

World Governance Survey Discussion Paper 6
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GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNANCE IN 16 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

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Introduction

Assessing Governance

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has stated that ‘good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.’² If governance matters, so does the need for more reliable and valid data on key governance processes. Many analysts believe, however, that current indicators provide inadequate measures of key governance processes. Based on the perceptions of experts within each country, governance assessments were undertaken in 16 developing and transitional societies, representing 51 per cent of the world’s population. The aim of the World Governance Survey (WGS) was to generate new, systematic data on governance processes.

To facilitate cohesive data collection and analysis, the governance realm was disaggregated into six arenas:

- (i) Civil Society, or the way citizens become aware of and raise political issues;
- (ii) Political Society, or the way societal interests are aggregated in politics;
- (iii) Executive, or the rules for stewardship of the system as a whole;
- (iv) Bureaucracy, or the rules guiding how policies are implemented;
- (v) Economic Society, or how state-market relations are structured; and,
- (vi) Judiciary, or the rules for how disputes are settled.

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The project identified 30 indicators based on widely held ‘principles’ of good governance – participation, fairness, decency, accountability, transparency and efficiency – with five indicators in each arena.

In each country, a national coordinator selected a small panel of experts – c35-40 well-informed-persons (WIPs) to complete the assessment. The panel included, amongst others, government officials, parliamentarians, entrepreneurs, researchers, NGO representatives, lawyers and civil servants. Respondents were asked to rank each answer on a scale from 1 to 5; the higher the score, the better. In addition, respondents were invited to provide qualitative comments. The total governance scores have a very robust correlation (0.77) with the country scores in Kaufmann et al’s aggregate governance indicators, indicating the validity of the results.³ Previous discussion papers looked at the issues of *Governance and Development*⁴ and *Assessing Governance: Methodological Challenges*⁵. This paper focuses on the government or executive arena.

Issues in the Government Arena

The essence of governance is the way that state-society relations are being structured and managed. Managing a regime successfully has a lot to do with how citizens perceive the rules that guide their interaction with public officials. Much of this regime assessment takes place in the context of both policy aggregation and implementation, the latter being the subject of Working Paper Seven. Equally much, however, occurs in the context of how well the government deals with broader underlying issues that transcend specific policies. Is the regime so structured that citizens experience that government cares about their welfare and security, whether individual or collective? This is the basic question guiding our assessment of governance in the government arena.

² Kofi Annan, *Partnerships for Global Community: Annual Report on the Work of the Organisation* (UN, 1998).

³ Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, ‘Governance Matters II: Updated Indicators for 2000/01’, *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2772*, 2002.

⁴ Goran Hyden and Julius Court, 2002, *Governance and Development, World Governance Survey Discussion Paper 1*, Tokyo: UNU.

⁵ Julius Court, Goran Hyden and Kenneth Mease, 2002, *Assessing Governance: Methodological Challenges, World Governance Survey Discussion Paper 2*, Tokyo: UNU.

It may be helpful to spell out the way that we use the key concepts that are relevant to the discussion in this paper. The notion of ‘state’ refers here to all institutions that make up the public sector. It encompasses all public officers – elected or appointed – with a responsibility for implementing policy or, as in the case of police and judges, enforcing and adjudicating laws. It excludes those elected officials with purely representative functions such as lawmakers. “Government” is typically defined with reference to both elected and appointed officials serving in core institutions at national, provincial, county or city level. In this paper, we refer to all appointed public servants as being part of the ‘bureaucracy’, while confining the term ‘government’ to only those with overall political responsibility for setting policy and making key appointments to the public service. In many countries they would be referred to as cabinet ministers. They are responsible for the executive dimension, the term we introduced in Chapter One. It is the rules that guide the behavior and actions of these officials that concern us in this paper.

More than anybody else, government officials, as defined above, are responsible for words and action that influence the developmental direction of society. The decisions that they have to make are not merely in immediate response to demands from groups in society. Government does not only revolve around the aggregation of interests, values and preferences that come up via different channels to the executive level. It also implies transformative decisions that involve choices going beyond specific interests or preferences. For instance, this may sometimes mean making decisions that go against particular interests but are viewed as necessary in order to protect what members of the government view as a larger ‘public’ or ‘national’ interest. The readiness and ability to make such ‘hard’ choices is very much a product of the ways the polity is institutionalized. The rules of the political game vary from country to country in terms of how they affect government capability in this regard.

The first section of this paper will discuss the principal governance issues as they relate to the government arena, drawing on relevant literature. This discussion is meant to provide a background sketch to help the reader better understand the choice of indicators used in this project. The second part will analyze the aggregate findings of our survey and discuss the differences between the high, medium, and low governance performers. The third section is devoted to a discussion of each individual indicator to probe further some of the more

specific issues relating to each one. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of the findings with regard to this arena.

Governance Issues in the Government Arena

What is now referred to as Western Europe was for a long time the laboratory for social and political experimentation. Philosophers in France, Britain and Germany pioneered ideas that guided new forms of political development. Montesquieu heralded the idea of separation of power between the various branches of government. Rousseau's principal message was the sovereignty of the people. Locke advocated the social contract between rulers and ruled. Hegel, and later Marx, pursued the notion that development is the product of opposing social forces. These ideas were both causes and consequences of political crises. They reflected the violent nature of European history over many centuries. They were meant to provide hope for peace and development, but often ended up causing more misery and violence. Europeans have not given up on experimenting, as the European Union project indicates, but it is significant that since the end of the Second World War, which caused so much damage to their countries, they have turned their attention to modifying inter-state relations rather than the transformation of individual nation-states.

