

# **Linking livelihoods and protection:**

A preliminary analysis based on a review of  
the literature and agency practice

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## Glossary of terms

**Political economy.** Political economy analysis is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time. When applied to situations of conflict and crisis, political economy analysis seeks to understand both the political and the economic aspects of conflict, and how these combine to affect patterns of power and vulnerability (Collinson, 2003: 13).

**Conflict analysis.** Conflict analysis is the systematic study of the structures, actors and dynamics that interact to cause conflict. It is concerned with the underlying and long-term security, political, economic and social factors that play into conflict; the interests, relations, capacities and agendas of different actors in conflict; as well as an analysis of different patterns and trends in conflict, including long-term perspectives, triggers for increased violence, capacities (institutions, processes) for managing conflict and likely future conflict scenarios (Goodhand, Vaux and Walker, 2002).

**Protection.** Protection is described as all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law (Giossi Caverzasio, 2001). In conflict and crisis, it is often interpreted as efforts to assure the safety of civilians from acute harm.

**Livelihoods.** A livelihood 'comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living; a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with, and recover from, stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihoods opportunities for the next generation' (Chambers and Conway, 1992).

**Livelihood goals.** Livelihood goals are often thought of as increased income, food security, wellbeing and dignity, and the sustainable use of natural resources. However, these goals may change according to context and may be limited to reducing risk and vulnerability, or ensuring personal safety and survival in times of emergencies or conflict.

**Livelihood strategies.** What people do, or the strategies that they use, to meet their livelihood goals (recognising that these goals may change according to context). Strategies include meeting food and income needs, such as agriculture, pastoralism and wage labour, and protecting or increase assets.

**Coping strategies.** Temporary responses to threats to lives, livelihoods and security. Coping strategies are often divided into reversible strategies, which are not damaging to livelihoods, and irreversible ones, which will damage livelihoods in the long term. The latter are also termed crisis or survival strategies.

**Protection strategies.** Strategies employed by at-risk populations to avoid, confront or contain (manage) the threats they face (Bonwick, 2006). These strategies may involve personal risk. Strategies to protect the household or community may be at the expense of one or more individuals within the group; and the responses of one individual may impact negatively on others. However, in times of stress and in the absence of safer alternatives, people may view this as their least worst option.



## Chapter 1: Introduction

This project is the first research study specifically to analyse the linkages between livelihoods and protection in conflict, and to examine whether greater linkages in analysis and action can contribute to making people safer. This Working Paper is the first phase of a comprehensive collaborative research project between the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute and the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University. Working closely with agencies with experience of protection and/or livelihoods, the project will provide recommendations for humanitarian programming so as to achieve maximum impact on both protection and livelihoods. Africa is the geographical focus of the study, as this is the continent most affected by conflict.

The paper draws on a literature review of protection and livelihoods threats and responses, as well as interviews with a select group of agencies involved in livelihoods and/or protection programming. Chapter 2 begins by examining the impact of conflict on the protection and livelihoods of civilians, and the different strategies employed by endangered populations to increase their protection, protect livelihoods or meet basic subsistence needs. Chapter 3 discusses the similarities between protection and livelihoods analyses and action in humanitarian programming. Chapter 4 explores current efforts by humanitarian agencies to undertake complementary programming in livelihoods

and protection. It provides some practical examples of 'joined-up' programming and discusses some of the institutional and practical challenges involved. Annexes attached to this report provide separate reviews of livelihoods and protection concepts and approaches.

The second phase of the project will involve in-depth field research in three case study countries. Darfur and northern Uganda have been chosen as initial case study sites, and a third will be identified for comparison once the findings from this work are available. The case studies will involve an examination of the risks and threats that vulnerable populations face and the strategies populations employ to mitigate or reduce these threats. Field research will explore the extent and nature of livelihoods and protection interventions and the impact of these on the protection of conflict-affected populations, as well as how livelihoods and protection specialists work together in practice. Interviews with technical and managerial staff will be undertaken to understand opportunities for greater complementarity between approaches. Each case study will be published as a separate Working Paper describing the current and potential links between the two areas. A major HPG Paper will be published by the two institutions in 2008 to synthesise the findings and provide analysis and recommendations for aid agencies for more complementary work in this area.



# Chapter 2: The impact of conflict on civilians

## 2.1 The nature and logic of conflict

Today's protracted political and conflict-related crises combine transnational and internal characteristics. These 'new wars' are increasingly linked to questions of statehood, governance and the status of nations and communities. These wars are characterised as enduring national or regional conflicts rather than the shorter, inter-state wars of the past (Holsti, 1996; Kaldor, 2004). Duffield (2000) explains the emergence of complex political emergencies as rational responses to the inequalities, opportunities and costs of globalisation and transnational commerce.

Some analysts view conflict and complex political emergencies as functions of 'fragile states'. While having no commonly accepted definition, 'fragility' in this context is loosely understood as the instability which derives from a state's weak institutions, capacities, political will and policies on the one hand, and its poor governance, poverty and/or ineffective use of development assistance on the other (Cammack et al., 2006).

A number of political analysts have focussed on the drivers of conflict, emphasising either 'grievance' or 'greed' as motivations for violence. Stewart and Fitzgerald (2000) discuss 'horizontal inequalities' used by elites as a source of grievance to enlist support and legitimise violence, whereas Collier suggests that it is greed, or the feasibility of predation, which determines the risk of conflict, 'so that it [conflict] occurs when rebels can do well out of war' (Collier, 2000: 4). Both views emphasise the political and economic motivations behind violence – the 'political economy' of conflict – as well as its functional or rational aims.

Civil wars that start with clear political aims may mutate into conflicts where economic benefits become the overriding driving factor. New economies may emerge that are dependent on the violent asset-stripping of the politically weak, so that the perpetuation of conflict becomes an object in itself (Duffield, 1994; Ballentine and Sherman, 2003; Berdal and Malone, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2000). Vulnerability in conflict can therefore be understood as 'powerlessness rather than simply material need' (Collinson 2003). As civil wars are often fought along ethnic lines,

power or vulnerability is often determined by ethnicity or political identity.

The creation of parallel economic activities (Le Billon, 2000; Schafer, 2002) is common in complex emergencies. The nature of the war economy varies between different conflicts depending in part on the availability of resources, such as minerals (diamonds, gold), oil, land and timber, as well as aid resources. In conflict, the different economies that develop can be divided into war economies, shadow economies and coping economies. The war, or combat, economy involves military and paramilitary actors who generate resources by illegal taxation, extortion and controlling the exploitation of minerals. The shadow economy consists of profiteers, who benefit from the lack of legal and regulatory environment, often those with connections to power or with power; as such, the war and shadow economies may merge. Finally, the coping economy includes the majority civilian population, and can encompass illegal economies around drugs, minerals or smuggling, as well as subsistence agriculture, petty trading and remittances (Goodhand, 2004; referred to in Ballentine and Nitzscke, 2005). War and shadow economies often involve exploitative or abusive practices such as forced labour, extortion and the control of trade and land through violence and coercion. Keen (1998) distinguishes between 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' violence, where top-down violence is perpetrated by states, warlords or other forms of leadership, and bottom-up violence is the violence ordinary people turn to as a consequence of impoverishment and long-term social and economic exclusion.

The manipulation of humanitarian assistance is frequently part of war economies, and the control of such assistance can be of strategic importance. This has included the diversion of assistance to feed troops, the denial of aid to contested areas or certain population groups and attacks on or control of civilians receiving assistance. In addition, the mechanisms of aid delivery can reinforce existing inequalities in power relations (Duffield, 1994; Keen 1998; Macrae and Zwi, 1994; Jaspars, 2000).

## 2.2 The consequences of violence for civilians

As the logic of war has changed, so too has its impact on civilians. Civilian casualties in the First World War are estimated at five percent. This had risen to 50% by the time the Second World War was fought, and calculations at the end of the twentieth century indicated that 80–90% of casualties of war were civilian, the majority of them women and children (Collier et al., 2003). These figures do not reflect other forms of suffering brought about by violence. Torture, sexual violence, exploitation, forced recruitment into fighting forces and other forms of civilian abuse frequently accompany conflict, and are now more commonly documented as features of warfare.

Armed conflict has a devastating effect on livelihoods and personal security. Conflict can result in extreme threats to people's lives, dignity and integrity, ranging from deliberate personal violence, deprivation and restrictions on movement and access to basic services. Violence frequently results in the displacement of populations from their homes and separates people from their livelihood sources. In 2000, internal conflicts generated 21 million refugees and 25 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). The numbers of IDPs has remained relatively constant in the interim (IDMC, 2006), but refugee figures are estimated to have fallen to approximately 8.4 million in 2005 (UNHCR, 2007). This reduction is partly due to the increasing containment of conflict-affected populations *within* borders, as well as a function of the more local and regional nature of violence. Borders with neighbouring countries are more frequently closed during conflict, and increasingly restrictive asylum policies make it more difficult for at-risk populations to find sanctuary in other states.

In contemporary conflicts, state militaries and armed groups often seek to undermine the enemy's civilian support base by destroying civilian livelihoods. The impoverishment and deliberate intimidation of the civilian population is thus frequently a conscious war strategy, and the deprivations and losses caused by war often become the determining factor in people's suffering (Goodhand, 2001). The direct impacts of war on livelihoods include attacks on villages and the destruction, looting or theft of key assets, such as houses, food stocks and livestock.. There are also *indirect*, or collateral, impacts, where livelihoods are undermined and assets lost through the destruction or loss of basic services,

### Box 1: Violations and deprivations that give rise to protection needs

Discrimination as a result of age, legal status (refugee, asylum-seeker), socio-economic group, ethnicity, religion, education, gender and sexual orientation.

Deliberate killing, wounding, displacement, destitution and disappearance.

Sexual violence, rape, female genital mutilation, domestic violence, early marriage, bride price.

Torture and inhuman or degrading treatment.

Dispossession of assets by theft and destruction.

The misappropriation of land and violations of land rights.

Deliberate discrimination and deprivation in health, education, property rights, access to water and economic opportunities.

Violence and exploitation within the affected community.

Forced military recruitment, prostitution, sexual exploitation and trafficking (including by peacekeepers and humanitarian staff), abduction and slavery.

Forced or accidental family separation.

Arbitrary restrictions on movement, including forced return, punitive curfews or roadblocks which prevent access to fields, markets, jobs, family, friends and social services.

Thirst, hunger, disease and reproductive health crises caused by the deliberate destruction of services or the denial of livelihoods.

Restrictions on political participation, freedom of association and religious freedom.

The loss or theft of personal documentation that gives proof of identity, ownership, access to services and citizen's rights.

Attacks against civilians and the spreading of landmines.

Adapted from UNHCR, 2006, and Slim and Bonwick, 2005.

the collapse of public health systems and the loss of access to employment, markets, farms or traditional pastures through the restriction of movement. As conflicts become entrenched, violence increasingly shapes the economy and livelihood opportunities. Free markets often become 'forced markets', with military actors

using coercion to maintain protection regimes and price differences. The deaths resulting from such indirect impacts of war are thought to outweigh direct casualties (Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2001).

Violence affects social networks, as well as the physical and economic status of conflict affected populations. The fraying of social networks can have significant negative implications on livelihoods as individual and communal survival frequently depends on the practice of reciprocity. Violence and the emergence of new social bonds through war often rupture or transform existing social networks (Summerfield, 1999), and the destruction of these networks is thought to be a conscious strategy of war (de Waal, 1997). New social and political institutions may emerge during conflict. New political structures are frequently militarised, posing a challenge to traditional leadership structures (Keen, 1998). Informal institutions often play a more important role in livelihoods and protection in situations of internal war, including local conflict resolution mechanisms, customary law and self-protection or defence initiatives, although these too may be undermined (Young, Osman et al. 2005; Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars 2006; Pantuliano and O'Callaghan 2006).

Conflict also causes inter-generational exclusion: the effects of war are felt many years after the fighting stops, and those disadvantaged by conflict are likely to remain so following the arrival of peace (Green, 1994: 45). These generations may also experience violence again, as post-conflict societies are more vulnerable to a recurrence of violence than pre-conflict ones, other risk factors being equal (Collier, 2000: 18).

### 2.3 Community responses

As the two sections above illustrate, conflict has devastating effects on people's livelihoods and their safety and dignity. This section examines how people respond to these threats, and the linkages between strategies that aim to increase protection and those that aim to protect livelihoods or meet basic subsistence needs.

Any response to conflict will depend on the nature and severity of the threat and on whose response is being considered; whether it is different livelihood groups or ethnic groups, whether people are displaced or living at home, and different age and sex groups within this. By reviewing the literature, however, it is possible to make some broad generalisations about the types

#### **Box 2: How conflict and violence impacts upon livelihoods**

##### *Household level*

Displacement, forced migration or relocation disrupts social, legal and economic ties.

Changing household composition (due to death, abduction, displacement, migration) impacts on income generation, labour and productivity.

Destruction, loss, depletion and maintenance of all asset types: natural, financial, physical, human and social for many, but wealth accumulation for some.

The ownership of valuable assets can make people more vulnerable to attack.

Ways in which the above, in combination with the broader context, affect livelihood strategies and livelihood outcomes for different groups.

##### *Broader livelihood and political economy context*

Spatial patterns of political tension and physical insecurity leading to restrictions on movement which impacts on access to fields, pasture, wild foods, employment, markets.

Disruption to markets and trade – for both consumption and sale – and wider economy.

Development of war economy often involving exploitative or abusive practices.

Changing governance structures; control over markets, labour and resources, as well as rule of law, service provision, through formal and informal institutions.

Changing power relations within and between groups and communities; underlying causes of conflict; strategies used by insurgents, create a reduction in livelihood opportunities for some and benefits for others.

