will have to be sought from higher value products perhaps confectionary groundnut in Malawi; probably livestock in semi-arid regions of Zimbabwe.

But what are the underlying drivers? Obviously, smallholder productivity cannot be improved without better agricultural technology.

Currently, per capita production stagnates because most countries in the region still seem to insist on blanket or ideal recommendations, and few are held accountable for impacts (or the lack thereof). As a result, varieties are released but never multiplied or distributed. Fertilizer recommendations are offered, but the fact that few farmers apply them is ignored or blamed on the policy maker.

The glamour of crop improvement has been in crop breeding programs. Yet most changes in varieties are not offering significant improvements in average yields at least not without associated improvements in crop management. It is easy to find trial data that suggests otherwise. But it is difficult to confirm this in the broader estimates of farmers themselves of their productivity gains.

By inference, the main source of productivity gain has to come from improved crop management and soil fertility management in particular. Why are these gains so practically difficult to achieve? Possibly because the advice remains se 60 + kg of which is not available or extremely expensive (given 40% interest rates); or apply as much fertilizer as you can afford Agronomists still talk about applying 10 t of lime, as if this will miraculously appear at the farm gate. I understand that gains from legume rotations may be available in systems with good latent fertility. But it is less clear that these gains are significant in areas with degraded soils.

I expect this will be resolved in the longer run by strengthening markets for inputs, and markets for technology advice. As both sets of markets become more sophisticated, NARES may find themselves increasingly irrelevant.

The key problem of agricultural markets is high transaction costs. Many farmers in Tanzania receive 50% or less of the millgate price in Dar es Salaam. Yesterday, we found prices of Tsh1000/kg of maize and Tsk 2000/kg maize in 2 markets situated 25 km apart. These are extreme cases, but indicative of the severity of this problem.

We have an offer of US$750/t for groundnut in Europe. By the time this market reaches the farmer in outlying Malawi, or Zimbabwe, the farmgate price is only US$150/t. No company will produce or distribute the seed of varieties sought by European buyers. Sorting systems are too limited to assure aflatoxin control. Assembly costs are high because of the need to collect 5 t truckloads as opposed to 30 t truckloads. Cash payments are risky to manage. These are not problems to be solved by market information systems. Such logistical problems require increasing sophistication in building linkages between input supply, extension advice, assembly systems, grading systems, packaging, inventory control and pricing. The fellow who can solve these problems gets the $600/t margin between farmgate and European import price for groundnut.

There are undoubtedly examples of successful production of cash or export crops by smallholder farmers. But in my limited experience, most of these have been built on the basis of trader investment in input delivery and product assembly for a known market. Sometimes, an NGO helps. But the gain derives not from technologies chasing crops, but from crops chasing markets. It is almost a truism that if a market exists, farmers will invest in improved inputs and better crop management. Perhaps this is a truism that is not commonly enough tested.

But where does this leave the food insecure. Many will be working for those who produce cash crops. Many will derive income from non-farm enterprises. And many will remain dependent on well functioning food markets within the rural areas - capable of moving grain from surplus to deficit areas.

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My fear is that without an integrated and simultaneous onslaught on what is so called drivers and supporters anticipated economic growth might not occur and if it does might be permanently configured to follow a sup-optimal path. Increasingly development economists are resorting to the study of biological and organic processes of growth especially of perennial plants to develop insights on economic growth processes. The attraction here is the need for a balanced and dynamically changing diet of nutrients to sustain optimal growth of life forms.