The frontier of political and social experimentation moved instead to the post-colonial world or what we call here developing societies. Over the past fifty years or so, we have witnessed an extensive experimentation with political systems aimed at finding ways of accelerating economic and social development. Bold but also risky steps have been taken in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to attempt catching up with the West and often, in the process, transform these societies in a completely new direction. Much of what guides discourse on governance and development today draws its inspiration from these experiences. With specific reference to the issues that are relevant for this paper, we like to review three sets of literature: (1) the nature of the state, (2) the search for a truly 'public' interest, and (3) the relations between civil and military authorities. All three subjects bear directly on the issue of how we see governments providing for security and development.

Nature of the State

We are not concerned in this paper with state capacity. Nor do we focus on the question of what role the state should play in the economy. These issues are discussed in the next two Working Papers. What interests us is the view of what the state ought to be in relation to society. This is relevant because government ministers have a decisive influence on how the state should interact with society and realize such goals as 'peace' and 'development'.

This search for reigning ideas about the nature of the state is relevant to the current governance debate. Much of what has been on the agenda in the past is today being dismissed as irrelevant. We believe, however, that there are some issues that were important in the 1960s and 1970s that are still very valid. One of them is the extent to which the state enjoys autonomy vis-à-vis society.

This issue was very much at the forefront of the discourse on development in earlier decades. Nationalist leaders in Africa and Asia having gained independence by defeating their colonial masters came to power with a great sense of being capable of making history of their own. It is no coincidence that the literature on socialist revolution by Marx, Lenin, and Mao Zedong became important sources of inspiration for others in the developing world. All three provided arguments that supported the notion that the post-colonial era provided a unique political opportunity for reversing the trend toward capitalist hegemony.

Development, in this perspective, was not merely a matter of achieving incremental change. It was a grand project aimed at providing citizens with all the values that they had been denied in the past. Little attention was paid to whether the means to realize this grand vision existed. Were the historical conditions really present? Was the revolutionary consciousness or will of the elite adequately developed? Were the masses ready to be mobilized for a full transformation of not only society at large but also their own individual livelihoods? To so many nationalist leaders in the developing regions of the world, the ends of the revolution were beyond question. Whichever ways these ends were sought could be justified.

Their view of the executive dimension – whether identified with a single ruling party’s *politbureau* or with a strong central government – was that it has a moral responsibility to take the lead for the rest of society. As happened, for instance, in much of Africa, nationalist leaders expected total deference to their own vision of the national development project. Any opposition to it was tantamount to treason. The role that ideology played in shaping the post-colonial world has been little studied, because the most common assumption among academics was that ‘objective’ structural conditions were more important.⁶ What actually happened in most of these societies is best described as a ‘disjuncture’ between the objective conditions, on the one hand, and the subjective will of the political leadership, on the other. The latter acted as if there were no structural limitations, while history soon spun a web of tight threads around them. Hyden has described this contradiction by calling attention to the lack of control that the political leadership had over social forces⁷ and to the problems of ignoring the historical conditions prevailing in African countries⁸.

This form of analysis draws attention to the significance of state power as potentially a positive and negative factor in development. What difference can an ideologically ambitious political leadership really make? The answers to this question have been sought along two separate lines. One has been that objective conditions set definite limits to what can be accomplished. Another has given more significance to human agency, assuming that it can make a positive difference.

The latter position was evident in the influential writings on political development that followed in the wake of the efforts in the 1960s to create a structural-functionalist framework for the analysis of politics⁹. This position has also been constantly present in the writings of Charles Tilly¹⁰ who sees significant political change as the result of purposive

⁶ An exception is Crawford Young’s book, *Ideology and Development in Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press 1982.

⁷ Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry*. London: Heinemann Educational Books 1980 and Berkeley: University of California Press 1980.

⁸ Goran Hyden, *No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective*. London: Heinemann Educational Books 1983 and Berkeley: University of California Press 1983.

⁹ The landmark contribution was the book edited by Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, *Politics of Developing Areas*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1960. It was followed in the 1960s by a series of edited volumes devoted to a particular set of variables meant to correlate and explain political development.

¹⁰ See, e.g. Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975.

action by ideologically committed political leaders. For him – and others like Ted Gurr¹¹ - possibilities for changing governance arrangements occur as a result of underlying social changes, which the political leadership can exploit. For instance, in Gurr's case, such an opportunity arises because of growing social deprivation in key segments of the population.

Others have been more circumspect when it comes to attributing positive outcomes to human agency. Even if we ignore the economic determinism embraced by orthodox Marxists, there are a significant group of academic writers who stress the significance of 'objective' conditions setting limits to what can be achieved. Foremost among them is Barrington Moore who has devoted much of his professional career to explaining why men – and women – endure violence and repression. His most important book – *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*¹² - sees class relations, notably those between lords and peasants, as key factors in the making of the modern world. In so doing, he acknowledges the role that repressive violence plays in sustaining or failing to sustain state power. In a subsequent book¹³, less heralded than the first but still important in this context, Moore points to the role that ideology and culture play in forming and reproducing cultures of compliance. His ideas have been influential in shaping the argument of others, including Theda Skocpol, one of his students. In her work¹⁴, she questions the extent to which self-declared revolutionaries really achieve what they set out to do. She focuses her explanation on the structural crises that inevitably occur in society and produce the structurally determined opportunities for social and political change. Eric Hobsbawm echoes her argument when he maintains that what determines the possibilities for revolutionary action are idiosyncratic factors in a given situation¹⁵. In other words, a revolutionary political process cannot be easily modeled.

This brief review of the literature tells us that members of the political leadership – the actors in the government arena – are far from being free agents. Even if they wish to

¹¹ Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970.

¹² Barrington Moore Jr., *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press 1966.

¹³ Barrington Moore Jr., *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt*. White Plains NY: M.E. Sharpe 1978.