Adapted from Longley and Maxwell, 2003.

of strategies that people use to cope with, and adapt to, conflict.

#### *2.3.1 Coping strategies, protection strategies and livelihood strategies*

Although originally applied in natural disasters as temporary responses to declining food entitlements, the term 'coping strategy' is now used much more broadly in a range of emergency contexts, including conflict, and in relation to both responses to threats to livelihoods and to physical security.

In relation to livelihoods, Davies noted in 1993 that 'coping strategy was used as a catch all for everything that rural producers do over and above primary productive activities', and that 'it is not analytically helpful to think of everything as a coping strategy'. Davies also points out the dangers of the use of the term 'coping strategies' to describe a variety of vaguely defined strategies, as it implies that people do cope. All behaviour becomes coping behaviour when people are destitute, but in this case they are 'coping' simply in the sense of surviving.

The distinction between livelihood strategies and coping strategies is often not clear. Livelihood strategies are seen as 'what people do' in normal times, such as agriculture and wage labour (Schafer, 2002), but can also encompass all coping strategies in a particular context (Devereux, 1999). Perhaps livelihood strategies can best be described as the strategies that people use to pursue their livelihood goals. These goals change according to the context in which people find themselves: for example protecting assets, ensuring survival and/or ensuring personal safety. Coping strategies could be seen as temporary responses to threats to lives, livelihoods and security, and may fluctuate over time. The literature on livelihoods divides coping strategies into those that are reversible and those that are irreversible. Reversible strategies are those that do not cause permanent damage to livelihoods (for example changes in diet, collection of wild foods, migration of family members for work), and irreversible when they do (for example sale of productive assets, migration of whole families following destitution) (Corbett, 1988). Devereux (1999) names irreversible strategies more appropriately as survival strategies, as they actually reflect an inability to cope.

Strategies to protect livelihoods in response to conflict are often more limited than those that can be employed in response to natural disasters. Corbett (1988) notes that, in war situations (e.g. Mozambique and parts of Ethiopia in the 1980s), markets for food and labour may be so disrupted that households are unable to obtain sufficient access to food through market channels to supplement their production deficits. In conflict, people may be actively prevented from following coping strategies: when assets are stolen or destroyed, looking for wild foods becomes unsafe, labour opportunities are denied, or food is withheld (de Waal, 1991). The key differences between coping strategies in conflict and in natural disasters can be summarised as follows:

1. Many of the strategies used in stable situations are blocked either intentionally by the parties to the conflict or as an unintended consequence of conflict.
2. The range of possible responses to meet basic needs becomes extremely limited under conditions of extreme asset loss, ongoing insecurity and risk of attack. For many, survival becomes the main strategy. Whilst maintaining economic assets remains important, the protection or formation of new human, social or political assets appropriate for survival in the context of conflict may gain greater significance for both current and future livelihoods.
3. The risk of insecurity becomes an additional consideration in determining coping strategies, and minimising the risk of insecurity may become the overriding purpose of coping strategies.
4. A developing parallel or war economy may present new opportunities for livelihood strategies, but these new strategies often involve exploiting others within the same population. In other words, one person's livelihood may create serious protection risks for another.

In conflict, the options for livelihood strategies are more limited, but populations must weigh more carefully the associated risks before deciding on a particular response. In contrast to natural disasters, the strategies that people use during conflict are relatively under-researched.

A number of analysts emphasise the importance of understanding and supporting the strategies employed by at-risk populations to protect themselves from threats to their safety and dignity (Vincent and Refslund Sorenson 2001; Slim and Bonwick 2005); Bonwick, 2006). Bonwick posits that it is the strategies of civilians that are most essential to determining their own safety. He categorises three types of protection strategies: avoidance, containment and confrontation. Avoidance strategies are aimed at escaping the threat, and include flight or displacement, changing patterns of movement (such as travelling at night or taking safer routes) or developing information networks or warning systems to alert when there is danger. Containment strategies are described as living with the threat. This includes paying taxes or protection money, negotiation with warring parties to secure safety or submission, such as through 'marriage' to force commanders. The final response, confrontation, involves fighting

back through the formation of self-defence or vigilante groups, or joining one party to the conflict.

Similar to the concerns highlighted by Davies above, the concept of ‘coping strategy’ is contentious in protection circles due to the recognition that people do not ‘cope’ with violence or attack. Vincent and Sorensen use the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as a framework for analysing responses by at-risk groups. They divide protection strategies into strategies that protect the right to life and

personal security (activities that shield individuals from acts of violence and physical threats); strategies that protect the right to personal liberty (such as acts to shield people from arbitrary detention); and strategies that support movement-related needs (i.e. the right to seek safety in another country or the right to return to a country).

A number of analysts have described and categorised the strategies adopted in response to threats to livelihoods and personal safety in conflict. These are summarised in Table 1 below.

**Table 1: Strategies adopted by conflict-affected people**

<b>Bonwick (2006): protection strategies</b>	<b>Vincent and Sorenson (2001): strategies of conflict-displaced people</b>	<b>Le Billon (2000): livelihood strategies in conflict</b>	<b>Jaspars and Shoham (2002): livelihood strategies in conflict/chronic political instability</b>	<b>Korf (2003) Three pillars of livelihood strategies</b>
<p><i>Avoidance</i> Flight, hiding assets, early warning systems <i>Containment or submission</i> Payment or negotiation with warring parties <i>Confrontation</i> Establishing self-defence or vigilante groups, joining one party to the conflict</p>	<p><i>Protection strategies</i> Strategies that people use to protect right to life and security, protecting personal liberty and protecting movement-related needs <i>Subsistence strategies</i> Strategies that people use to improve access to basic needs, including employment and economic activity <i>Access to education</i> <i>Civic strategies</i> Strategies which help increase people’s access to public participation <i>Strategies that protect property</i></p>	<p><i>Legal</i> Engaging in manufacturing, trade, subsistence farming <i>‘Grey area’ activities</i> Engaging in large-scale extraction, informal trade, small-scale smuggling <i>Illegal</i> Engaging in government corruption, asset transfer, taxation by armed groups <i>Criminal</i> Engaging in capital flight, forced labour and robbery</p>	<p><i>Subsistence and marginal activities</i> Engaging in subsistence agriculture, petty trading, firewood collection <i>Engaging in the parallel or informal economy</i> <i>Violent or illegal acts</i> Theft, looting <i>Acts which are morally degrading within people’s own culture</i> Prostitution, begging</p>	<p><i>Managing personal risk</i> Risk-minimising strategies such as flight, sending children to safe places and farming in groups, or risk-taking strategies if necessary for economic survival <i>Managing household economics</i> Strategies to secure income, changing economic roles of family members and reducing expenditure and investment <i>Accessing external support</i> This can include strategies to access family support, building alliances with power holders, satisfying the claims of armed actors or qualifying for state or NGO support</p>

Taking the categories from these studies, people's strategies in conflict can be broadly divided into economic survival and subsistence strategies, protection strategies and strategies aimed at improving future livelihoods (for example, through education or building new social networks). Subsistence or economic survival strategies need to be divided further based on legality, criminality, and whether they are harmful to people's dignity. These strategies are inter-related, and specific actions will depend on the available livelihood options, a consideration of the benefits and risks and the context of the crisis. As in natural disasters, people will plan their strategies carefully based not only on the resources available to them, but also on their knowledge of the prevailing threats and risks.

### *2.3.2 Economic survival and subsistence*

#### Subsistence strategies

In situations of conflict, livelihood strategies may be restricted to subsistence agriculture and marginal economic activities, due to loss of assets, restriction of movement, etc. These are usually the strategies normally adopted by the poorest sections of the population.. In Africa, such strategies may include the collection and sale of firewood, the production and sale of charcoal, petty trading (for example in agricultural products and basic household items), casual labour (for example agricultural wage labour, domestic labour, brick-making), and in some cases small-scale crop production or harvesting wild food. In emergencies, there is often an intensification of these livelihood strategies for the poorest households, and a larger percentage of the population will adopt them. In conflict, this intensification is even greater, but for fewer possible livelihoods strategies, as migration for work, access to farmland, and looking for wild foods may be unsafe.

In many conflict situations, subsistence and marginal economic strategies involve considerable risks to personal security. For example, in northern Uganda, Darfur and the DRC, farming often takes place in insecure areas (Stites et al., 2006; Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006; Vlassenroot et al., undated). Firewood collection, particularly in areas distant from settlements, often involves security risks: cases of rape associated with firewood collection in Darfur are the most well-documented example of this (Pantuliano and O'Callaghan, 2006). Engaging in casual labour, such as domestic labour for women, has also been associated with sexual abuse or attack. Other

forms of labour may involve different types of protection risks, as people may be subject to exploitative labour relations when they are known to be desperate for work, as with displaced populations in Kass camp in South Darfur (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars 2006; Pantuliano and O'Callaghan 2006). As production becomes limited, more people become dependent on the market, but travel to markets might mean exposure to attack and demands for 'taxes', as in the DRC (SC-UK 2003; Thoulouzan, Rana et al. 2006) Conflict-affected women may turn to prostitution as one of the only options to generate income (e.g. Thoulouzan, Rana et al., 2006). For young men, enlisting in the military or joining an armed group may become one of the few available livelihood options. Livelihood strategies in situations of conflict are therefore inextricably linked with protection threats.

With a reduction in the range of strategies available to people, conflicting strategies may emerge between different population groups. Alternatively, the strategies of one group may be harmful to another, which in turn can fuel conflict. Conflicting strategies are common in relation to competition over scarce natural resources, for instance conflict between IDPs and pastoral groups over firewood in Darfur. The high levels of sexual violence associated with firewood collection can be explained in part by pastoral groups trying to maintain control over these resources (Young, Osman et al., 2007).

#### Accessing external assistance

In situations where relief assistance is provided, accessing this assistance (and maximising such access) becomes an important livelihood strategy. Ensuring access to relief may include a variety of specific tactics, including providing gifts or taxes to community leaders to ensure representation in the aid system, registering at multiple locations or selling food aid to meet other basic needs (e.g Birkeland and Gomes, 2001). Those in positions of power may have the greatest opportunity to register more than once for assistance, or to manipulate the system in general (Jaspars, 2000; Mahoney et al., 2005). For people displaced in Khartoum, where little assistance is provided and livelihood opportunities are few, keeping children malnourished to ensure their access to feeding programmes was preferable to running the risks associated with other strategies for obtaining access to resources (Jacobson, Lautze et al. 2001). In other contexts, for example Sri Lanka, forming community-based organisations also helped in accessing NGO support (Korf, 2003).

Whilst conflict negatively affects social networks through displacement, death or undermining previously harmonious relationships between communities, there are examples of communal acts of sharing and mutual support, even in situations of extreme hardship. In Burundi, IDPs in the initial phase of displacement pooled their resources and cooked communally (Boutin and Nkurunziza 2001). Khartoum IDPs set up revolving funds to help families pay school fees, and charges for medical treatment, or to cover newly arrived IDPs ((Jacobson, Lautze et al. 2001). Sharing resources with newly arrived IDPs is reported in many IDP settings. In Uganda, groups of female IDPs set up community funds to start economic activities (Olaa 2001). In DRC, some farmers established groups to minimise payments associated with accessing markets (Raeymakers, undated). In other contexts – the most well-documented being Somalia – assistance from relatives elsewhere (either in capitals or abroad) is one of the key sources of income for those affected by conflict. Some studies have shown that social networks may become stronger within smaller social units; i.e. people rely more on traditional networks such as extended family, or religious networks (Harragin, 1998; Narbeth, 2001; Goodhand et al., 2000; Korf, 2003). Forming alliances with power holders, whether local authorities or armed actors, can be an important way of maintaining livelihood strategies. This can be passive, in terms of payment of taxes or bribes to armed actors, or more active strategies of forming political alliances (Korf, 2003).

The war economy and new economic opportunities  
The majority of a population in conflict is likely to turn to some combination of the strategies described above to deal with the threats to their livelihoods and a reduction in livelihood opportunities. There are some positive examples of changes in livelihood strategies in conflict, for example in DRC, where lack of regulation meant that people could return to their original land in one of the national parks to cultivate (Raeymakers, undated), and in Sri Lanka, where some people developed lucrative new livelihoods cultivating cash crops (Korf, 2003). Other strategies may be illegal or criminal, however. These can range from the illegal brewing of alcohol (e.g. in Khartoum) to theft and robbery. A distinction needs to be made, however, between illegal activities by ordinary people designed to meet their basic needs because they have no other option, and deliberate asset-stripping of certain groups as a strategy of war or to accumulate personal wealth for the elite.

As described in Section 2.1, newly developing war economies can create opportunities for wealth accumulation and can yield significant benefits for some. Strategies to profit from the war economy are often associated with high levels of violence. Keen (1998) highlights seven economic opportunities which can potentially derive from war: pillage; extorting protection money; controlling or monopolising trade; exploiting labour; gaining access to land, water and mineral resources; stealing aid supplies; and advantages for the military. In addition, the lack of regulatory mechanisms (in markets, transport, cross-border trade) can create opportunities to make a profit in the black market, or shadow, economy.

### *2.3.3 Protection strategies*

The strategies used by warring parties create a number of protection threats. In addition, the livelihood strategies that people use are often associated with considerable risks to personal security. Like threats to livelihoods, threats to security are often anticipated, and people may prepare for insecurity or attack, in particular in protracted crises. Within the household or community, decisions may need to be made about which households or household member faces the lowest risk, or what is the least-worst option. For example, in Darfur, while women collecting firewood are at risk of rape, if men did so they would almost certainly be killed. Similarly in Sri Lanka, women rather than men would travel to markets (Korf, 2003).