1.2 Does smallholder agriculture represent a credible driver of growth in the forum countries?
I believe that smallholder agriculture is an important component of any economic development strategy for most African countries. For one it represent the most popular and most widespread economic activity under the present initial state of our economies. Is it capable of becoming the engine of growth driving economic development. I am skeptical and indeed uncomfortable with such a characterization and differentiation of economic activities. Smallholder agriculture is presently an important part of the economy and as such is partly to blame for the present state of economic underdevelopment and poverty. Indeed the whole economic system of which smallholder agriculture is a big part is at steady state equilibrium, albeit an undesirable equilibrium.To push the economy forward to a new and better preferred equilibrium, there is need for a significant "big push" shock that can cause a quantum leap forward landing the economic to a new state of equilibrium where higher levels of agricultural and economic production are sustained. Unfortunately any cosmetic uni-dimensional approaches such as focus on smallholder farm sector are akin to superficial scratching on the skin of an elephant which indeed might elicit a twinkling of the ear but would fail to change the direction and speed of its movement. A focus on smallholder farmers is unlikely to sustain smallholder agricultural development nor shift the whole economic system to a higher level of development. It might cause some positive perturbations that are likely to quickly die out restoring the whole economic system back to its original state of underdevelopment and poverty.

Zimbabwe is a good but not perfect case study on the complexities and limitations of pro-smallholder agricultural growth strategy. In 1980s, the government paid massive attention to Prof. Either and Staartz' so agricultural development movers (extension, technology, markets and prices) temporarily led to the rapid albeit miscued and less than efficient growth of smallholder agriculture and related agribusinesses. This development in the smallholder sector could not be sustained. Nor could it sustain growth development of the rest of the economy which started to progressively deteriorate rapidly under the negative drag of escalating fiscal imbalances caused in part by the socially desirable and economically justifiable subsidies to the smallholder farmers and the agricultural sector. These subsidies were directed to support the bloated public agricultural research and extension service, excessive and non sustainable input subsidies to peasant farmers, misguided food security subsidies to marketing boards, unaffordable excessive accumulations of unexportable stocks of grains beyond reasonable food security requirements. Smallholder agric failed to take off despite these support programs primarily because the rest of the economy could not provide the base for sustained agricultural growth.

Without a robust non-agricultural sector,government's successful smallholder agricultural support programs that were necessary to prop-up the sector were rendered infeasible and unsustainable. Agricultural research and extension component of the smallholder agric growth strategy also proved too costly and unsustainable.

LESSON: Smallholder agriculture alone is too poor and too under developed to be an effective driver for economic development. This does not mean that there must be limited emphasis on smallholder agric but that it must be part of a balanced integrated multi-faceted approach with particular attention on growth areas in the industrial sector, agribusiness value adding chains, service sector, tourism all geared up to generate positive feedback through employment creation and non farm income growth which is essential to sustain growth in domestic demand for food and agriculture. The pull forces of sustained demand and income growth would further create a stimuli for commercialization and dynamic autonomous restructuring and market-driven growth of the smallholder agricultural sector.

1.3 What can it achieve in low potential areas?
I have learnt to accept that not all of the current population in Zimbabwe's regions need to be practicing smallholder farming. Indeed low potential dry areas were ICRISAT is working may never become economically vibrant regions on the basis of mixed smallholder agriculture! They might discover that out migration of labor to RSA/UK offer better returns to family labor than dryland agriculture. As bulk of the younger generation continues to migrate to off farm (cross border) employment centers, their absence would relieve the regions of population pressure on farm size while their continued remittances would also make adoption of capital intensive irrigation and water harvesting technologies more feasible than at present. Once again the face of agriculture and prospect for rural economic growth in dryland low potential areas of Zimbabwe is likely to be shaped more by the dynamism of the competitive and complementary off farm employment sector than by any myopic and futile smallholder agricultural development strategy for dry and low potential area. If regional and cross border agricultural trade is developed, cheaper food would flow into these low potential areas sentencing local agriculture to death and liberating resources for other economic ventures better suited to dry non agricultural zones such as eco-tourism conservancies, wildlife ranching and safari hunting.