¹⁴ See, notably, Theda Skocpol, *States and Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979.

¹⁵ Eric J. Hobsbawm, "Revolution", paper presented at the XIVth International Congress of Historical Sciences, San Francisco, August 1975, cited by John Dunn, *Rethinking Modern Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985, p. 76.

dramatically improve the circumstances for the people, their opportunities for doing so are few and far in-between. More typical is the situation in which their hands are tied and they will have to settle for something much less than transformative action. This doesn't necessarily mean that political leaders typically fail in legitimizing their regime. It indicates, however, that a political regime that gives too much autonomy to government may suffer backlash.

Defining the Public Interest

This takes us to the second issue of importance here: how to find an acceptable way of defining the public interest. In theory, it is easy for a government to define the public interest for its citizens. It is more politically complicated to do so, however, if citizens are allowed to have an input into this exercise. Process complicates things and inevitably raises a fundamental issue in political theory: how can the tension between substance and procedure be most suitably resolved?

One of the real challenges to sustaining democracy is to give roughly equal dignity to every expression of preference in the public arena. While every dollar carries equal value in the marketplace – whether it is spent by the most careless or the most careful consumer – in democracy political procedures impose a necessary arbitrariness of choice. As Kenneth Arrow pointed out long time ago, even if all preferences are admitted to the democratic aggregation 'game', there is no single objective rule by which they could in fact be aggregated¹⁶. Whether we choose majoritarian or proportional rules for aggregating private preferences, we will fail to identify the one and only 'will of the people' or its collective preference. Even if there were an objective or unobjectionable aggregation rule, it could not rule out the possibility that individuals, for example, would misrepresent their preferences for tactical reasons in order to ensure at least a sub-optimal gain¹⁷.

Representative democracy is minimalist in the sense that it requires relatively little of those involved. It asks of citizens only to cast their vote. It requires of political leaders only their

¹⁶ Kenneth J. Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values*. New York: Wiley 1963.

ability to bargain so as to arrive at an acceptable outcome. In this respect, democracy produces at best sub-optimal results. To some observers that is good enough. Democracy is about both giving and taking. Bargaining and compromising are at the bottom of a functioning democracy. Others, however, believe that this model of democracy is inadequate because it presupposes that each actor is an autonomous agent trying to maximize his or her own self-interest. This model fosters neither civic competence, nor a valid notion of the common or public good¹⁸.

Deliberative democracy is different from representative democracy in that it presupposes a more demanding and complex system for arriving at what constitutes a public conception of a common good. Only those preferences that come out of special efforts such as self-examination, reflection, and deliberation deserve to be considered. The public good, in other words, is not merely the outcome of a mechanical aggregation of individual interests. What counts even more is how seriously a citizen or a group of them have weighed a preferred option against those of others¹⁹. Even though this is a process that carries its own costs, careful and informed deliberations are believed to strengthen regime legitimacy.

Many politicians are inclined to avoid deliberation because it often undermines promises that they have made to the public. The issue has taken on special significance in developing countries faced with the demand to cut public expenses and treat issues in a longer-term economic perspective. For instance, Indonesia's president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, recently spoke of her determination to maintain cuts in fuel, electricity and telephone subsidies despite public protests. More specifically she said: "I chose an unpopular but constructive policy for the long run, rather than opting for a populist step that may trouble us further". Less than a week later, however, she had changed her position and reinstated many of the subsidies²⁰. The challenge that President Sukarnoputri and so many other leaders in developing societies face is how to reconcile public participation in expressing preferences with the need for solution to a given policy problem that is not just a 'knee-jerk' response

¹⁷ For a discussion of this set of issues, as they affect modern democracy, see Claus Offe, "Micro-Aspects of Democratic Theory: What Makes for Deliberative Competence of Citizens?" in Axel Hadenius (ed.), *Democracy's Victory and Crisis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997, pp 81-104.

¹⁸ See, e.g. Jon Elster, *Deliberative Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998.

¹⁹ See, e.g. John Dryzek, *Discursive Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990; also, Jules L. Coleman and John Ferejohn, "Democracy and Social Choice", *Ethics*, No 97 (1998), pp 6-25.

²⁰ "All the Spine of a Jellyfish", *The Economist*, Vol 366, No 8308 (January 25-31, 2003), p. 42.

to public pressure but based on reasoning that transcends specific group interests and serve a country's development in the longer term. Perhaps no one has discussed the constitutional and governance implications of this challenge with greater sensitivity to the realities of developing societies than the late Carlos Santiago Nino, an Argentine human rights lawyer and advisor, who was a strong advocate of inter-subjective means of establishing principles and policies guiding the public²¹. For governments around the world, defining the public interest in ways that balance substance with procedure continues to be a governance challenge with consequences for the public perception of the legitimacy of the regime.

Civil-Military Relations

Governments in developing societies have often been described as powerful and overbearing when it comes to managing development. The paradox, however, is that the problem is more often the opposite. Samuel Huntington emphasized this point already some thirty-five years ago when he noted that the main distinction between states lies not in their type of government, but in the degree to which the government really governs²². With specific reference to African countries, Aristide Zolberg argued along similar lines when he stated: "The major problem is not too much authority, but too little"²³.

Many authors have followed in the footsteps of these statements about the problematic nature of political institutions in developing societies. States have been variably described as "soft"²⁴ or "weak"²⁵. It is in this institutional context that the role of the military in politics has acquired a special interest. In the 1960s and 1970s, the problems associated with lack of institutional capacity at the state level made the military look as the best equipped institution to rule. It was viewed as a corporate entity with strong discipline and, therefore, less inclination to engage in nepotistic or corrupt behavior. Retaining this image

²¹ See Carlos Santiago Nino, *The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press 1996.

²² Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press 1968.