As apparent from the high numbers of IDPs and refugees, avoidance and escape is the most visible form of response to protection threats. However, other more temporary movement strategies are also employed, such as fleeing into the bush at night and returning to settlements during the day, moving part of the family to safe areas, or relocating entire villages to safer areas (Stites et al., 2006; Korf, 2003). Many of these responses will have direct impacts on livelihoods, for example preventing the theft of livelihood assets and enabling people to carry out some livelihood strategies, such as farming and accessing markets (to sell or buy goods and seek employment).

Containment strategies include the widest range of responses, including group protective strategies, payment of militia for protection, vigilance and contingency planning, and lobbying or negotiation with authorities and/or warring parties. Others seek to ensure protection from attack, either

through payment of 'taxes' or protection money, or negotiation to remain neutral. Livelihood strategies that minimise risk of attack include reducing investment in assets that may be looted or stolen, or that cannot be moved, or changing to short-season or low-risk crops. Containment strategies demonstrate that many preferred protection strategies aim at managing threats in order to continue with life in the best way possible, i.e. to meet basic subsistence needs with minimum risk to personal security. Some examples are given in Box 3.

Examples of confrontation strategies include carrying arms when travelling to fields (e.g. in Angola), joining the military or militia forces or armed groups, or the formation of self-defence groups. Examples of the latter include groups to protect roads to markets and settlements (as in Angola); groups from within the community to prevent attack (in a number of places in Darfur) and civilian policing undertaken in camps and villages in northern Uganda (Vincent and Sorenson, 2001; Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006).

**Box 3: Examples of containment protection strategies**

***Group protection strategies***

Collecting firewood or farming in groups for greater security (Uganda, Darfur, DRC).

Working in groups to bring the harvest in as quickly as possible (Uganda, DRC).

Mutual childcare when women are arrested (Khartoum IDPs).

Revolving funds among women to pay fines when arrested or to replace confiscated property (Khartoum IDPs; related to illegal brewing of alcohol).

***Minimising investment and possession of valuable assets***

Minimal investment in household equipment, agricultural inputs, construction of homes (DRC).

Changes in cropping patterns to low-risk crops or seasonal rather than perennial crops (cassava in DRC).

Requests to postpone aid distributions when the situation is unsafe (DRC, Darfur).

***Payment to potential attackers or those allied to them***

Payment to farm own land (Darfur).

Sexual services in exchange for protection (Liberia, DRC).

Payment of middlemen for access to goods in markets (Dar Zagawa, Darfur, DRC).

Staying away from farms for one day a week so that army or militias can harvest their share (DRC).

***Payment of taxes to local authorities or army/militia for protection***

This can be in the form of cash, agricultural products or aid (often food aid), and can be either voluntary or forced (e.g. South Sudan 1998, Somalia 2003).

***Payment to potential attackers or those allied to them***

Payment to farm own land (Darfur).

Sexual services in exchange for protection (Liberia, DRC).

Payment of middlemen for access to goods in markets (Dar Zagawa, Darfur, DRC).

Staying away from farms for one day a week so that army or militias can harvest their share (DRC).

***Vigilance/contingency planning***

Pending relocation, Khartoum IDPs placed a family member in the armed forces to reduce harassment and get intelligence on the timing of removals/relocation.

Preparing camouflage for stays in the bush and night, and pre-selecting places in which to hide (Uganda).

Use of whistles, bells and other forms of alert (DRC, Uganda).

With assistance from army and self-defence forces, stay in IDP camps from a set time each evening.

Moving in groups or with local defence forces. Looking for footprints, observing those in the vicinity when farming. Not farming for a couple of days after attacks have taken place. Posting 'sentries' where possible.

***Lobbying/negotiation***

Khartoum IDPs: through elders and chiefs, particularly on documentation. Two sets of chiefs: one that meets with the government, and one that meets with churches and opposition groups.

Negotiation with authorities and opposition groups to remain neutral and stay in original homes (Colombia, Malha, Darfur).

*(Vincent and Refslund Sorenson 2001; SC-UK 2003; Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars 2006; Stites, Mazurana et al. 2006; Thoulouzan, Rana et al. 2006; Vlassenroot, Ntububa et al., undated).*

#### *2.3.4 Strategies that improve the possibility of future livelihoods*

Links between protection and livelihoods strategies need to be considered both in the long and short term. Some protection strategies may be harmful to livelihoods in the short term – for example, payment for protection (either to members of the community or to potential attackers) may inflict short-term damage, but may be beneficial in the long term if it enables people to retain their access to land, or maintain mobility to carry out livelihood strategies. In Darfur, such practices have been found in government-controlled areas where land is particularly fertile (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006; Young et al., 2007b). Similarly, the payment of taxes to local leaders, authorities or defence forces may have a negative impact on income in the short term, but may also ensure representation in the distribution of aid, getting access to essential documentation, and to be part of the community in general (e.g. Jacobson et al., 2001). This is different from situations where taxation is forced or aid diverted without the knowledge of the intended recipients.

The emphasis that people place on maintaining some sense of social cohesion, even at the height of conflict, shows its importance for both immediate and long term survival. For example, in displaced settlements people will often congregate with others from the same area or ethnic group (e.g. Jacobson et al., 2001). Mutual support networks continue to exist even in times of extreme hardship. The importance of

maintaining traditional practices to retain community and cultural identity is evidenced by the building of community huts for public consultation, traditional dance and storytelling by IDPs in Angola, and maintaining traditional institutions for conflict resolution and the casting of spells in Uganda (Birkeland and Gomez, 2001; Olaa, 2001). In addition, new social networks may develop to deal with the effects of conflict. Examples were given in earlier sections of the creation of groups or networks to share resources and to increase protection.

Maintaining or creating new assets is an important feature of the strategies of many conflict-affected populations. To maintain livestock, people in Darfur spend money on fodder and water for as long as possible, and pay protection money to stay on their land. The importance that many populations attach to education indicates that this is seen as an important asset for future livelihoods. For example, in some places in Darfur women chose risky strategies to get money to pay school fees for their children (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars 2006). In other conflicts, women and children may stay in camps or settlements to retain access to education, while their men go home to villages and tend farms (Vincent and Refslund Sorenson 2001). Even in the most extreme situations, people think of ways of maintaining part of their livelihoods or opening up new possibilities for the future. The relationship between livelihoods and protection strategies, both in the short and long term, will be further investigated in the field research for this study.



# Chapter 3: Similarities in livelihoods and protection analysis and action

## 3.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces some of the key concepts and approaches in livelihoods and protection, before reviewing the similarities and complementarities between them. A more in-depth review of livelihoods and protection approaches can be found in Annexes 1 and 2.

### *3.1.1 Protection concepts and analysis*

Protection is about seeking to assure the safety of civilians from acute harm.<sup>1</sup> It is concerned with preventing or mitigating the most damaging effects – whether direct or indirect – of violent or abusive behaviour on a civilian population. Acute harm can be interpreted in legal terms as violations of the civil, political, social and economic rights which are codified in human rights, international humanitarian and refugee law, or in more physical terms, as threats to people's life, dignity and integrity. Slim and Bonwick (2005: 43) argue that the most severe risk of acute harm emanates from deliberate personal violence, deprivation and restrictions on movement and access to basic services. Deliberate personal violence can include sexual violence, physical attack and torture. Deprivation includes the deliberate destruction of assets and productive livelihoods, as well as the depletion of resources. Restrictions on movement and access to services cause indirect harm by compromising people's ability to survive, and these restrictions are frequently part of a wider policy of oppression, punishment, marginalisation and group-targeted violence. Three factors affect civilian safety: first, the actions of warring parties and the degree to which they adhere to their responsibilities as set out in international law; second, the strategies that conflict-affected people themselves undertake to minimise their exposure to risk; and lastly, the actions of third parties, which can be

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<sup>1</sup> The IASC definition of protection is 'all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e. human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law). Human rights and humanitarian organisations must conduct these activities in an impartial manner (not on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, language or gender)' (Giossi Caverzasio, 2001). However, many organisations use a more operational framework such as Slim and Bonwick's concept outlined here when translating this into practice.

political, military, human rights or humanitarian actors, whether national or international.

A protection analysis focuses on the cause and intent of a violation, as well as the humanitarian consequences, to develop a strategy for a reduction in violations, as well as to minimise the consequences for affected populations. This will include an assessment of the type and pattern of abuse, who is responsible and their motivations, as well as an analysis of who is most vulnerable. The latter is often done by disaggregating the population into different 'risk' groups, for example according to age, gender, ethnic group, social status and religion. Assessing conflict-affected people's own responses, identifying legal standards and mapping political commitment to protection is another key factor. Monitoring and reporting of rights violations is both part of a protection analysis and a tool for protection (as it can inform advocacy towards protection actors). A protection analysis is multi-dimensional, as it focuses on a number of different levels: the structural environment (legislation), behaviour and motivation (actions of warring or abusive parties) and community impact and response.

### *3.1.2 Livelihoods approaches and analysis*

A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and strategies required for a means of living. The tools of a livelihoods approach include the sustainable livelihoods framework and livelihoods principles. The livelihoods framework shows the key elements of livelihoods and how these interact. It includes assets, strategies, outcomes and policies, institutions and processes (DfID, 1999), which is explained in more detail below. A number of adaptations for complex emergencies exist (Collinson, 2003; Lautze and Raven-Roberts, 2003 and 2006). Livelihoods principles include taking a participatory and capacity-building approach, working at different levels (micro and macro, or national and international, as well as community) for maximum impact, learning from change and adaptation and promoting sustainability (DfID, 1999; Ashley and Carney, 1999).

Livelihoods frameworks adapted for complex emergencies consider vulnerability as central to all elements of the framework, explicitly incorporate power relations and politics and encourage an analysis of assets as liabilities. In most emergency

contexts, vulnerability and resilience are determined by the assets available to a household or community. Assets encompass what people have, including their natural (land, forest products, water), physical (livestock, shelter, tools, materials), social (extended family and other social networks), financial (income, credit, investments) and human assets (education, skills, health). Political status, meaning proximity to power, may be added as a sixth asset. In conflicts, all assets have the potential to become life-threatening liabilities.

Policies, institutions and processes can be understood as the governance environment, which determine access to, or control over, the assets and the livelihoods options that people have. The effectiveness, motivations and reach of civic, economic and political institutions during a complex emergency are likely to play a large part in determining people's protection and welfare. The functioning of institutions concerned with rule of law, enforcing justice, delivery of basic services, and of markets are all likely to be important determinants of the livelihood strategies of different population groups. Policies on land rights, the movement of goods, taxation (formal and informal), and processes such as the marginalisation of certain population groups, environmental degradation and relations of power between groups will also be important in shaping people's livelihoods options and in determining who is most vulnerable. In conflict, therefore, an examination of the political economy is an important part of a livelihoods analysis (Collinson 2003).

In practice, for most operational agencies an emergency livelihoods analysis usually includes an assessment of changes in livelihood strategies, for different livelihood groups, as a result of a shock, and the strategies adopted to manage risks, to estimate the severity of crisis, who is most affected and to identify appropriate responses.<sup>2</sup> It may include some elements of PIPs (Policies, Institutions and Processes), for example whether and how markets are functioning. Livelihoods groups can be farmers, agro-pastoralists or pastoralists, but in situations of conflict, ethnic group or political status (IDP, refugee) may be the determining factor in the risks that people face and the livelihoods options they have (Jaspars and

Shoham, 2002). A systematic analysis of policies, institutions and processes is rarely included in emergency assessments (Jaspars, 2006; Young, Osman et al., 2007b). Recent work on livelihoods in conflict or fragile states in Sudan, DRC, and Somalia, however, show the crucial importance of policies, processes and institutions in influencing livelihood strategies (Young, Osman et al., 2005 and 2007b; Alinovi, Hemrich, et al., 2007). PIPs themselves are affected by conflict, and this in turn affects the dynamics of conflict (Lautze and Raven-Roberts, 2006; Young, Osman et al., 2007a).

### *3.1.3 Protection activities*

There are three forms of protection activity – responsive, remedial and environment-building. These can be undertaken in tandem or in isolation.

**Responsive action** involves any activity undertaken to prevent abuse resulting from violence, coercion or forced deprivation, or alleviate its immediate effects (Slim and Bonwick, 2005). These activities are carried out when abuse is threatened or in its immediate aftermath, to try to mitigate their effects on civilians. Examples of responsive actions in conflict include: 1) directly engaging warring parties on their wartime responsibilities – mainly by ICRC, but increasingly also by other aid actors; 2) providing direct services to victims of abuse by being present in affected areas, transferring or evacuating people from affected areas and providing information and communications; 3) alleviating victims' immediate suffering through the provision of emergency material, medical assistance and psychosocial care, for example to victims of sexual violence; and 4) public and private lobbying of international actors. In situations of active conflict, responsive activities will be prioritised. While responsive activities are also important in situations of protracted crisis, there will also be an emphasis on remedial actions which assist affected populations while they live with the effects of the abuse.

**Remedial action** focuses on assisting and supporting people while they live with the effects of abuse, and are often the same as responsive actions but with a longer-term focus. Additional actions might include promoting justice for victims and due process for perpetrators and supporting and protecting organisations working to defend rights, such as the provision of legal advice and access to justice programmes in Darfur (Pantuliano and O'Callaghan, 2006).

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<sup>2</sup> A livelihood group can be defined as group of people with similar food and income sources, and who face similar risks and/or would respond in a similar way to those risks.

The third sphere of protection activity is **environment-building**. This relates to fostering an environment conducive to respect for the individual's rights. It is concerned with moving society as a whole towards political, social, cultural and institutional norms that prevent or limit violations and abuse. Environment-building activities in Darfur have included support to state committees on combating sexual violence (Pantuliano and O'Callaghan, 2006: 10).