1.4 If it is not a credible driver of growth, what is its role in the future development of the forum countries?
Smallholder agriculture is not a credible driver but remains an essential component of any economic development strategy in Zimbabwe and all other FORUM countries of Southern Africa. But the role it might play during these early stages of development is not necessarily sustainable. Already we have witnessed here that as the economy develops, there is greater movement of family labor from peasant agriculture to the more productive economic sectors. Had this process continued I believe that the face of smallholder agriculture would have changed into "medium sized and highly productive" farms employing less of the family labor force and combining more efficiently more skilled component of family labor with capital intensive technologies to produce higher value agricultural commodities including maize produced at the right cost and sold at the right price - the opportunity cost price. Such higher prices for agricultural food and cash crops have been rendered infeasible by policy concerns about their implications on viability of subsidized and inefficient industry and food security of poorly remunerated working class.

If industry is restructured into a highly productive and international (at least regionally) competitive sector capable of supporting higher wages for workers in industry and commerce and for paying internationally competitive opportunity cost prices for the agricultural produce (cotton, sunflower and soybeans and maize) used in their processing plants, agriculture would be able to self sustain investment in capital intensive farming systems to boost its own productivity and competitive retain some of the outward bound agricultural labor force. That new agricultural sector of the future might have no bearing to the present form represented by low productivity semi-subsistence smallholder agriculture and the over sized and under managed commercial agricultural sector.

1.5 If smallholder agriculture is a credible driver of growth, what is constraining its ability to perform this role at present, and how can these constraints be overcome? What should be the roles of different actors in addressing these constraints? In particular, what can and should be expected of Agric Ministries?
This question is valid whether or not smallholder agriculture is indeed a credible driver of economic growth and development! The major constraint is that we lack appropriate development paradigms that neither glorifies smallholder agriculture as a panacea nor ostracize it as the antithesis of development. What is required for our part of the world is fresh start in thinking about development rather than the continuous panel-beating and reformulation of models that have consistently failed to work in Africa.Unfortunately I do not believe that this investment is forthcoming because we do not see eminent scientists on the subject converging to the hot spots to figure the development challenge from first hand experience.

African Ministries of Agriculture have so far demonstrated limited capacity to address strategic agricultural development issues and are often overwhelmed by management of crises of the day. African specialists have so far been given very limited opportunity and resources to put into practice their ideas on development of their countries and continent. African development has so far been driven by ideas and resources from outside the continent with disastrous results. I am not saying that we Africans already possess the knowledge that can prove right but arguing for equal opportunity to try out own ideas and models and equal opportunity to make our mistakes.

What can be done and what can be expected of our Ministries of Agric? The best that our Ministries of agriculture could do, resources permitting, is to pull together their limited budgetary resources and create regional agricultural development policy think tanks that can work full time in the quest for African solutions to the African agricultural and economic development crisis. Reliance on models designed from outside has obviously failed dismally over the past forty years and is unlikely to up with a workable solution in the next century.

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The following is extracted from the original proposal and contain the summary recommendations - I can send the full report to anyone who wants it. The entire proposals for a focused technology devt effort to increase the attractiveness of N-fixing grain legumes and crop diversification was eliminated, as, even more importantly, were the requirements for concurrent policy interventions. The donors will have to answer for themselves as to why they were so negative on these issues.

Improved maize seed and fertiliser is unquestionably needed to give the productivity boost necessary to lift Malawi from its present situation. However, as noted, there are disturbing signs of an unsustainable smallholder farming system as soils erode, the diversity of the farming system declines, and household diets become reliant on an inadequate supply of a single calorie rich crop. Maize/grain legume rotations (groundnuts and promiscuous soyabean) and, where livestock do not graze extensively after the maize harvest (as in the south of the country), maize/pigeonpea intercropping are the only other promising technologies that: (i) look to be at a stage suitable for large scale adoption, and (ii) are competitive with unfertilised local maize in terms of calories and cash, and, (iii) address, in part, the genuine concerns regarding sustainability, soil erosion, and soil degradation that form an important component of the discussion on Malawi smallholder agriculture.

This is not to discount the very many other, but local, options that should also be explored. Green manures, agroforestry, improved fallows, the expanded use of composts, improved household gardens all form a component of the matrix of better farming methods which should be encouraged in Malawi. But the widespread applicability of these efforts is compromised by the need for further testing, the absence of key components (such as widespread livestock ownership or adequate water supplies), or simply by their unsuitability for the situation in which most poor smallholders in Malawi find themselves.