²³ Aristide Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1969, p. x.

²⁴ Gunnar Myrdal with reference to Asian countries. See his *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*. New York: Pantheon Press 1968.

²⁵ See e.g. Joel Migdal, *Weak States and Strong Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1988; with specific reference to Africa, see Robert H. Jackson and Carl Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press 1982.

and behavior, however, proved much more difficult once the military officers took over the reins of civilian government. Their ranks were quickly politicized. Divisions sprang up and their effectiveness in implementing policy did not live up to popular expectation. Their tendency to rule in an authoritarian fashion, often relying on repressive methods, added to the growth of public disillusion with the military in power.

The experience of the military in power differs from one region to another. In Asian countries, the military has had an important role in both economy and politics without necessarily ruling alone. In South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, the military has played a positive role in building the economy. For example, in several of these countries the military has exercised control over government-run public sector firms. At the same time, however, the military in Asian countries has been reluctant to extend political rights to citizens and accept full accountability to a civilian government. In this respect, the military in Asia has differed from its counterparts in Latin American countries. Although the military continues to be a key institution, since the 1980s the military in Latin American countries have returned to the barracks and transferred power to civilian elected leaders. The pattern in African countries is again different in that military rule never led to greater political stability there. One military regime often succeeded another, because of disagreements within the officer ranks. Thus, a succession of military coups has occurred in a good number of countries, e.g. Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda.

The military record in power has nowhere been such that it has given this type of regime lasting legitimacy. Even in Asian countries, the military has found itself on a political retreat. Many officers realize that the costs of being involved in running the affairs of civilian government exceed the benefits of being in power. The general trend more recently toward democratic governance has reinforced this orientation. Thus, nowadays there is greater agreement between civilian and military authorities regarding the desirability of the latter remaining primarily a professional corps with ultimate accountability to a civilian government. This principle seems to apply regardless of whether the civilian form of governance is democratic or not. This doesn't necessarily mean that political development today is more institutionalized than before. Uncertainty continues to affect civil-military relations in some countries. Even where these were constitutionalized in a 'pact' at the time the military handed over power to civilian rulers, these relations are more like a truce than a

treaty²⁶. The ongoing political tensions in Venezuela and civil and political violence in neighboring Colombia are cases in point. What is new in the present situation around the world is that attempts by the military to intervene in civilian politics tend to have repercussions beyond the boundaries of a single country. It causes enough uncertainty and anxiety in neighboring countries for governments to mobilize their own military to protect their territorial borders from incursions by soldiers or displaced people. The notion that democratic countries don't engage in war with each other may be accurate if confined to established democracies. It is yet to be established as a principle applied to countries still in the process of democratizing. These 'diminished sub-types' of democracy²⁷ lack some of the qualities that are requisites of democracies for which attacking another democratic neighbor would be taboo.

The Government Arena: The Aggregate WGS Findings

The five indicators used in the World Governance Survey are drawn from the concerns expressed in the literature reviewed above. They have been constructed in order to indicate how well government in a particular political system is set to make big or transformative decisions on issues that affect the citizenry at large. This is a quality of the regime that can make a huge difference at critical junctures in development. The five specific indicators used here are:

1. Ensuring Freedom from Fear. This indicator is meant to probe the extent to which governments promote rules that reduce the threat to personal security;
2. Ensuring Freedom from Want. This indicator aims at highlighting how far governments show interest in promoting social and economic rights;
3. Readiness to Make Tough Decisions. This indicator is expected to assess how far rules enable governments to make decisions with the long-term interest of the country in mind as opposed to being driven by populist and short-term demands;
4. Political-Military Relations. This indicator is assessing the extent to which the military is subject to civilian control and largely confined to its professional role;

²⁶ For a discussion of 'pacting' between outgoing and incoming rulers, see e.g. Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*. New York: Cambridge University Press 1991.

²⁷ The notion of 'diminished sub-types' of democracy comes from an article by David Collier and Steven Levitsky, 'Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research', *World Politics*, vol 49, no 3 (April 1997), pp. 430-51.

5. Attitude to Peace. This indicator is meant to measure how seriously government takes its task of reducing the risk of violence or war within its territorial boundaries as well as with neighboring countries.

These five indicators are important for any effort at sustainable development. The first focuses on the importance of *personal security*, a quality that citizens expect governments to be largely responsible for. The second relates to another key function that governments have typically been asked to oversee and development – *social welfare*. The third refers to the role that government plays in defending and promoting the *national interest* as seen in a developmental perspective. The fourth speaks to the issue of *civilian control* of the military. The fifth, finally, refers to the ability of government to maintain *peace*. These are all issues that cut across specific demands that individuals or groups may make in society. They speak to a regime quality that in many respects is systemic, yet very much conceived as stemming from how well government is doing its job. It is our belief that the best way of assessing the governance quality of this arena is to focus on the ‘big’ issues that affect not specific groups but every one in society.

Differences Between Countries

As we have done in the previous two Working Papers, we will begin our analysis by looking at the aggregate arena score for each country. We also follow the same distinction between high, medium, and low performers.

Table 1. Aggregate executive arena scores by country.