Different *modes* of protective action can be used in responsive, remedial and environment-building work. Persuasion, mobilisation and denunciation are different forms of advocacy aimed at promoting compliance and cooperation on the part of the authorities or abusive parties with their responsibilities to protect civilians (Caverzasio, 2001; Slim and Bonwick, 2005).. The fourth and fifth modes of protective action – capacity-building and substitution – involve providing direct practical assistance or expertise to the authorities to assist them in protecting civilians, or aid to civilian communities themselves in place of the authorities.

Many organisations new to protection do not have the skills, experience or mandate to develop these 'stand-alone' protection activities and have instead focused on incorporating protection approaches into their ongoing assistance activities. 'Mainstreaming protection' is the term which describes humanitarian programming (such as food, shelter or healthcare) which also helps mitigate or prevent harm to civilians related to the induced deprivation which often accompanies conflict or abusive situations. Protection mainstreaming goes further than mitigating the harmful effects of humanitarian assistance ('do no harm'), and involves purposefully using assistance to help keep people safe. This means that protection considerations must be deliberately integrated into the design and implementation of assistance programmes from the outset (InterAction, 2004: 8). Protection can thus be considered as much 'an orientation and a way of approaching one's humanitarian work as it is a set of particular activities' (*ibid.*: 4).

### 3.1.4 Livelihoods activities

Livelihood interventions are not well-defined. A huge variety of different types of interventions is possible, depending on the types of livelihoods affected and the nature of the risks facing different population groups. Broadly speaking, livelihood interventions can be divided into those that

support the assets people need to carry out their livelihood strategies, and interventions that support policies, institutions and processes (Lautze and Stites 2003; Young, Osman et al. 2007).

The objectives of livelihoods programming in emergencies can range from assisting in meeting basic needs to livelihood protection and livelihood recovery. Although relatively rare, there are an increasing number of examples of livelihoods interventions during on-going conflict, most of which focus on improving food security. These interventions can be categorised as production, income and market support (Sphere, 2004). While food aid comprises the bulk of humanitarian assistance in emergencies, humanitarian agencies are increasingly using a range of food security responses in both natural disasters and conflict situations. For example, income generation and cash transfers (grants, vouchers, cash for work) are increasingly used in situations of conflict, as well as natural disasters (Harvey, 2007). The provision of seeds and tools is probably the most common emergency livelihood support intervention after food aid, but it has been criticised as rarely being based on an assessment of availability and access to seeds (Levine and Chastre, 2004).

Emergency livelihood interventions to enhance or support policies, institutions and processes are much less common than the provision of goods or cash. Support for markets is an exception as there has been an increase in NGO interest in supporting markets in emergencies. Supporting PIPs can include support for services, such as veterinary care, education and health care, or creating or strengthening institutions such as farming cooperatives, women's groups, or local systems for natural resource management. Other interventions could include influencing policies, for example on exports or border closures (easing border restrictions can allow remittance flows), and policies on taxation, land rights and compensation for lost assets (Lautze and Stites 2003). In conflict, this might include systems for promoting justice, customary law and local conflict resolution, promoting access to information and services.

As with other forms of humanitarian assistance, emergency livelihoods support in conflict requires the application of humanitarian principles, in particular the principle of humanity (to prevent and alleviate suffering wherever it is found), neutrality (not taking sides) and impartiality (no discrimination on the basis of race, religious

beliefs, class or political opinion, and to relieve suffering solely on the basis of need). Ensuring impartiality can be challenging when taking a livelihoods approach because it can involve working with, and building the capacity of, local institutions which may not apply the same principles, or because it can give the appearance of being biased in favour of certain population groups. Many agencies have adopted a 'do no harm' approach, which involves analysing potential tensions within and between groups, control over resources and how aid influences this. It also includes looking at the broader political and security impacts, and finding ways of minimising potential negative impacts (Anderson, 1999).

### **3.2 Similarities and complementarities in livelihoods and protection analysis**

Livelihoods and protection approaches both emphasise contextual understanding and ensuring that responses hinge on an in-depth analysis of the nature of the threats faced by conflict-affected populations, who is most vulnerable to threats and deprivation and the impact of violations on affected populations. However, these analyses tend to be undertaken separately, thus causing duplication and minimising opportunities for greater collaboration.

Many protection risks are also risks to livelihoods, especially as regards deliberate deprivation and restrictions on movement and access. For example, deprivation through deliberate assault on assets, displacement or forced labour all have livelihoods implications, as well as raising protection issues. Restriction of movement and access, such as roadblocks, border closures and the destruction of markets, have serious consequences for livelihoods. A consideration of protection risks associated with deliberate personal violence (such as murder, rape and other physical violence) may not be understood as direct livelihoods risks, but will certainly have direct and indirect consequences.

Both protection and livelihoods analyses in conflict usually incorporate aspects of political economy analysis (i.e. analysis of the strategies of all key stakeholders in the conflict), to gain an understanding of why certain (livelihood) groups are pursuing a policy of violations. A livelihoods analysis is more likely to give consideration to both the political and the economic dynamics of a conflict, whereas a protection analysis may emphasise political issues (for instance, it may give less consideration to grey economies), though

this will be context-dependent. Questioning communities about the abusive or warring strategies of different actors can place them and humanitarian agencies at risk. A livelihoods analysis has been recommended as a comparatively safe way of investigating sensitive political and economic relationships in insecure environments, as these are examined indirectly by exploring how people live (Collinson, 2003). This was done by ODI in a number of case studies examining the political economy of conflict. More recently, in a series of workshops in Darfur, the livelihoods framework was used as a neutral forum for discussion between different stakeholders with of diverging aims and views (Young, Osman et al., 2007b).

Both approaches incorporate analysis at macro- and micro-levels. Although not described as such, analysis of the protective environment overlaps significantly with an analysis of policies, institutions and processes. Protection analysis includes a review of the legislative environment (both international and national law) and customary practice governing a particular context; the capacity of different institutions (whether courts, security officials or local systems of administration) to support or enforce compliance, as well as an analysis of the level of respect for these laws and policies. Legislative and security arrangements feature more prominently in a protection analysis, but would also feature as one of a number of PIPs considered under a livelihoods analysis. Similarly, an analysis of changes in the nature of the conflict, and the role of violence within this, is an important component of both a protection and livelihoods analysis. An earlier paper published by ODI (Narbeth and McLean, 2003) highlights these similarities in protection and livelihoods analysis. It recommends a joint protection and livelihoods analysis which, in addition to assets and strategies, looks at the more structural causes of exploitative relations to hold duty-bearers to account and reduce the negative impacts of aid.

Both models seek to understand the impact of crisis on vulnerability, and the actions communities undertake in response to it. For the communities in conflict-affected areas, the source of the vulnerability that brings about livelihoods and protection problems is likely to be the same. The response strategies of affected populations will also feature in both sets of analyses, with livelihoods studies considering how livelihoods strategies change in times of acute crisis, as well as the short- and long-term impact on livelihoods.

A protection analysis will also explore how communities respond, although this component tends to be marginal (Bonwick, 2006). Recent research in Uganda has combined the livelihoods framework with a human security framework to better identify the threats and vulnerabilities faced by different populations, and the ways in which local strategies influence both livelihoods and protection. A key objective was to design responses which supported effective livelihood and protective strategies (Stites, Mazurana et al., 2006).

The methodologies employed in the analysis will also be similar, in that they will include a mix of primary and secondary research, with participatory approaches featuring strongly in both. As outlined above, protection assessments can raise difficulties in terms of both security and sensitivity, which means that collecting information through a livelihoods approach may in certain instances provide opportunities to explore protection issues in non-conductive environments.

### **3.3 Differences in analysis**

A livelihoods analysis considers the impact of conflict on different livelihoods groups in terms of changes in their strategies and assets, how groups inter-relate, and the wider impact of policies, institutions and processes. The analysis usually adopts a global rather than individual perspective, analysing threats and vulnerabilities at the level of livelihood groups rather than at the individual level.

Rather than taking an approach based on the strategies and assets of particular livelihood groups, a protection analysis will focus on a set of particular human rights or IHL violations. Depending on the agency in question, these may be analysed explicitly in terms of the violation of law, with a legal standards and responsibility analysis, or may be interpreted in terms of specific issues, such as sexual violence, freedom of movement or access to assistance. Rather than focusing on the population as a whole or specific livelihood groups, a protection analysis will break down the population into different forms of social distinction which may give rise to vulnerability or marginalisation (e.g. legal status such as IDP or refugee; religious group; ethnicity).

A protection analysis will often go further than a livelihoods analysis in that it will review not only the cause and impact of a violation, but also the question of responsibility and intent. It will identify

which actor is responsible for the abuse and why the abuse occurred (deliberate/negligence, policy/isolated incident, ordered/weak chain of command). It will also identify which actor is responsible for protecting civilians and the degree of capacity and willingness they have to protect. As such, protection analysis can be described as political, in that it is mapping patterns of warfare in order to promote changes in behaviour.

Both livelihoods and protection analysis may be undertaken on a periodic basis to determine risks and the impact of conflict to inform the design of an intervention. Protection analysis often continues for as long as the protection concern persists, and monitoring the factors influencing livelihoods is a common agency activity in protracted crises (for example, monitoring of markets). Whilst ongoing livelihoods analysis is mainly designed to track changes in the risk environment and the process and impact of livelihoods interventions, for protection the aim is also to monitor, document and report violations and abuses, either as part of ongoing dialogue with the responsible authorities or in order to inform the advocacy efforts of the organisation in question, or of the protection community as a whole.

### **3.4 Similarities and complementarities in action**

Given the similarities in the types of issues that livelihoods and protection actors are concerned with in their analysis, to what degree are there also similarities in action? Current practice indicates that there three areas of related practice which can be built upon to enable greater complementarity.

#### *3.4.1 Do No Harm approaches and mainstreaming protection*

‘Principled’ programming features significantly in both livelihoods and protection. This is programming in conflict which aims to minimise negative impacts (‘Do No Harm’) and adhere to humanitarian principles. Negative impacts include the diversion of aid to more powerful groups, aid fuelling conflict, the informal taxation of aid and aid increasing the risk of attack. These issues are now frequently referred to as protection issues, but have been recognised as risks associated with programming (in particular food aid) in conflict since the early 1990s. It was also the subject of a large body of literature in the late 1990s

concerned with applying humanitarian principles in programming (Leader 1998; Leader 2000).

As described above, some agencies integrate Do No Harm approaches into their 'mainstreaming' protection work, whereas others approach the two separately. Mainstreaming protection principles builds on the Do No Harm approach of minimising negative impacts, and also incorporates questions of safety into assistance work. In many circumstances, the two may be indistinguishable (such as, for example safe locations for latrines, lighting, safe access to water and cooking fuel, food distributions planned with the assistance of women). In protection circles, this would be described as 'mainstreaming protection', whereas in livelihoods it would be referred to as principled programming or Do No Harm.

Both livelihoods and protection specialists identify risks to beneficiaries associated with programming in conflict situations and develop strategies to minimise them. However, the responsibility for reorienting programmes in light of the identification of these risks rests with programme managers or technical sectoral experts (such as food distribution, water and sanitation, food security/livelihoods programme managers), rather than with protection personnel. An opportunity exists, therefore, to maximise the potential to reduce risks and increase safety if livelihoods and protection personnel work together in identifying risks, as well as strategies to address them. Given the frequent isolation of protection staff from programme staff, this might also provide a useful entry-point for ensuring that broader protection issues are taken into account.

#### *3.4.2 Working at the community level: complementary action to improve protection and livelihoods outcomes*

Livelihoods and protection analyses identify direct action that can be carried out by humanitarian organisations to assist affected populations. More complementary action between the two spheres of work may enhance both protection and livelihoods outcomes.

Livelihoods programming, and humanitarian assistance in general, can have specific protection objectives by ensuring equal access to services, either through the identification of marginalised groups or by assisting different groups to access their entitlements. The provision of adequate humanitarian assistance per se can be an important protection measure, as harm can result

from inadequate access to basic needs. Provision of food to minority groups previously denied access is an important response to abuse and a form of protection. Therefore, decision-making on *where* to intervene and *which groups* to assist is critical; these decisions can be guided by an analysis which identifies marginalised and excluded groups. This can be either a protection or a livelihoods analysis, and it is important that the different specialists work together and share analyses on issues of marginalisation. Protection considerations may also mean that certain groups are targeted, not on the basis of need alone, but rather to reduce risks of tension between different groups or to create an opportunity or space for protective action, for instance through the development of contacts and relations with different groups (whether conflicting parties or the authorities) so that dialogue, negotiation and education on protection can occur. This response may require a measure of flexibility in relation to the humanitarian principle of impartiality (populations are not solely targeted on the basis of need). Finally, specific programmes or programme modalities may be devised to maximise the aid the most vulnerable groups receive; such as soup kitchens in Somalia or widow bakeries in Afghanistan. Informing people of the services available to them is promoted as a way of enhancing beneficiary access and promoting accountability in both livelihoods and protection work (e.g. WFP, 2000; Creti and Jaspars, 2006; Slim and Bonwick, 2005).

There are also opportunities to design programmes which have both livelihoods and protection objectives (as opposed to integrating protection principles into assistance). Such programmes would aim to reduce immediate risks, prevent people from having to adopt survival strategies that expose them to new secondary risks or provide people with safer options. For example, if people are collecting firewood in order to increase their income, but this is placing them at risk of attack, livelihoods programming can assist in creating safer alternatives. Other skills-based or income generating activities, or interventions which reduce expenditure or increase access to services, can help reduce vulnerability, for instance among young people at risk of recruitment into fighting forces. There is evidence of this from Darfur, where the provision of food aid was found to reduce people's need to adopt strategies that involved risks to their personal safety, or to engage in exploitative labour relations (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars 2006). Also in Darfur, CHF implemented a number of

livelihood interventions, including production and sale of shelter materials through women's groups, income generation, vocational training, veterinary care and the provision of small livestock. These programmes were found to have positive impacts on civilian security by providing safe sources of income. The provision of services and skills building may also be more difficult for armed actors or others with power to steal or manipulate (Hill, Diener et al. 2006). Some livelihoods interventions may also have the potential to bring people on opposing sides together, by creating opportunities for economic and social interaction (*ibid*). In situations of displacement, providing information on conditions in places of origin can be an important complement to resettlement and recovery packages.