With good leadership and organisation, it has been shown possible swiftly to develop area-specific recommendations for smallholder fertility management technologies. The achievement in producing area-specific fertiliser recommendations efficiently and with the use of existing resources is considerable. This experience should be built upon and expanded.

Preliminary results indicate that Tephrosia, Crotalaria and Mucuna, when undersown early, can produce significant amounts of biomass (> 2000 kg ha-1) when intercropped with maize at low-fertility sites in Malawi. Sole crop green manures on sandy soils can give substantial improvements in subsequent maize yields. There are data on the effect of residual fertiliser on the growth of legumes. These research and demonstration efforts involving green manures and other legumes should continue, but in the clear recognition that the time is not yet ripe for large-scale development efforts or policy reforms regarding their use. Future verification/demonstration work should have a greater component of farmer participation in the design and implementation of the effort.

It is practical to look, through joint ventures with donors and with private sector input suppliers, at making good quality farm management advice more readily available to those farmers already using modern inputs and to those whose efficiency can be readily improved so as to make the use of modern inputs profitable. The emphasis moves from making inputs "affordable" to making them profitable. It also moves from the diagnostic (typified by efforts in Farming Systems Research and various forms of rapid rural appraisal) and the prescriptive (from top down extension efforts to the training and visit (T+V) system favoured by the World Bank) to a problem solving format in which the farmer is actively involved. It provides a framework for effective research/extension linkages and facilitates the evolution of a demand driven technology development process by smallholders. Malawian farmers need to know how to blend and mix various technologies and management factors to suit their particular circumstances. This requires "decision tree" type guidance which is more complex to develop and deliver than the conventional message based extension.

The work leading up to the Starter Pack proposal has set a useful standard in the implementation of decision tree guided recommendations, and in the incorporation of basic farm management information (primarily prices of inputs and outputs) into advice given to smallholders. This promising start should be expanded and developed.

Required also is a policy environment which is conducive to the adoption of improved technologies. Farmers need reliable markets to buy inputs and other goods and to sell their produce, such as the promising grain legumes. These markets need to operate efficiently and consistently. Innovation is needed to create an appropriate market infrastructure and to bring into the market a greater proportion of those farmers currently excluded from it. This is more than simply liberalising markets. The low purchasing power of most Malawi smallholders, combined with the overall poverty of the country, means that more must and can be done to improve marketing services.

The technical interventions which have dominated the discussion in earlier sections of this paper need to be supported by short term economic and institutional measures that have an immediate impact, as well as longer term policies which address the underlying institutional and economic constraints to marketed maize and other crop production and access. One of the most promising ways to address this failure in terms of improving access to input and output markets is to look at the "interlocking" of finance, input supply and crop markets which might include: (i) the establishment of local commercial monopolies, (ii) the involvement of input suppliers (fertiliser importers or seed companies) and grain users (millers) in these commercial operations, (iii) support to small traders to enable them to trade actively in farm input and output markets, (iv) support to farmer organisations to enable them to participate more effectively in the market, (v)and the development of systems for inventory credit to allow farmers to hold maize and other crop stocks for longer periods after harvest so as to be able to benefit from higher prices later in the season.

The development of local market centers for fertiliser sales can, without a great leap of imagination, be expanded to incorporate better purchasing services for smallholder outputs. There needs to be active support to rural traders to enable them to service smallholders better. It is important to note that the value attributed to the grain legumes for the contribution they can make in slowing the decline in soil fertility in Malawi stems from an agronomic assessment of their role in smallholder cropping systems. However, farmers principally grow grain legumes for the immediate economic benefits which they can derive from so doing, and not, at least in the first instance, the soil fertility benefits. Consequently, in order to derive the greatest soil fertility benefit for the nation, it is absolutely vital that the economic benefits which farmers can derive from growing grain legumes be maximized.