Country	Personal Security	Social Welfare	National Interest	Civilian Control	Peace	Average
High scoring countries						
Chile	3.70	3.63	2.87	3.20	4.20	3.52
India	3.00	2.81	2.35	4.67	3.69	3.30
Jordan	3.93	3.13	3.13	3.98	4.13	3.66
Mongolia	2.77	2.82	2.67	3.04	3.54	2.97
Tanzania	3.15	2.95	3.05	3.97	3.24	3.27
Thailand	3.10	3.29	2.99	3.66	3.66	3.34
Medium scoring countries						
Argentina	2.69	2.66	2.40	4.23	3.89	3.17
Bulgaria	2.12	1.95	2.90	3.44	3.46	2.77
China	2.79	2.85	2.88	3.36	2.97	2.97
Indonesia	1.94	2.17	2.31	3.09	2.74	2.45
Peru	3.03	2.64	2.51	2.97	3.38	2.91
Low scoring countries						
Kyrgyzstan	2.49	2.44	2.85	3.31	3.85	2.99
Pakistan	2.27	2.09	2.24	1.33	2.48	2.08
Philippines	2.37	2.00	2.00	3.34	1.97	2.34
Russia	2.18	2.16	3.24	3.63	2.74	2.79
Togo	2.43	1.79	2.07	1.75	2.71	2.15
Average	2.75	2.59	2.65	3.31	3.29	2.92

There are a few scores that immediately catch the eye. One is the generally high score for civilian control of the military. Only Pakistan and Togo, both countries where the military was – and still is – in power have a really low score on this indicator. With those exceptions, all countries have a score, which indicates that the military is generally ready to accept civilian control. Even countries that otherwise do not have a high score, e.g. the Philippines and Russia, come out quite favorably on this indicator.

Another noticeable thing about this table is the quite high score for the peace variable. While governments are not necessarily seen as very good at providing for personal security, they do have a better record in keeping peace within their territorial boundaries as well as with their neighbors. Not surprisingly, given the conflicts between government and rebel forces on the island of Mindanao, the Philippines is the worst performer with regard to this indicator.

Generally speaking, governments seem to do better with regard to maintaining law and order than development. To be sure, there is some significant variation with respect to personal security. For instance, government in Indonesia in 2000 was not viewed as being very capable of providing for personal security, an opinion that is not very surprising given the uncertainty and increased violence surrounding the transition from the Suharto regime. It is worth noting that ex-Communist countries, notably Bulgaria and Russia, also scored relatively low on this variable. There is no evidence that form of government plays a major role with regard to ability to guarantee personal security. The views of our WIPs coincide regardless of regime type. It is quite high in democratic countries like Chile, India and Peru, but noticeably high also in Jordan, a Muslim country where monarchy is generally more influential than parliament. Other high scoring countries include Tanzania and Thailand, both of which have governments that are democratically elected but not foreign to autocratic rule.

The lowest score of all is recorded for the social welfare indicator. It reflects the problems governments have encountered in the past decade in meeting popular expectations with regard to access to health care and education. While these services used to be free of charge, in the 1980s and certainly by the 1990s, they were available only at some cost to each household. The high scoring countries generally do well on this indicator but outside that group it is only one country – China – where the opinion of government performance with regard to this variable is at the same level. Countries that have undergone structural adjustment programs are foremost among those with a low score.

Government ability to make long-term decisions in the national interest is also called into question in many countries. Although it is not clear that countries with democratic forms of governance necessarily fare worse than others, it is interesting that countries like Argentina,

Chile, India and Peru on this particular indicator score lower than countries with forms of government that are less democratic, for instance, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tanzania.

One country stands out more than any other in this arena and that is Jordan. Its high governance score in this arena must be viewed in the context of the tensions that exist in the Middle East. There is a general sense that the Hashemite monarchy has successfully guarded the Jordanians from many of the calamities that have afflicted other peoples in the region, notably the Palestinians. The widespread and great appreciation of governance in the government arena in Jordan, therefore, should not come as a big surprise.

If we compare the aggregate scores for each category of country, there is no real surprise. Compared to the average scores for political society, they are considerably higher for this arena. It applies especially to the high and low scoring categories.

Table 2. Mean scores on government arena indicators by groups of countries.

Category of countries	Mean score
High scoring	3.34
Medium scoring	2.85
Low scoring	2.53


It may be a surprise that the scores for this arena are so much higher given that government in developing countries has been forced to contract its involvement in the development process. These scores, however, conceal the fact that there is quite a lot of variation on the five indicators for this arena. A closer examination of each indicator, therefore, will tell us more about the specific governance features of the government arena.

Changes Over Time

Compared to both the civil and political society arenas, the changes over time here are quite modest. There is much greater continuity or stability in the government arena. To the extent that there is a difference, it is in the form of a slight improvement, although the single

biggest change is negative – in the Philippines. The specifics for each country are contained in Figure 1 below:

Figure 1. Changes over time in WGS scores by country.



Improvements and declines are also more scattered in this arena than in the others. Although all countries in the medium-scoring category, with the exception of one, have recorded improvement, there is noticeable variation in the other two groups. The declines in Kyrgyzstan and the Philippines can be explained by the growing inability of government to provide personal security and peace. The recorded declines in India and Tanzania are in part for the same reason, but also more influenced by the perceived sense that government is unable to secure freedom from want.

The improvement recorded for Chile is very much related to the ability of the civilian rulers to increase their control of the military, while in Russia it is related to the role that President Putin is playing in enhancing security. Although his record is not impeccable, compared to that of his predecessor, Yeltsin, he looks better in the eyes of our Russian respondents. The change to the better in Peru is explained both by the ability of the Fujimori Government to eliminate the threat of the Shining Path movement and, somewhat paradoxically, the

removal of the man in charge of the security services of the country – Valdomiro Montesinos.

A final comment on these scores is that the government arena was not a key place for change in countries like Indonesia or Mongolia, which have undergone significant political reforms, but where the changes over time are more noticeable in other arenas.

Analysis of Individual Indicators

As we have indicated above, each of the five arena indicators here refers to how the regime is structured in order to deal with issues that are cross-cutting and quite fundamental to the security and welfare of the citizenry and, thus, their sense of how well their government is able to protect and promote their common interests. The discussion of each indicator below draws on the statistical data already provided as well as qualitative comments provided by our respondents.