Protection and livelihoods staff may also be able to facilitate each others' work. For instance, protection staff help facilitate discussions and negotiations between affected populations and protection actors, such as national authorities or international peacekeepers. As livelihoods staff are more likely to be present in the field, they can also help raise protection problems witnessed when undertaking programmatic work.

#### *3.4.3 Working at the structural level: complementary advocacy and capacity building to achieve livelihoods and protection outcomes*

While livelihoods analysis frequently identifies structural issues to be adopted in advocacy, livelihoods specialists often lack the access and skills to pursue advocacy in practice. Meanwhile, protection staff frequently undertake advocacy, but its level and content may be limited due to concerns about security. The opportunity exists, therefore, for protection specialists to use information on the impact of conflict on livelihoods in their advocacy. A focus on livelihoods may also offer an entry-point for more sensitive discussions.

Protection advocacy, in turn, should have an impact on livelihoods. Different modes of protection advocacy were discussed earlier. Local persuasion may be particularly effective when the harmful practices which result in risks to both livelihoods and protection relates to a lack of control and command, rather than a deliberate policy. For instance, engaging local commanders on issues such as freedom of movement or illegal taxation or extortion may result in more effective control over rogue groups. More concerted action may be required when there is a deliberate policy

of abuse. Progress may be possible through education on IHL, consistent demarches to the authorities, mobilising influential third parties to bring pressure to bear, or denouncing activities publicly where other measures prove ineffective. Opportunities may also exist for humanitarian agencies to provide technical assistance and other forms of support to the relevant parties so that change can occur. For instance, in a context where the legislative environment is resulting in discriminatory policies towards certain groups (for instance excluding women from working or accessing land), humanitarian organisations may be able to provide technical assistance or finance to revise the legislation.

While working at the community and policy levels has been distinguished here for the sake of explanation, complementarity between protection and livelihoods approaches should provide for an integrated approach which combines assistance to mitigate negative impacts on communities, and dialogue and advocacy to change policy. Thus, livelihoods and protection responses are undertaken jointly, and are mutually reinforcing.

#### *3.4.4 Complementary approaches and skills*

Protection and livelihoods action both emphasise participation, capacity-building and linking actions at micro and macro levels. Participation is believed to be of particular relevance in protection in order to understand how different sections of the community experience abuse, and how targeted abuse may be a deliberate strategy aimed at marginalising and disadvantaging certain sections of the population. Likewise, in a livelihoods approach appropriate interventions need to be determined by people themselves, rather than by outsiders. A livelihoods approach is therefore participatory both in terms of the analysis of people's priorities and goals (including an analysis of different groups of people) and by involving them in programme design, implementation and monitoring. The issue of *who* participates is crucial in both protection and livelihoods approaches, as groups with greater power are likely to dominate unless marginalised and exploited populations are actively sought out.

In both protection and livelihoods approaches, capacity-building is an important element of response. In livelihoods programming, this might include building the capacities of households and communities, as well as of local institutions. Capacity-building as a protection activity is appropriate where responsible authorities

and communities are willing to take action, but do not have the means to do so. It involves the provision of support, finances and/or technical expertise to authorities to assist them to act.

However, the two approaches also require distinct skills sets – in the case of livelihoods, knowledge

of livelihoods concepts and frameworks and participatory assessment methods, as well as experience in the practical implementation of a range of different livelihoods interventions. In protection, the necessary skills include analysis, negotiation and communication abilities.

# Chapter 4: Organisational issues for joined-up livelihoods and protection programming

## 4.1 Introduction

This section draws on interviews with representatives from humanitarian organisations working on livelihoods and protection (see Annex 3 for a list of interviewees). It describes their experience of linking livelihoods and protection, and some of the challenges faced.

There was widespread recognition of the links between livelihoods and protection in situations of conflict, and wide support for the development of greater linkages between the two. While all agencies reported using Do No Harm approaches in assistance, many others had proactively linked protection and livelihoods programming. In such instances, the initial entry-point for complementary programming derives either from protection or from livelihoods, rather than being the outcome of integrated assessments and project design from the start. The success and constraints in linking the two in practice, and how links were made, depended to a large degree on each agency's mandate, the size and complexity of the organisation (including the number of sectors it works in) and issues of skills and capacity.

Three recurring themes can be identified from our interviews:

1. Agencies with an initial focus on protection had probably gone furthest in terms of joined-up protection and livelihoods programming in emergencies (e.g. ICRC, SC-UK, UNHCR).
2. Agencies often had greater expertise in one area than the other. Joined-up programming was thus constrained due to limited skills and expertise in the other sector (e.g. UNHCR, IRC, which have stronger capacity in protection; WFP, ACF, which have stronger capacity in food security/livelihoods).
3. Many agencies reported challenges in integrated programming. This was particularly so for agencies with either a mixed mandate (e.g. Oxfam) or those working in a number of sectors (e.g. ICRC and SC-UK).

Other key issues included a lack of capacity within the humanitarian sector in general in both protection and livelihoods programming in emergencies, as well as difficulties in securing funding for livelihoods programming in conflict,

since livelihoods work is usually seen as a recovery or development intervention. The different approaches of agencies are discussed in detail below.

## 4.2 Joint programming in agencies with a protection mandate

Agencies such as ICRC, UNHCR and SC-UK have protection expertise, but also undertake other forms of assistance programming, including in livelihoods-related sectors. ICRC has a holistic (and unusual) approach to assistance and protection, whereby protection involves discussion with duty-bearers to encourage adherence to legal duties under IHL (representation), and assistance deals with the consequences of the actions of warring parties. ICRC's approach also incorporates all the elements of linking protection and livelihoods considered in chapter 3, under the section on similarities and complementarities. There is therefore an explicit recognition that economic security work can contribute to protection objectives, which may become more significant in contexts where there is limited adherence to IHL. As described above, ensuring protection can also involve ensuring that all conflict-affected groups are considered for assistance, and that the provision of assistance to particular groups does not create tensions. In Darfur, this includes providing veterinary care to pastoralist groups aligned with the government, as well as assistance to IDPs and rural war-affected populations aligned with the opposition. This means that, whilst protection threats are the starting-point for ICRC's work, the response is not necessarily limited to protection.

According to ICRC, the most sophisticated integrated approach in a humanitarian programme is based on a joint analysis, so that protection and assistance responses complement each other and can have a cumulative impact. For example in Darfur, the ICRC has deployed 'polyvalent delegates' – generalists whose task is to identify violations and then ask for support from protection and/or economic security delegates in developing a coherent strategy. Each sub-delegation develops local strategic frameworks which describe how different responses will contribute to the overall protection objective. In other contexts, joined-up programming may be more ad hoc. For example, in

Sri Lanka an economic security assessment found that the impact of drought was exacerbated because people looking for work in the city were subjected to harassment. Through dialogue with local authorities, protection and economic security delegates were able to reduce the level of harassment.

UNICEF and SC-UK both use the Convention on the Rights of the Child as their operational framework. Programmes linking protection and livelihoods occur mainly in DDR work, in particular the reintegration of former child soldiers. According to SC-UK, livelihoods programmes for demobilised soldiers usually have two objectives: improving literacy and skills, and economic development. The latter is often very difficult because of constraints at the macro-economic or policy level. In Liberia, for example, linkages between livelihoods and protection were only achieved in the second phase of SC-UK's demobilisation project. A number of projects were started, including vocational training, apprenticeship schemes and small business start-up kits. However, children were often trained in skills which could not lead to viable livelihoods in their communities, and so in the third phase the approach was to focus on the community as a whole. In general, however, concerns were raised about the lack of rigorous economic surveys or livelihoods analysis to inform reintegration programming. The analysis of livelihoods and protection linkages in the Liberia programme is the start of a process of learning within SC-UK to bring together its expertise in both protection and livelihoods work (Rizzi 2007). SC-UK has also tried to integrate child protection into its Household Economy Approach (HEA) work, and is adapting its HEA methodology for situations of conflict (SC-UK 2005; SC-UK and Food Economy Group 2007, forthcoming).

UNICEF faces similar issues in its reintegration programmes for former child soldiers, but has the additional constraint of not having in-house livelihoods expertise. UNICEF's preferred approach is to focus on assisting communities to which former child soldiers return, rather than providing assistance to individuals. It is considering the use of cash transfers to support communities in reintegrating former child soldiers (Jaspars and Harvey 2007).

UNHCR has a mandate to protect refugees, IDPs and other persons of concern. This involves a range of activities, from supporting refugees in securing asylum to the provision of assistance and

coordination of camps for displaced populations. UNHCR's participatory assessments frequently highlight the linkages between livelihoods and protection risks. However, as UNHCR does not have expertise in livelihoods, livelihoods projects are often carried out in partnership with the ILO. Projects often focus on micro-credit or income generation, but have also included advocacy on access to land for refugees, and access to trade and employment. Livelihoods interventions will vary in accordance with the stage of displacement. For example, during displacement the main aim may be to prevent risks, such as gender violence or forced recruitment, whereas preparing for durable solutions is more likely to focus on achieving self-reliance. At this stage, livelihoods are related not just to economic security, but also include land issues (compensation for lost land, land titles, documentation), as well as legal and civil status.

UNHCR and UNICEF both reported difficulties in finding suitable partners for livelihood interventions, as agencies experienced in livelihoods programming often work in development and may not be present at the emergency phase of crises. Even when agencies have experience in livelihoods in emergencies, the initial focus is frequently on food distribution and nutrition. UNHCR therefore feels that there is a need for agencies with livelihoods expertise to be active in crises.

#### **4.3 Links between livelihoods and protection programming in other agencies**

A number of other (non-mandated) agencies have made efforts to link livelihoods and protection work. Some, like Oxfam and IRC, work in both livelihoods and protection. Others, like ACF, FAO and WFP, work mainly in food aid or food security, but may have adapted assessment methods for situations of conflict, adopted Do No Harm approaches, considered the protective impact of livelihoods interventions and sometimes even considered a wider role in protection. Many examples can be found within these agencies of joined-up programming, but there is as yet no systematic or institutionalised approach for linking the two.

The incentive for undertaking joint programming results from protection and livelihoods staff encountering issues which would benefit from a more integrated response. For instance, protection specialists often identify protection issues that relate to livelihoods strategies, or to the way in

which assistance is delivered. Oxfam protection assessments in Darfur and Chad found that certain groups were being excluded from food distributions, and identified protection risks associated with community livelihoods strategies (such as the risky collection of firewood or travel to farms and markets, the need to engage in survival sex when assistance was inadequate, and a lack of livelihood support for returnees) (Oxfam, internal documents, 2007). Similar issues were raised in WFP protection assessments, in relation to registration, the manipulation of assistance, the exclusion of marginalised groups from distributions (which in turn may cause protection risks due to the alternative subsistence strategies these groups are compelled to use) and targeting (Martin, Lonnerfors et al. 2004; Mahoney, Loughton et al. 2005; Eguren, Bizzarri et al. 2006; Thoulouzan, Rana et al. 2006).

Similarly, livelihoods and food security assessments can highlight many protection risks, for example to do with bonded labour, extortion, lack of freedom of movement, forced repatriation or the use of survival sex as a livelihoods strategy. An ACF food security assessment of Chechen IDPs in Ingushetia found that, whilst there was an official policy in favour of repatriation, 82% did not want to return home because of insecurity, lack of shelter and inadequate income. The survey illustrated the protection implications related to return, in particular that return was unlikely to be voluntary, as assistance was being decreased in Ingushetia (ACF 2004). SC-UK in Bunia, DRC, showed how access to markets and farmland was linked to ethnicity and to where people lived (SC-UK 2003).

Whether and how livelihoods issues such as these are followed by action depends on the expertise, focus and capacity of the agency concerned. In Darfur, for instance, Oxfam's work on integrated livelihoods and protection programming went through a number of different stages. The first involved a senior protection advisor mainstreaming protection into the agency's assistance work by assessing and monitoring protection risks and advising on safe programming. The advisor also initiated dedicated protection activities, such as local-level advocacy on the adequate registration of new IDPs and on preventing forced return. In the second phase, dedicated protection programme managers were appointed to undertake small-scale projects, such as the development of alternative income sources and other ways of meeting basic needs. This led to the introduction of fuel-efficient stoves and a one-

off firewood distribution. In the third phase, protection programming was reduced to protection mainstreaming within existing core programmes (mainly water and sanitation). Finally, the fourth phase has involved the introduction of livelihoods programming as a new programme sector, one of the objectives of which is to reduce protection risks. There are plans to reintroduce fuel-efficient stoves, along with a number of other livelihoods programmes, for example limited restocking paraveterinary training, the provision of seeds and tools and cash grants.

This example can be contrasted with Oxfam's work in the Philippines, where from 2004 livelihoods, public health and protection programmes were implemented within an overall protection framework. The programme combined the provision of direct assistance with raising civilians' awareness of their rights, increasing the knowledge of warring parties of their responsibilities under international law, as well as strengthening government services and community organisation and improving the links between the two.

IRC has established an economic recovery and development unit as part of a focus on post-conflict programming. However, increasingly the work of this unit is being applied to conflict situations. A particular challenge has been that, once economic projects are started, economic objectives tend to take over from protection objectives.