Groundnuts are a crop which could readily be sold, at least regionally, for higher prices, if there was a reliable quality crop available. In the longer term, the overseas market for confectionery nuts might be regained. Soyabean and pigeonpea are probably less open to a quality premium. But processing could be done in country instead of exporting the raw material. There is a regional shortage of cooking oils and Malawi could be well placed to compete for this market. There appears already to be a significant trade in beans and pigeonpea.

Farmers need up to date, easily accessible information on prices and price trends. This information is currently available, but often late, in the major newspapers and some government publications. The adoption of new crops and technologies would be enhanced if regular market information was made available to smallholders, and they were assisted in making their cropping decisions based on this information.

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Although I have not adequately read the theme paper, I would still want to make the following contributions on the topic:
In Malawi, both the government, civil society (and donors?) agree that agriculture is the key sector that has both the direct and indirect impact on growth, poverty alleviation and the socio-economic development. The country's current Priority Framework for Agriculture (PFA) and the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (MPRSP) recognize that a strategic approach is needed for generating broad-based agricultural development as an engine for overall economic development.

However, while there is overwhelming agreement regarding the role of agriculture in growth, it is not clear how the current state of agriculture can act as a credible source of growth. Malawi's agriculture is predominantly small-scale, characterised by subsistence farmers who are poorly endowed with productive resources, they still use rudimentary tools and practices and over 70% of them cultivate on landholdings smaller than 1 ha. As a result they still produce primary commodities (non-tradable) which do not create viable backward and forward linkages with other sectors. Farmers' link to markets is curtailed by the lack of physical infrastructure such as roads, communication facilities and power. The agricultural priority framework for Malawi highlights a prioritized list of over 20 issues that constrain the development of smallholder agriculture. These range from lack of market development in both inputs and outputs to low labour productivity due to among other factors the HIV/AIDS p

Therefore is its current state, smallholder agriculture cannot be taken as a credible source of growth. However given its prominent role, growth resulting from other sources cannot be sustained if the smallholder sector's problems are not resolutely addressed. The sector still retains the role of being the springboard from which broad-based growth will emanate. It is highly unlikely that we can experience a structural transformation away from reliance on agriculture in the foreseeable future.

Among so many factors, the following are the major constraints that affect the development of smallholder agriculture as highlighted in a number of government documents:
- low access to inputs and agricultural finance
- inadequate market infrastructure and information systems
- low technology development and ineffective dissemination mechanisms
- insecure land tenure and management system
- declining soil fertility
- dependence on rainfed agriculture
- low institutional capacity at all levels to address the problems
- low labour productivity due to low profitability of agriculture
- declining labour endowment exacerbated by HIV/AIDS scourge

An implementation strategy for addressing most of these constraints has been put in place by the government. However oprationalization of the strategies has always been a problem due to lack of resources and capacity within government to take on such a huge task. For example the Ministry of Agriculture established, through support from the donors, the Malawi Agricultural Sector Investment Programme (MASIP) to coordinate all programs (be they from donors and other sources) within the agricultural sector as a way of avoiding duplication of efforts and to ensure efficient use of resources. But still, this requires a multi-sectoral approach since some of the major constraints are outside the control of the Ministry of Agriculture and the fact that government's role has been limited to providing a policy, legislative and institutional framework. Currently the civil society and NGOs have been working hand in hand with government to address some of these problems.

One of the critical issues regarding smallholder development is the land tenure issue. The government recognizes the limitations imposed by this tenure regime and instituted a land policy reform programme. Although the new land policy has been formulated, it appears it will take time before its implementation.Since this is one crucial step in ensuring a sustained development of the agricultural sector, there is need for government to iron out the outstanding issues in the policy (from the civil society point of view) for the speedy implementation of the policy.

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(i) what innovative long term mechanisms were proposed?
(ii) what were donors' rationale for making changes in the proposal?