Personal Security

This indicator is included in our survey because it refers to a fundamental aspect of how governance relates to development. Freedom from fear is a basic human right that is referred to in Articles 3-5 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is also stated in no uncertain terms as a right in the Convention Against Torture. Government's ability to provide personal security, however, is not easy, especially in societies undergoing rapid social change or suffering from economic crisis.

This is being confirmed in our study. A few country cases deserve special attention to highlight these findings. The first is Jordan, which scores higher than any other country (3.93) on this indicator. Its high score reflects a widespread belief among our respondents that the government really pays special attention to both public safety and security in accordance with the principles of the religion of Islam. There has been no real change over the past five years, suggesting that the religious principles underpinning government action with regard to securing freedom from fear are firmly in place. Comments by individual

respondents indicate that the fact that government policy on this issue is in tune with the principles that the majority of the country's population share helps to earn it this high score.

Mongolia stands in contrast to Jordan. Both are among the high performers, but Mongolia's score on this indicator is considerably below that of the other countries in this category (2.77). A major reason for this discrepancy is the extent to which Mongolian respondents have focused on the prevalence of domestic violence in the country. It is not necessarily more common than anywhere else, but it has acquired special attention in recent years in Mongolia, because of widespread reporting of women being victimized by their men folk, especially their husbands. This kind of behavior contradicts the culture of gender equality that was developed during Communist days and most Mongolians continue to wish to defend. The fact that many Mongolians are nomads and the country is large may be an exacerbating factor.

It is generally true that countries with some tradition of democratic governance tend to score higher than those without such a legacy. For instance, Chile, India, Peru, and Thailand all fall in this category. There are, however, also exceptions. Both Argentina and the Philippines – countries with tradition of democratic governance – score quite low on this indicator. Respondents recognize that there has been a decline in the ability of government to provide personal security as a result of corruption and other manifestations of a 'soft' state. Respondents in the Philippines suggested that it was possible in 2000 to get away with murder as long as one had the right political connections. This, they argued, was a marked deterioration from the situation five years earlier. Similar sentiments were expressed by respondents in Russia, who noted the presence of a local 'mafia' as a growing threat to personal security. They suggested that government was still in need of showing that it could contain these threats to citizens around the country.

That doubts about government ability to protect citizens from fear for their life were expressed in countries like Indonesia and Bulgaria may be less surprising given the political transition there and the uncertainty that it tended to generate in the minds of the people. It is important to note here that although our respondents were all members of the elite, they empathized with the situation of the poorer segments of the population and the threats they are exposed to. Although in most countries, there has been no significant deterioration with

regard to how our respondents perceive the level of personal security, the qualitative comments that we received clearly indicate an ongoing and genuine concern about the ability of governments to enhance their freedom from fear.

Social Welfare

This indicator refers to the ability of governments to ensure freedom from want. As such, it comments on the extent to which citizens are able to benefit from the promotion of social and economic rights, as reflected in Articles 23-25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the various paragraphs of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Governments vary in their commitment and capacity to satisfy citizen demands for a better life. Different categories of people also differ in terms of their expectations of what governments should be doing on their behalf. Our findings suggest that citizens do expect governments to care about their social and economic needs, but not to the extent that an earlier generation did. For instance, the ‘revolution of rising expectations’ that Huntington saw as a threat to political development and stability in the latter part of the 1960s seems to have faded away²⁸. There are those among our respondents who make it very explicit that they believe government should not be concerned with securing social or economic rights. It should stay out of development and be concerned only with securing order and justice.

At the same time, we sense that to the extent that development is being approached from a rights rather than a needs perspective, popular expectations and demands on government to secure acceptable livelihoods for all certainly stay alive. The scores on this indicator across countries should be viewed against this background. We want to make the following more specific comments.

The first is that the government role in securing adequate livelihoods for people is most widely appreciated in the more developed countries, notably Chile and Thailand. To be sure, there are those in Chile who accept that government has been more responsible for growth than redistribution of the benefits of economic development, but in both places

²⁸ Huntington, “Political Order...” *op.cit.*

there is a sense that government is improving its role in securing freedom from want. Given budgetary limitations in the light of structural adjustment of the economy in a neo-liberal direction, government may not be involved directly to the same extent as in the past, but new partnerships with private and voluntary agencies are seen as important initiatives to improve the living conditions for the poorer segments of the population.

Countries scoring low on this indicator tend to be those that had a strong government involvement in the development sector in the past. This applies especially to former communist and socialist regimes. Thus, it is not a coincidence that the sense of disappointment, bordering on cynicism, is particularly noticeable in Bulgaria and Russia, where the transition from communism to capitalism has created opportunities for widespread abuse of power. This sentiment is present also in Kyrgyzstan and Tanzania – two other countries with a socialist legacy – but less pronounced. Pakistan and the Philippines also have rather low scores on this indicator, but the reason in those two places is different. Our respondents make it clear that corruption has undermined belief in the government's interest in caring about citizens' welfare.

Another comment that cuts across countries in our sample refers to the gap between government rhetoric and practice. Several of our Indonesian respondents made a point of arguing that during the Suharto regime, there was political repression but also progress on both the economic and social fronts. Following his resignation and the arrival of a new regime with high aspirations, the political language in 2000 was 'correct', but there was very little evidence that the promises that politicians were making could be realized.

Respondents in some countries stressed that the government's role in securing freedom from want for all citizens require institutional reform. Mongolians were making references to the need for strengthening local government, a point that was echoed also in comments from Russia and Tanzania. A strongly centralized government, especially in large countries, lacks the outreach that makes it sensitive to local concerns. It tends to act in more general terms with little understanding of the variations that exist in living conditions for different groups of people. Even though it may have good intentions, it fails because it acts too much

according to a blueprint instead of in response to real-life variations in people's circumstances²⁹.