There are a large number of examples of food security and livelihoods agencies incorporating protection concerns into their work. As described above, this ranges from Do No Harm approaches to more dedicated protection activities. Agencies such as ACF, WFP and FAO describe their work in terms of rights, and thus view the provision of assistance as one element in protection.

WFP's experience in integrating protection into its assistance programming spans the full spectrum, from Do No Harm to more dedicated protection activities. Much of WFP's role in protection is about good-quality programming: ensuring the accurate registration of beneficiaries, minimising manipulation and diversion, ensuring that those most in need are effectively targeted and ensuring that targeting one group over another does not create additional tensions. There is also a recognition that a good food distribution needs socio-political information. Similarly, accurate registration is necessary to provide protection from

exclusion (Mahoney, Laughton et al. 2005). For example, in Colombia, knowing that official registrations excluded many IDPs, WFP relied on a number of different information sources for its beneficiary numbers. Clear and well-communicated targeting criteria are another way of minimising exclusion. In some conflict zones, WFP has adapted distribution schedules, or changed commodities, to minimise the risk of attack for beneficiaries. In Liberia, for instance, WFP reduced distribution intervals so that people had less food to carry home, and distributed less valuable commodities to minimise the risk of theft. In DRC and Colombia, WFP implemented school feeding for both IDP and host communities (Martin, Lonnerfors et al. 2004; Eguren, Bizzarri et al. 2006; Thoulouzan, Rana et al. 2006).

As the largest humanitarian agency, often with the greatest physical access and considerable political influence with governments and warring parties, WFP has a potentially powerful advocacy role. WFP's work in Burma is an example of efforts to mitigate protection risks relating to food insecurity. Lack of access to land in Burma is an important contributor to food insecurity, and has immediate implications for WFP's Food for Work (FFW) programmes. WFP does not use FFW to help people develop terraces unless the government guarantees land rights for these people. WFP is also undertaking advocacy to reduce the impact of taxes. Other food security agencies, such as ACF, have a similar but more systematic approach to advocacy. For example in Laos, people are forcibly displaced if they have no access to irrigation systems, so ACF works to provide such systems. Advocacy is directly linked to food security issues on the ground. Strategies may also be directly aimed at influencing government policy, and/or work with other governments and donors to influence the government in question.

Fuel-efficient stoves in Darfur were repeatedly mentioned as *the* example of joined-up protection and livelihoods programming, as they involve minimising the protection risks associated with livelihood strategies (collecting firewood). However, while a large number of agencies have been involved, recent surveys have indicated only limited impact on protection as women have continued to collect firewood in order to generate income (Women's Commission, 2006). A similar intervention relates to the provision of donkeys to assist in firewood collection, which also limits the regularity with which women have to forage.

A new area of involvement for agencies is cash transfers, including in complex emergencies such as Somalia and Afghanistan (Hoffman, 2005; Mattinen and Ogden, 2006; Majid, Hussein et al., 2007). Cash transfers can have important benefits, such as providing choice and cost-efficiency, but like food distribution they may also be subject to manipulation, theft and diversion. Agencies involved in cash transfers, for example ACF and Oxfam, have developed ways of assessing and minimising risks associated in particular with the delivery and distribution of cash (Creti and Jaspars, 2006). Cash transfers may be less prone to diversion and corruption as fewer actors are involved in delivery or storage. In general, however, less attention is given to issues of manipulation in evaluations of cash programmes than in food distribution programmes.

#### **4.4 Challenges of integrated programming within agencies**

All agencies reported challenges in developing integrated programmes. This applied not just to livelihoods and protection programming, but also to the integration of other sectors. Linking programming on the ground to advocacy work (on protection) was also a challenge for many.

A number of different reasons for this were highlighted. First, many agencies develop expertise and capacity in specific and compartmentalised sectors. The tendency, therefore, is to set up separate programmes within each sector. The larger the overall programme, the greater the tendency to limit involvement to as few sectors as possible. A lack of organisation-wide analytical frameworks makes it difficult for different sectors or departments within the organisation to link their programmes such that they tend towards a common goal. Coordinating across different sectors is thus challenging as it involves different departments and teams,<sup>3</sup> as well as coordination between headquarters, regional and country teams. Only ICRC and UNHCR have staff within the protection department whose specific responsibility is to work on assistance–

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<sup>3</sup> For example in Oxfam, this would be the Humanitarian (emergency livelihoods and food security advisors and protection advisors) and the Campaigns and Policy Department (Humanitarian Policy Advisors, Advocacy Advisors, Livelihoods Advisors). In WFP this would be the Policy Department and the Operations Department (Assessment Analysis and Preparedness Division, and regional bureaus). In SC-UK it would be the Hunger Team, the Protection Team and the Emergencies team, etc.

protection linkages. Even within the same country programme, different parts of the organisation may be responsible for different elements of livelihoods or protection programming in conflict. For example, a political analysis may be carried out by one part of the organisation, livelihoods analysis by another, and protection analysis by yet another team, but findings may not necessarily be shared or analysed together to form a coherent programme strategy.

In addition, programmes are often determined by the sectoral expertise that is already on the ground, or the composition of the initial assessment mission. In theory, this should not matter as long as everyone is able to identify key issues in different sectors. In practice, however, this often leads to programme recommendations that mirror the sectoral composition of teams on the ground or of assessment mission teams. It is rare for agencies to have both a livelihoods and a protection presence on the ground in on-going programmes, or to have an assessment team with expertise in both livelihoods and protection.

The bigger the organisation, and the more sectors it is involved in, the more difficult it becomes to achieve a consistent programme approach. Even within ICRC, the sheer size of the organisation means that it is difficult to achieve a homogenous approach, and the ideal integrated approach described above is rare. This problem exists within agencies with a highly decentralised approach to programme decision-making (e.g. SC-UK and UNICEF), agencies where much of the decision-making is devolved to regional offices (Oxfam) and agencies which have a highly centralised approach (ICRC). It remains open as to whether more centralised decision-making is more conducive to consistent programming.

There are also challenges in balancing scale and complexity. As sectoral projects within a single programme become more diverse, so the programme will become more complex and the tendency will be to make the overall programme smaller in terms of area covered or beneficiaries reached. At the same time, many agencies aim to reach the maximum number of beneficiaries in humanitarian crises, which is easier with a single sector response. Large, diverse programmes may

also be too complex to manage well. Similarly, it is easier to secure and manage funding for a limited number of large-scale programmes than for a larger portfolio of smaller interventions. For agencies without specific protection mandates, there are often fears that involvement in protection programming will divert attention away from meeting responsibilities in core sectors, or worse, that this may put staff at risk. Similarly, for some agencies which include protection but not livelihoods in their humanitarian programme, the addition of livelihoods programmes often appears daunting if capacity to run other programmes is already stretched. So even if the link between livelihoods and protection is recognised, it may not be achieved for reasons of capacity and fundraising.

In many agencies, the concept of protection and what it means is often not well understood. Almost all agencies recognise the IASC definition of protection, but have either adopted a narrower working definition or have found it difficult to determine what it means in practice. At the same time, agencies may adopt a rights-based approach to humanitarian programming, which some also interpret as a form of protection. Protection and rights-based programming is often done by different teams within an organisation. Lack of clarity over what protection means leads to inconsistent programming, and fear that it may be too complex to integrate within existing programmes. Emergency livelihoods programming faces similar constraints, as livelihoods programming is generally understood as something that is done once the emergency is over, as part of a recovery intervention.

The most important management issues are how to encourage staff to think holistically. However, as the preceding analysis has indicated, this is extremely difficult in practice. Whilst joint assessments might be one way of achieving this, this is not always possible or even necessary if all humanitarian staff have the skills to be able to identify key risks and threats to populations in conflict, regardless of their own sectoral expertise. Programme design, or strategy development, is probably most important in developing more joined-up programmes, and it is at this stage that the relevant sectoral experts need to become involved.



## Chapter 5: Conclusion

The way in which conflict-affected people understand, prepare for and respond to the threats they face remains relatively unknown to humanitarian practitioners. However, it is clear that these processes are central to people's ability to withstand and survive conflict. While humanitarian organisations create clear distinctions between protection and livelihoods, endangered populations recognise no such differences. For conflict-affected populations, livelihoods and protection responses are inextricably linked. Difficult choices are made, often between unpalatable and unsafe options, and frequently based on limited information. However, it is important not to over-emphasise the significance of what are often extremely curtailed survival strategies on the part of affected populations. This preliminary analysis shows that, during conflict, people's options become more limited, but the risks to consider increase, including in particular the risks to personal safety. Livelihoods strategies are still pursued, although often at extreme risk to people's security. Similarly, minimising security risks frequently involves short- or long-term costs to livelihoods.

There are similarities and complementarities between protection and livelihoods approaches in humanitarian programming. Both involve a significant emphasis on analysis, at micro- and macro-levels. Protection and livelihoods assessments both consider the risks and threats that people face, the impact of violations and who is most vulnerable, and elements of the political economy of conflict. Many protection risks are also risks to livelihoods. In terms of response, there are important potential synergies between the two areas, incorporating principled or Do No Harm approaches to assistance, ensuring access to assistance by the most marginalised groups, expanding the range of options (including livelihoods interventions) available to threatened communities to minimise security risks, opening up space for engaging in sensitive protection activities or working at the policy and institutional level to change the overall protection or livelihoods environment. Much would therefore be gained from sharing analysis and collaboration between livelihoods and protection specialists.

While a number of organisations have recognised the linkages between protection and livelihoods, programming in this area is relatively new and learning has not yet been captured or developed. Examples where programming is integrated from the time of assessment and programme design are limited. Most often, protection has been the entry-point for joint programming. However, for agencies which do not have both protection and livelihoods expertise this has proved challenging. Funding for livelihoods programming in conflict is another challenge. There are also a number of examples where food aid or food security agencies have incorporated protection into their work, mainly through safe and dignified programming and combining programming on the ground with advocacy. The difficulties in integrated approaches to humanitarian programming often relate to issues of size and the complexity of the organisation, the way it is structured and skills and capacity. This affects agencies' abilities to pursue complementary action in protection and livelihoods work, leading to what have generally been ad hoc activities in this area.

Despite these challenges, the findings from this preliminary review highlight the important role that complementary livelihoods and protection work can play in improving analysis, mitigating risks, helping to provide people with an expanded number of safer options during conflict and assisting in maintaining survival strategies or creating new livelihood strategies for the future. Whether it is better targeted and planned food distributions that minimise risks to recipients, implementing livelihoods interventions with specific protection objectives, or working with authorities to reduce levels of harassment, integrated approaches in this area have resulted in benefits for affected populations. No specific model or approach to this work has emerged, and it is likely that different approaches will be relevant to different contexts and agencies. Given the priorities and actions of conflict-affected populations, and the potential for greater complementarity in the activities of humanitarian agencies, it is hoped that further research can generate greater understanding, learning and the development of best practice across these different approaches.



# Annex 1: Review of livelihoods approaches, frameworks and activities

## A1.1 What is a livelihoods approach?

At its most basic, ‘a livelihoods approach is simply one that takes as its starting point the actual livelihoods strategies of people ... It looks at where people are, what they have, and what their needs and interests are’(Chambers, quoted in (Schafer 2002)). The most commonly used definition of livelihoods is that developed by Chambers and Conway in 1992: a livelihood ‘comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living; a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with, and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihoods opportunities for the next generation’.

The tools of a livelihoods approach include the sustainable livelihoods framework and livelihoods principles. The livelihoods framework aids livelihoods analysis and programme planning by showing the different elements of livelihoods, the factors which influence livelihoods and their vulnerability, and the interactions between these elements. The first sustainable livelihoods frameworks were developed in the early 1990s by agencies such as Oxfam and CARE, and were later adopted by DFID (Ashley and Carney 1999). Livelihoods principles are concerned with how livelihoods programming – both analysis and action – is done, and the objectives of doing it. The principles include: people-centred, multi-level and holistic, dynamic and sustainable. They are explained in Box 1.

Principles like participation and capacity-building are not unique to a livelihoods approach, and in many ways these are general developmental principles. They have also been incorporated as key principles in humanitarian action, for example in the *Sphere Handbook* for minimum standards for disaster response, and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes.

Livelihoods approaches originate from the 1980s development sphere as alternative approaches to poverty alleviation, i.e. an approach determined by the goals and priorities of people in developing countries themselves. This change resulted from concerns about the effectiveness of development activity, and a donor and government focus on providing resources, facilities and services, rather

### Box A1: Livelihoods principles

*People centred.* It involves the people whose livelihoods are affected, and should therefore be participatory both in terms of the analysis of people’s priorities and goals (including an analysis of different groups of people), and involving them in programme design and implementation. Capacity-building is a key objective which includes the capacities of households and communities, as well as of local institutions.

*Multi-level and holistic.* Livelihoods analysis and action recognise the many influences, at different levels, on livelihoods. It combines an analysis of political, economic and social factors at national and international level, with an analysis of the strategies and priorities of people at the local level. It also recognises the multiple actors influencing livelihoods.

*Dynamic.* A livelihoods analysis recognises that livelihoods change over time, and livelihoods actions aim to learn from and build on positive change. It also recognises that livelihood strategies may compete within communities and populations.

*Sustainability.* The aim of a livelihoods approach is to promote sustainable livelihoods. This means that livelihoods are resilient in the face of stress and shocks, not dependent on external support unless this support itself is sustainable, maintain the long-term productivity of natural resources, and do not undermine the livelihoods of others.

*Adapted from DFID’s Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets, 1999, [www.livelihoods.org](http://www.livelihoods.org).*

than on the priorities of poor people. Thus, it was recognised that effective poverty alleviation required action at the community level as well as at the level of government policy and services (Ashley and Carney 1999).