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The outcome - an very innovative starter pack proposal which was pushed about by discussion with donors and some of the crucial elements removed - esp those which would have built up longer term market demand. Since then the African voice has got lost and the donors have taken over - turning it into a safety net (which is v. much second best), and ignoring the real development potential. I really don't think handing over enough inputs to fit into a shoe box (and plant 0.1ha) is handing out free goodies on anything like the scale is happening in other past and present programmes. Also look at Melinda Smale's studies - when a rich person is a villager with a change of clothes, where is the potential to buy themselves out of poverty???? They simply have to have some kind of stepping stone. The pack goes to everyone so who are you buying off??? Yes, lots of things need improving BUT it was a genuine African response to a crisis. It unequivocally eliminated the crisis and, if the African input had been nurtured and developed, could have opened a path to the kind of dialogue and discussion you are taking about.

The SP has many flaws - you have outlined some, no doubt many will cheerfully put me right on even more. But the process through which the SP came about was, in my experience in southern Africa, totally unique. It is the failure to understand this process and to build up, improve, and expand it that is missing. I know this is achievable as the SP process indicates. But without exception, all the extensive discussion on SP has totally ignored this central fact.

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Though a major constraint to all agric activity in Zambia, continues to be the very high interest rates. For the past 12 years, base rates have hovered around 40%. For seasonal cropping activity this is a non-starter. Until Government reins in its spending, which is fueled by internal borrowings on the treasury bill market, progress is going to remain pedestrian.

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In Malawi, so much has been invested in starter packs (and their successors) that it is difficult to see how the government and donors will ever emerge from the hole that they have dug for themselves. If starter packs are a safety net strategy, then they should be managed that way (e.g., fertiliser for work). If they are meant to stimulate demand for inputs, they have obviously failed and should be abandoned. And they hardly qualify as an extension tool, as each year is a last-minute rush to find enough seed of whatever type to assemble and give away. It would appear that the idea is spreading to Zambia and perhaps other countries. It is difficult to find someone who doesn't gain from starter packs. Governments are seen to be delivering goodies to their constituents; donors move huge chunks of their budget in a single step; NGOs have something to give away; and the rest of us have a wonderful subject to debate and do studies on.

Unless there is some commitment among donors and governments to map out a coherent policy for agricultural development, palliatives like starter packs will dominate the discussion. To make matters worse, we are led to believe that we either have to choose a "high input" or a "low input" path, when in fact elements of both are necessary. It is difficult to see building up the region's soils without a targeted, judicious use of chemical fertiliser, so efficient access to this input is required. Crop and varietal diversification is necessary, but this implies access to seed and planting material, requiring investment in sustainable seed systems. And all sorts of low-input technologies to build soil fertility and improve productivity offer real possibilities, but not by ignoring the fact that most such technologies are high-management and require considerable commitment on the part of the farmers.

The current situation features technology providers (national institutes, international centres, universities -- each with their own pet solutions) and NGOs (where many of the past or potential public agriculture staff now work -- dependent on donor largesse) struggling to interpret the constantly changing jargon and 'priorites' of a dozen major donors in order to develop acceptable projects. The result is a gaggle of unconnected, often competitive, and never fully evaluated agriculture projects. One would hope that Ministries of Agriculture could manage a healthy competition of ideas that contributed to the evolution of experience-based polices (e.g., how do we move in the next decade towards strategies that support farmers to build soil fertility on their farms?). Instead, government officials earn rents from sitting fees at endless stakeholder workshops; and donors, institutes and NGOs produce ever-glossier reports describing the solution of the month.

Unless donors are willing to make long-term commitments to working with each other and governments, in support of developing local capacities, then it is unlikely that official development assistance has anything to offer for the region's agricultural development.

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Smallholder Agriculture as a Driver for Growth?

We expected that this topic would generate quite a lot of contributions, as the role and potential of smallholder agriculture is often hotly disputed - and it is interesting to note how much of the first few days of the Politics, Policies, Governance and Accountability discussions have been about smallholder agriculture policies and their impacts.

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