National Interest

Government often has to make tough decisions that are unpopular or go against a majority opinion. This is particularly true in countries that are resource-scarce or undergo crisis. In an era of structural adjustment, this has become a real political issue. How well equipped is the regime to handle hard prioritizing that sets short-term gains in opposition to longer term necessities? Government is ultimately the only agency capable of resolving this dilemma.

Our respondents recognize the significance of this indicator. With growing interest in making development more sustainable, persons concerned with the way their country is governed are more aware of how government policy makes a difference also in the long run. "Development has become more demanding and difficult" is how one respondent in Argentina expressed it. The various conditions that are being placed on what development option is selected and what the potential implications might be of such a choice have raised the ante for the government.

No government is really rated as doing particularly well with regard to this indicator. There is some evidence to suggest that government in countries with democratic forms of governance may be less well situated to make 'tough decisions'. Countries like India, Argentina, Peru and Philippines have a lower score than countries like China, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. Even Chile, which has a high average score for the arena as a whole, comes out considerably lower than the average on this particular indicator. This indicates that governments that are democratically elected are sensitive to public opinion and inclined to take the demands for immediate action in response to particular interests as important impetus for political action. Taking into consideration the long-term interest of the nation as a whole is typically much more difficult.

²⁹ For a review of how governments with good intentions may end up undermining development efforts, see James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State*. New Haven: Yale University Press 1999.

Opportunities to do so tend to occur at particular conjunctures. Windows of opportunity may open as a result of an economic or political crisis. This helps explain why the higher scorers on this indicator are not necessarily the same as with regard to the other measures. Russia is the top scorer, followed by Jordan and Tanzania. Our respondents provide us with valuable insights into why these three countries come out generally well in this context. President Putin's ability to lead Russia from the chaos left in the last days of Yeltsin's time in power is associated with his ability to rise above the partisan crowds that tended to take advantage of an increasingly infirm Yeltsin. He is described as having brought Russians together. By standing above partisan interests, he is also said to have acted in the country's national interest. For yet some others, he is viewed as having brought pride back to Russia.

We have already commented on the situation in Jordan, where respondents in our survey point to the ability of the King to act in the interest of all Jordanians in a region where the situation is very volatile. Although King Hassan had been in power only a short time at the time of our survey, he enjoyed the same reputation as his father – King Hussein – as someone who acts wisely with the long-term interest of his country in mind. The Tanzanian case is bit different but still indicative of the same capacity. By the time President Mkapa took over in 1995, Tanzania's economy was not in a very good shape. By 2000, the new president had turned things around. Through prudent policies, public finance was under control. The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and bilateral donors were all impressed by the turn of events and gave the government high marks for its commitment to cleaning up public finance without losing sight of the need for poverty reduction. Although the latter has proved to be more complicated and an issue that needs longer time to produce results, our respondents give the President and his government credit for having been able to do things that they see as necessary for the country's ability to develop in the long run.

In the same way as good policy has spilled over into appreciation also of governance, bad policy has undermined the legitimacy of some regimes. This is particularly true for the Philippines, where the Estrada administration was seen as having completely lost sight of what the national interest is, but is also reflected in the case of Togo where President Eyadema in 2000 was viewed as acting in very partisan ways at the expense of the national interest.

Civilian Control

Civilian control has become a major governance issue, because of the failure in the past of democratically elected governments in developing societies to demonstrate discipline and commitment to modernization that was a broad expectation of governments in the 1960s. In those days, the military was regarded as a legitimate substitute for civilian governments that failed to meet popular expectations about their countries being able to catch up with industrial societies if only they have a strong executive in charge of the process³⁰. Civilian governments that were seen to stray ideologically from this objective, as in Brazil 1964, Indonesia 1965, Ghana 1966, and Chile 1973, or displayed signs of being corrupt or bogged down in disagreements as in Nigeria 1966, Uganda 1970, and Pakistan 1972, were overthrown by military juntas which believed that they were better equipped to rule the country³¹. Although the situation varied from one country to another, in several places the military were received as saviors by large segments of the population. Members of the democratically elected elite had lost their support among the public, including the oppressed classes in society.

Military rule was prevalent in the 1970s and into the 1980s in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Efforts were made to ‘civilianize’ the rule by bringing in civil expertise into government. Such efforts notwithstanding, the regime remained controlled by the military. Officers were overall in charge and unaccountable to elected civilian leaders.

The professionalism and discipline that the military had displayed prior to getting involved in running governments, however, dissipated quite rapidly once the officers had taken on this task. Their command style of running the affairs of government generated opposition, especially since it often involved the use of denial of not only political but also civil rights. Violation of human rights became eventually an albatross around the neck of the military. In Latin America especially, the civilian population began to organize and protest against military rule. These protests grew strong enough to eventually get the military to reconsider

³⁰ For a discussion of the role of the military in development, see e.g. J.J. Johnson (ed.), *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1962.

³¹ The various ways by which democratic regimes were overthrown are analyzed in a volume edited by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1978.

its involvement in politics. In Argentina, Brazil and Chile, where the military had kept a strong hold on the reins of power, this retreat took place during the 1980s and resulted in a return to democracy³². With a few recent exceptions, notably Pakistan, the military has also retreated and stayed out of power in other developing regions, e.g. Indonesia in Asia and Nigeria in Africa.

The WGS strongly suggests that civilian control of the military is now a broadly accepted principle in practice. The overall score on this indicator is among the highest we received across the board. To be sure, there are two notable exceptions – Pakistan and Togo, where the military remains in control – but elsewhere respondents generally agree that the military is ready to accept its accountability to a civilian government. A bit of a cloud is still hanging over a few countries on this issue. Rights and political prerogatives reserved for the military in the new democratic constitution in Chile remained a question of how far the military really was willing to accept civilian control in that country. The political uncertainty surrounding the regime in Indonesia and Peru in 2000 contributed to doubts in our respondents' mind when asked to rate their respective country on this indicator.