In the humanitarian sphere, livelihoods approaches gained prominence in the late 1980s following the drought-induced famines in the middle of the decade. At the time, humanitarian assistance was generally not provided until people were destitute, malnourished or displaced, which led to greater vulnerability to future shocks. In contrast, today’s guidelines and policy documents of agencies such as Oxfam, Save the Children, CARE, WFP and UNCHR highlight the importance of saving lives as well as protecting livelihoods. This shift in policy was also informed by academic research on the strategies and priorities of famine-affected populations.

A livelihoods approach in the humanitarian arena has generally been understood in terms of protecting livelihoods through preserving assets, and until recently has mostly been applied in natural disasters, in particular during the early stages of drought and in the recovery stages of floods, earthquakes and droughts. The focus on preserving assets has informed both assessments and programming, but has not been explicitly based on the livelihoods framework or principles. It is only recently that the livelihoods framework and principles have been used in academic research and field studies to guide analysis and response in complex emergencies (Collinson 2003; Young, Osman et al. 2005; Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars 2006; Lautze and Raven Roberts 2006; Stites, Mazurana et al. 2006). Adaptations of the livelihoods framework have been promoted to help analyse what happens to livelihoods in conflict, and to link a livelihoods analysis with a political economy analysis.

### **A1.2 What is a livelihoods analysis?**

A key feature of a livelihoods analysis is that it links an analysis of the strategies and assets of different livelihood groups at community, or micro-level, with policies, institutions and processes that determine the livelihood options that people have within a given context. A livelihood group can be understood as a group of people with similar food and income sources, who face similar risks and/or would respond in a similar way to those risks. A second key feature of a livelihoods analysis is that it uses participatory methods to explore changes in people's livelihoods and livelihood goals. Such methods may include wealth ranking, proportional piling and timelines, as well as the more standard key informant and focus group interviews.

For many agencies, an emergency livelihoods analysis entails simply assessing the impact of an emergency on people's livelihoods as well as on their lives. As such, it forms part of each agency's particular approach to emergency assessments, for example the household economy approach of SC-UK, the economic security analysis of ICRC and Oxfam's livelihoods approach to food security assessments. Many of these same agencies have adopted the livelihoods framework in their development work, but it is only recently that elements of the livelihoods framework have been explicitly incorporated into emergency assessments (Jaspars 2006). What has been incorporated and how depends on the agency's particular mandate and interests. Assessments may also focus on particular elements of the

framework, for example strategies to obtain food and income, or on whether and how markets are functioning.

According to DFID, the aim of the livelihoods framework is 'to help stakeholders with different perspectives to engage in structured and coherent debate about the many factors that affect livelihoods, their relative importance, and the way in which they interact' (DFID 1999). As the livelihoods framework shows the key elements of livelihoods and the factors that influence them, the framework can assist in livelihoods analysis and planning programme activities in both the humanitarian and development realm. A range of tools can be used to carry out the actual analysis. In addition to those mentioned above, some have suggested stakeholder analysis, social analysis and institutional analysis (Ashley and Carney 1999). In situations of conflict, the addition of tools for political economy and conflict analysis has been recommended (Collinson 2003).

The remainder of this section describes the elements of the DFID framework, as the most widely known livelihoods framework, reviews how the framework has been adapted for situations of internal conflict and discusses the value of this framework and why agencies have found it so difficult to use in practice.

#### *A1.2.1 The sustainable livelihoods framework*

The DFID livelihoods framework is shown in Figure 1.

Key elements of the livelihoods framework include:

- *The vulnerability context*, which is the external environment in which people exist. This can include factors such as shocks (natural, economic, conflict), trends (e.g. population change) and seasonality, which shape the assets and strategies available to different groups.
- *Livelihood assets* encompass the assets that people control or have access to. This can include natural (land, forest products, water), physical (livestock, shelter, tools, materials), social (extended family and other social networks), financial (income, credit, investments) and human assets (education, skills, health).
- *Policies, institutions and processes (PIPs)* can be broadly interpreted as the governance environment, both formal and

informal, and includes government, agency, customary governance and private sector policy; civic, political and economic institutions and other social customs and rules (such as gender norms and expectations) that are part of society; and processes which determine the way in which institutions and people operate and interact.


- *Livelihood strategies* are the strategies that people use in attempting to meet their livelihood goals, and can include activities such as farming, pastoralism, wage labour, collection and sale of natural resources, migration for work, etc. A livelihood strategy is often a combination of different activities performed by different household members, and will vary by season, context, etc.
- *Livelihood outcomes* are given in the DFID framework as increased income, food security or well-being, reduced vulnerability, and the more sustainable use of the natural resource base.

Using all elements of the framework, a livelihoods analysis would examine livelihood strategies that people use to reach certain outcomes, and the ways in which these strategies are influenced by access to or control over assets, by the existing vulnerability context and by the policy, institutions and processes at local, national and international levels. PIPs determine the types of livelihoods strategies that people can use, and who is able to use them. The PIPS, however, are perhaps the least well-defined part of the framework. These were originally called 'transforming structures and

processes' and include government, donor and aid agency policies, government, civil society and private sector institutions responsible for delivering basic services, and processes such as laws, culture or customary practices, power relations and markets. Institutions can also include traditional customs, rules or common law (Young, Osman et al. 2005). In practice, what is considered under a policy, an institution or a process varies according to who describes or uses the framework. What is agreed is that, in general, PIPs can be broadly understood as the external governance environment within which livelihoods are shaped. The lack of clearly defined PIPs has meant that there are continuing discussions and debate on their substance.

When applied in an emergency context, a livelihoods analysis will often look at changes in livelihood strategies (before and during the emergency, for example), and how different strategies are adopted to manage risks. Analysis of the nature of the strategies and associated risks provides important information on the severity of a crisis. For many emergency-affected people, vulnerability and resilience are determined by the available resources or assets. In natural disasters it is generally the case that people with a greater and more varied asset base are less vulnerable or able to recover more quickly, whereas in conflict assets can also be liabilities (see below). This includes both social and political assets, or capital, as well as economic ones. An emergency livelihoods analysis also needs to analyse how PIPs affect the livelihood options and vulnerability of different groups of emergency-affected people. This is explored further below.

Figure A1: The sustainable livelihoods framework



### A1.2.2 Adaptation of the livelihoods framework for complex emergencies

The DFID livelihoods framework has been adapted for complex emergencies in a number of ways: first, by placing vulnerability more centrally within the livelihoods framework, second, by incorporating power relations and politics more explicitly, and third, by incorporating an analysis of assets as liabilities. The analysis of livelihood strategies in situations of conflict is also different from that in natural disasters.

In adapted frameworks, the vulnerability context has either been placed more centrally in relation to the other elements of the framework (Collinson 2003), or removed from the framework as an additional box, because vulnerability is considered central to strategies, assets and PIPs (Lautze and Raven Roberts 2006). The adapted framework developed by Lautze and Raven-Roberts is shown in Figure 2.


In complex emergencies, assets can be turned into life-threatening liabilities, and this is shown in the adapted framework (Duffield, 1994; Lautze and Raven Roberts, 2006). Each asset in the asset pentagon (natural, physical, social, human and financial) can be turned into a liability. For example, living in resource-rich areas, whether near diamond mines in the DRC or on fertile land in Darfur, has opened people up to attack, exploitation and/or coercion. Similarly, owning cattle in a pastoral economy or receiving remittances in an IDP camp may bolster resilience, but having access to these assets also increases

these assets also increases the likelihood of being targeted. Asset ownership can therefore be a key determinant in vulnerability.

Some livelihoods frameworks, for example that of UNDP and Collinson's adapted framework (Schafer 2002; Collinson 2003) also include a sixth asset, political status, or proximity to power. As shown in Chapter 2, a key feature of conflict-related emergencies revolves around maintaining the power and economic advantage of a minority elite. To give greater attention to power relations within the livelihoods framework, Collinson added an additional box to show how power is affected by assets, and how power affects engagement with and access to policies, institutions and processes. As such, a livelihoods analysis in conflict is similar to a political economy analysis, and recognises that vulnerability is linked to political status and lack of power, rather than simply economic status and material need (Collinson, 2003). Using evidence from studies on the functions of violence in internal war, Lautze and Raven-Roberts (2006) argue that violence is an integral part of PIPs, and can be considered as a policy, an institution and a process. Violence determines both people's access to resources and the strategies they are able to use, and therefore their vulnerability.

The policies and strategies of the parties to a conflict are crucial in developing an understanding of livelihoods and relative vulnerability. A recent study of livelihoods in Darfur considered policies such as land rights, movement of goods within Darfur, taxation (formal and informal) and government of Sudan policy on the return of IDPs

Figure A2: Adapted livelihoods framework for humanitarian crises



Source: Lautze and Raven-Roberts, 2006.

to their place of origin (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars 2006). An earlier study of livelihoods and conflict in Darfur, focused specifically on policies, institutions and processes as the overriding factors determining the vulnerability of people's livelihoods (Young, Osman et al. 2005).

The effectiveness, motivations and reach of civic, economic and political institutions during a complex emergency are likely to play a large part in determining people's protection and welfare. An analysis of institutions therefore needs to include an analysis of different types of leadership, the accountability of government authorities, existence of the rule of law and the extent to which judiciary systems, public services and markets are functioning (Jaspars and Shoham 2002). Recent livelihoods studies have included an analysis of the impact of conflict on local conflict resolution initiatives, customary law and practices, for example in relation to gender roles, land tenure and newly emerging institutions, for example self-protection (Young, Osman et al., 2005; Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006; Stites, Mazurana et al., 2006; Young, Osman et al., 2007). The ways in which the access of particular groups to these institutions changes in an emergency is also crucial; an ethnic group may lose access to court systems, for instance, or women may be denied access to customary processes.

Institutions themselves can also be vulnerable and can change in an emergency, as budgets for health care and education, for example, are drained, existing systems collapse and people with skills and institutional memory flee the area or country. Both formal and informal institutions are dynamic and will reflect changing power relations during conflict (Lautze and Raven Roberts 2006). This was also recently demonstrated in Darfur, where an examination of the impact of the conflict on PIPs showed how this in turn could fuel conflict, in particular in relation to systems for control over natural resources (Young, Osman et al. 2007).

Processes can be viewed more broadly in complex emergencies, to include the 'hazards, risks and resulting vulnerabilities generated by humans as well as those in the natural environment' (Lautze and Raven Roberts 2006). This means that the long-term political and economic marginalisation of certain population groups, the process of environmental change due to repeated drought and other extended processes such as urbanisation and the spread of HIV/AIDS can be considered under processes (e.g. (Young, Osman

et al. 2005; Jaspars 2006). In conflict, the dynamics of the conflict and how this changes over time is also a process (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars 2006).

As mentioned above, PIPs and assets determine the livelihoods options available to different groups of people. Section 2.3 described how options for livelihood strategies often become extremely limited in complex emergencies, as well as being profoundly altered by the impact of conflict and the political economy of war. Different livelihood groups may engage in competing livelihood strategies, or the livelihood strategies of one group may be dependent on the exploitation of others. In conflict, livelihood strategies need to be analysed in relation to the risks they involve (both to themselves and others), not only from the perspective of livelihoods, but also in terms of people's dignity and physical security.

For complex emergencies, Lautze and Raven-Roberts (2006) recommend making a distinction between livelihood goals and outcomes. *Livelihood goals* are what the household aspires to, which can include increased income, food security, well-being or the more sustainable use of the natural resource base. In emergency contexts these goals may focus on personal safety or survival. *Livelihood outcomes* are what actually happens in the pursuit of a livelihood strategy. This might be improved food security or better health, or could be malnutrition, impoverishment or increased exposure to insecurity.

#### *A1.2.3 Use of the livelihoods framework*

In 2003, a review of livelihoods in situations of chronic conflict found that, whilst livelihoods approaches are increasingly used in emergencies, the livelihoods framework rarely forms the basis for assessments or for identifying appropriate responses (Longley and Maxwell 2003). The livelihoods framework is still rarely used in its entirety by operational agencies in emergency contexts. In part, this is because many agencies already have a conceptual framework in use: ACF uses nutrition causal analysis, SC-UK uses household economy analysis, etc. Rather than adopting a new framework, agencies often either incorporate livelihoods elements into their framework, or show the links between their method and the livelihoods framework. Some of this is due to lack of expertise at the agency level. For instance, most livelihoods specialists are not experienced in political economy analysis, but this is a key component of a livelihoods analysis in

conflict. Another reason why the livelihoods framework is rarely used is the lack of guidance on how to use the livelihoods framework in emergencies. Whilst the framework provides information on the important elements to consider in a livelihoods analysis, it does not tell you how to do the analysis, or how to use the analysis to determine and prioritise appropriate actions. In addition, from an organisational perspective, using the livelihoods framework requires the working together of different sectors and departments within an organisation. Such departments are often more accustomed to working separately. The framework appears to have been used mainly in research, evaluations or more in-depth qualitative studies of the impact of conflict on livelihoods.

Although there has not been widespread use by operational agencies to date, academic research points to a number of important advantages to using the livelihoods framework, and livelihoods analysis, in situations of conflict. This includes in particular the ability of the livelihoods framework to incorporate political economy analysis and elements of protection. In ODI studies on political economy analysis for humanitarian action, a livelihoods analysis was used as a safe way of investigating sensitive issues of political and economic relationships and processes in society, in an insecure environment (Collinson, 2003). In Darfur, the livelihoods framework was used to focus specifically on PIPs, by reviewing the social, economic and political features of the conflict at macro-level (Young, Osman et al., 2005 and 2007a). In Uganda, the livelihoods framework was combined with a human security framework to better identify the threats and vulnerabilities faced by different populations, and the ways in which local strategies affect livelihoods and protection, in order to identify appropriate responses in both livelihoods and protection (Stites, Mazurana et al., 2006). Earlier work in Somalia also highlighted the importance of analysing governance, in particular mechanisms of power and structures within and between different stakeholders, to inform both humanitarian and protection responses (Narbeth and McLean, 2003).