By and large, however, it seems quite clear from our study that when it comes to the military accepting its role as a professional corps working on the defense of the nation – or in nation-building capacity under a civilian government – there has been a dramatic change from the situation a couple of decades ago. The incentive for the military to get back into government is not there, which explains, for instance, why it has remained in the barracks even in countries like Argentina where the economy completely collapsed in 2001 due, at least in large part, to shortcomings in the way the elected government was handling economic policy.

Peace

This indicator was included to give us a sense of how respondents assessed government attitude toward resolving conflict. Our assumption was that even though war may be

³² The return to democracy in Latin America during the 1980s is analyzed in great detail in a four-volume publication edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1986.

justified in certain circumstances, such as defending the homeland, it is generally more costly than trying to resolve a conflict by peaceful means. This premise is in line with a prevailing opinion among member-states of the United Nations. Willingness to consider peaceful means of resolving conflict, therefore, is seen as preferable.

This applies to conflict resolution both between and within states. Government may decide on using repressive means to resolve a conflict between different groups within a country, as the government of Iraq did in the 1980s when it killed large numbers of Kurds or members of the Shiite sect of Islam or as the government of Sudan has repeatedly done vis-à-vis the population of the southern provinces of the country. Governments may also be ‘problematic neighbors’, either because they are outright provocative – cf. the conflicts in the Middle East – or because they are ready to take economic or political advantage of a weak neighbor – cf. the conflict involving the neighbors of the Democratic Republic of Congo in Africa.

The prospect of conflict or war brings uncertainty and tends to negatively affect development. For instance, investors – whether local or foreign – are likely to be reluctant to contribute to a country’s development if they see conflict or war on the horizon. Being able to avoid that a conflict runs out of control and ends up in violence is an important indicator of prospects for economic and social development.

Our respondents are generally ready to give their respective government high marks for the readiness and ability of the latter to seek peaceful resolution of conflicts. There seem to be two reasons for this rating. One is that governments of countries in highly volatile regions of the world such as the Middle East or Central Asia are rated favorably because of their ability to avoid conflict or war that would negatively affect their citizens. Cases in point are Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, and India. The other reason is a government’s contribution to a legacy of peace in their region. This applies to Chile in Latin America and Tanzania in Africa. Since the war with Bolivia over hundred years ago, Chile has been a good neighbor. Although there has been civil conflict on the islands of Zanzibar, Tanzanian respondents tend to assess their government also in relation to other countries in the region, many of which have suffered from civil war or war with neighboring countries. When the government fought a war with Uganda in the late 1970s it was in defense of its sovereign

territory (although it ended up with the Tanzanian armed forces invading Uganda to get rid of its erratic and autocratic ruler at the time, Idi Amin).

Argentina and Peru are interesting cases, because both were involved in military conflicts in recent years – Argentina with Britain over the Falkland Islands, and Peru with Ecuador over a contested border area. Respondents in our survey relate to these incidents in the sense that their rating reflects the readiness of their respective governments to avoid the costs to their country of nurturing such conflicts. In other words, respondents believe that their government is no longer seeking a confrontational solution to conflicts with other countries.

It may be no surprise that on this particular indicator, the government of the Philippines gets the lowest mark of all. It has been unable to resolve its conflict with the Muslim minority population on the island of Mindanao. Indonesians were somewhat more favorable in assessing their government, pointing to its readiness to transfer sovereignty to East Timor in spite of human rights violations committed by Indonesian soldiers in previous years.

Implications for Research and Practice

We would like to conclude our discussion in this chapter with three observations. The first is of particular relevance for research but also has practical implications: the need to make a distinction between government, on the one hand, and regime, on the other. There is often a tendency to conflate the two, associating regime with government (or even more specifically with the name of the head of state or government). Our survey shows that by disaggregating governance into six arenas, it is possible to get a more detailed appreciation of how government relates to regime. With regard to key functions that government performs vis-à-vis society, type of regime doesn't really matter that much. In this arena, governments associated with a variety of regimes score equally high. Thus, the monarchic regime of Jordan scores as high as the democratic regimes of Chile and India. Even the communist government of China is viewed as doing quite well with regard to the various key functions assessed in this arena. While respondents identify shortcomings with the

regimes of these countries in other arenas, their rating of government is generally higher than average.

The second point is that government generally scores lower on ability to ensure adequate standards of living for its citizens than on ability to provide security for them. With regard to promoting social and economic rights as well as making tough decisions based on a long-term national interest, government is seen as performing less well than with regard to enhancing personal security and taking a peaceful approach to resolving conflict. Our respondents indicate in their qualitative comments that the political rhetoric of governments is correct but practice differs for two reasons: lack of commitment or lack of resources. Some adjustment downward seems to have taken place with regard to popular expectation about the role of government in development, but even so expectations remain higher than what governments typically are ready or capable of doing in the field of economic and social development.

The third and final observation concerns the role of the military. We have noted that there is a general sense that the military these days is ready to accept civilian control. This doesn't mean, however, that everything has returned to 'normal'. It is important that the international community through its various agencies continues to pay attention to how the military in developing countries can be further professionalized. The U.S. government, through the various branches of its armed forces, is already doing this. The incentives that this kind of professional development gives to officers are important for regime stability as well as national development. Other governments, especially those in the European Union, could assist in improving the conditions of governance in the executive arena by paying more attention to how civil-military relations can be institutionalized through incentives for professional development of the military.