As suggested by DFID (1999), the livelihoods framework can be used to help stakeholders with different perspectives to engage in structured and coherent debate about the many factors that affect livelihoods, and can thus provide a neutral forum for discussion in situations of conflict. The adoption of livelihoods principles in emergencies brings additional benefits as well, in particular the

emphasis on macro and micro linkages, as this can explain the connection between local-level influences on livelihoods with national and international level factors. Recent work in Darfur, successfully brought together all these different elements. Tufts University organised workshops which brought together government institutions, UN agencies, international and local NGOs and members of universities and civil society to analyse the impact of conflict on different aspects of livelihoods (strategies, assets and PIPs) and to undertake a programming review to make strategic recommendations (Young, Osman et al. 2007).

### **A1.3 What are livelihood support interventions?**

Livelihood interventions are not well defined. The range of possible livelihood interventions varies and could potentially include a huge variety of different types of action depending on the types of livelihoods affected and the nature of the risks facing different population groups.

In theory, livelihood interventions could be any response that impacts on a part of the livelihoods framework, or that uses livelihoods principles. In stable contexts, livelihood interventions often focus more on using livelihood principles, such as capacity-building, to determine appropriate interventions, rather than choosing from a prescribed list of interventions.<sup>4</sup> In a way, this is the essence of taking a livelihoods approach as appropriate interventions need to be determined by beneficiaries themselves, rather than outsiders.

What is understood by livelihood interventions varies. Broadly speaking, livelihood interventions can be divided into those that support the assets people need to carry out their livelihood strategies, and interventions that support policies, institutions and processes (Lautze and Stites 2003; Young, Osman et al. 2007). The objectives of livelihoods programming in emergencies can range from assisting in meeting basic needs to livelihood protection and livelihood recovery, and vary according to the stage and severity of an emergency. In practice, livelihood interventions are more common in the recovery stage of an emergency, as many interventions need good analysis and time to plan programmes. In protracted crises, however, livelihood approaches

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<sup>4</sup> Livelihood principles were described earlier in the chapter, and include basic tenets of being people-centred, multi-level and holistic, dynamic and sustainable.

are increasingly promoted as alternative ways to meet basic needs on a longer-term basis.

Food aid still comprises the bulk of humanitarian assistance, and food interventions often include livelihood support as well as life-saving objectives. That is, food is distributed to prevent the sale of assets or to help people recover assets. After food aid, the most common emergency response to support livelihoods has been the distribution of seeds and tools (Levine and Chastre 2004). Agencies are, however, increasingly using a range of other livelihood support interventions in emergencies, in particular cash transfers, such as cash grants, cash for work and vouchers. Rather than just another sectoral response, cash transfers need to be seen as an alternative mechanism for providing assistance. It provides an alternative, or complement, to the provision of in-kind goods (both food and non-food) and promotes access to services (Harvey 2007).

Many livelihood interventions in emergencies focus on improving food security. These interventions aim at specific sectors of food security, such as production, income and market support (Sphere, 2004). The breadth of possible livelihood interventions is illustrated by a more detailed look at interventions within these sectors of food security:

- *Production support* can include agricultural support (provision of seeds and tools, seed vouchers, agricultural extension, etc.), livestock support (fodder distribution, destocking, veterinary care, etc.), and the provision of equipment and assets (carpentry, blacksmithing, pottery, etc).
- *Income support* can include activities such as skills or business training, income generation, micro-credit, direct cash transfers, fee waivers (for example school fees and healthcare user fees), micro-insurance and price subsidies.
- *Market support* can include activities such as voucher interventions (bringing together traders and consumers), building/repairing market infrastructure, helping to create cooperatives and the sale of subsidised goods.

Within each of these sectors and examples of livelihood interventions, some activities involve the distribution of goods or the protection of assets, while other interventions support

livelihood strategies by improving the provision of services, supporting local institutions and influencing policies.

Emergency livelihood interventions to enhance or support policies, institutions and processes are much less frequent than the provision of goods. Examples of this type of intervention include support for formal institutions, such as the establishment of national famine early warning systems and disaster management capacities, or infrastructure support (roads, bridges). Supporting local services, such as veterinary care, or supporting cooperatives or women's groups is another example. This category of livelihood interventions also includes advocacy, such as removing policies banning exports, border closures (to allow remittance flows) and taxation, as well as policies on land rights and compensation for lost assets (Lautze and Stites 2003). Market systems can be considered institutions, and there has been an increase in NGO interest in supporting markets in emergencies, in particular through vouchers and fairs and through the local purchase of relief items.

Whilst the aim of livelihood interventions in a development context may be to promote livelihoods and ensure sustainability, in emergencies sustainability is unlikely to be achieved, and livelihood interventions are as much about finding alternative ways to meet basic needs, support non-damaging survival strategies and protect livelihoods.

#### **A1.4 Challenges of livelihoods programming in conflict**

Livelihoods activities are rare in situations of conflict, for a number of reasons. First, the application of livelihoods approaches and activities may compromise the application of humanitarian principles. Second, there are risks associated with the provision of any assistance in situations of conflict, and assistance other than immediate life-saving aid is often considered too risky. Third, in situations of conflict, options to support livelihoods often appear to be very limited due to the limits that conflict places on livelihoods options. Fourth, it is a new field and there are few people with the experience and skills to design and implement livelihoods activities in complex emergencies. In addition, skilled local people may have fled the conflict. There are, however, an increasing number of examples of appropriate

livelihoods programming in conflict, and opportunities for doing more.

Humanitarian assistance is guided by humanitarian principles of humanity (to prevent and alleviate suffering wherever it is found), neutrality (not taking sides) and impartiality (no discrimination on the basis of race, religious beliefs, class or political opinion, and to relieve suffering solely on the basis of need). The application of these principles in practice can be challenging when taking a livelihoods approach. For example, ethnicity and political affiliation will influence the actions of local institutions to some extent and, even if not politically biased, local institutions may come under pressure to favour the more powerful. An agency that supports these local institutions may be unable to maintain a position of neutrality and impartiality. On the other hand, working with local institutions has significant advantages, such as in-depth local knowledge and better access, which must be balanced against the possible risks. A distinction also needs to be made between supporting formal institutions with mainly technical or service delivery functions, and those with essentially political functions.

Taking a principled approach also means minimising the risks of diversion and manipulation of assistance and the potential exclusion of the most marginalised groups (Leader 1998; Leader 2000). Such risks have been most extensively documented for food distributions, but also apply to other relief distributions (see e.g. (Jaspars 2000). Agencies have developed a number of ways to minimise potential negative impacts of assistance, through the adoption of 'Do No Harm' (Anderson 1999). Beneficiary participation in interventions is always important, but the issue of *who* participates requires particular attention as groups with greater power are likely to dominate unless marginalised and exploited populations are actively sought out. Unless specific measures are taken to include vulnerable or marginalised groups, they may be excluded from assistance, leading to serious protection risks.

Finally, it could be argued that livelihood support in itself is not consistent with the principle of impartiality, as in many cases it is targeted at those who still have livelihoods, rather than the most destitute or malnourished. Going beyond life-saving assistance, by promoting interventions which are intended to have a longer-term impact, or supporting some livelihood groups over others,

could be seen as suspicious by the belligerents, thereby potentially increasing tensions.

At the same time, however, some people affected by conflict have to use strategies that are both damaging to their livelihoods and their physical security just to meet basic survival needs. This is a result of inadequate access to goods and services, which can be deliberate or not. It can also be the result of inadequacies in the level and type of assistance, or the way in which it is provided. It would follow that, if adequate and appropriate assistance is provided, such risks would be minimised. There is some evidence of this. For example, the provision of food aid in Darfur was found to reduce people's need to adopt strategies that involved risks to their personal safety or to engage in exploitative labour relations (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars 2006). Also in Darfur, CHF implemented a number of livelihood interventions (including production and sales of shelter materials through women's groups, income generation, vocational training, veterinary care and provision of chickens) that were found to have positive impacts on civilian security by providing safe sources of income (Hill, Diener et al. 2006).

Although still limited, there are an increasing number of examples where livelihoods interventions are carried out during ongoing conflict. Most come from protracted conflicts, and the interventions occurred during periods or in areas of relative stability. This caveat applies in particular to cash transfer programmes, which have been implemented in Somalia, Afghanistan, Uganda (Khogali and Takhar 2001; Jones 2004; Ali, Toure et al. 2005; Hoffman 2005; Mattinen and Ogden 2006; Majid, Hussein et al. 2007). As direct cash transfers may be associated with risk of theft and thus insecurity for beneficiaries, indirect transfers, whereby expenditure is reduced, may be a safer option in situations of ongoing acute conflict. Major expenditures may include basic goods such as clothes, but also cooking fuel, milling, healthcare and education. These expenditures can be minimised either by providing this assistance directly, or providing vouchers for these essential goods or services (Jaspars and Harvey 2007).

Using the livelihoods framework, a much wider range of responses can potentially be identified. Some possible interventions that support policies, processes and institutions in emergencies are provided above. A recent study by FAO on addressing food insecurity in fragile states, however, concluded that the

international community has not sufficiently supported the positive efforts of local institutions (Alinovi, Hemrich et al. 2007). In complex emergencies, this may include supporting local mechanisms, networks and systems, such as systems for promoting justice, customary law and local conflict resolution

(on land tenure, grazing rights and access to natural resources), promoting access to information and services, and mechanisms for self-protection. As long as the risks and the application of humanitarian principles are carefully considered, there is certainly potential for doing more.



## Annex 2: A review of protection concepts, approaches and activities

### A2.1 What is Protection?

Protection is conceptually challenging. The most commonly accepted definition was developed during a consultative process in the 1990s:

*[Protection is] all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e. human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law). Human rights and humanitarian organisations must conduct these activities in an impartial manner (not on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, language or gender) (Giossi Caverzasio, 2001).*

This definition is comprehensive in scope, both in terms of the legal framework for protection ('full respect'), and with regard to the strategies and methods by which protection may be achieved ('all activities') (IASC, 1999). However, it is precisely these all-encompassing qualities, as well as the fact that the definition focuses on the action ('protection') rather than the risks facing civilians ('protection from what?') that gives rise to difficulties in comprehension.

Put more simply, protection is about seeking to assure the safety of civilians from acute harm. It is concerned with preventing or mitigating the most damaging effects – whether direct or indirect – of violent or abusive behaviour on a civilian population. Acute harm can be interpreted in legal terms as violations of the civil, political, social and economic rights which are codified in human rights, international humanitarian and refugee law, or in more physical terms, as threats to people's life, dignity and integrity. Slim and Bonwick (2005: 43) argue that the most severe risk of acute harm emanates from deliberate personal violence, deprivation and restrictions on movement and access to basic services. Deliberate personal violence includes murder, sexual violence, physical attack and torture. Deprivation is described as the deliberate destruction of assets and productive livelihoods, as well as the depletion of resources. Restrictions on movement and access to services cause indirect harm by reducing the capacity of affected communities to survive; these restrictions are frequently part of a

wider policy of oppression, punishment, marginalisation and group-targeted violence.

Whether viewed in physical or legal terms, there are three factors which affect civilian safety. The first are the actions of warring or abusive parties, and the degree to which they adhere to their responsibilities to exercise restraint in their behaviour towards civilians. These responsibilities are set out in the national laws of states, international human rights law and international humanitarian law, in the context of armed conflict. The second factor in civilian safety is the steps that civilians themselves take to limit their exposure to the direct and indirect consequences of actions by abusive parties. Although an important feature in protection, this tends to be underestimated and inadequately explored by humanitarian organisations (Vincent and Refslund Sorensen, 2001; Bonwick, 2006). The third factor is the interventions of third parties in protecting civilians. This is understood as the primary obligation of national governments in recognition of their sovereign responsibility for, and authority over, all those living within their territory. The role of external third parties – political, military, human rights and humanitarian – is therefore of most relevance in contexts where the warring or abusive parties do not adhere to their responsibilities, and the responsible government is unwilling or unable to protect civilians.

### A2.2 The recent prominence of protection

Protecting civilians at risk is not solely a humanitarian concern. Indeed, in many ways humanitarian agencies are marginal players in a complex field also populated by national and international political, military and human rights actors. In the past, protection by humanitarian organisations largely related to upholding the rights of non-combatants and refugees, and was considered the preserve of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which derived their mandates from the 1951 Refugee and the 1959 Geneva conventions respectively. The changing nature of war and its associated costs to civilians (in particular generating large numbers of internally displaced) and evolving perceptions of the role of humanitarian action in these changed contexts has precipitated increased debate on whether relief is sufficient when the most serious concerns

of civilians relate to their safety (Bruderlein, 1999). Protecting civilians from the worst effects of violence and abuse is, more than ever before, an active concern of aid actors, and the number of humanitarian organisations engaging in protection has proliferated. These include additional ‘mandated agencies’ (UNICEF and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)); experienced operational NGOs (such as the International Rescue Committee, the Norwegian Refugee Council and Save the Children UK) as well as a raft of other humanitarian actors (for example, WFP, Oxfam and MSF). In 1999, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), made up of UN agencies, the ICRC and NGOs, published field strategies to protect or promote the rights of IDPs through humanitarian activities (IASC, 1999). Over 40 humanitarian organisations claim to undertake protection work in Darfur (Pantuliano and O’Callaghan, 2006). Protection has been recognised as a ‘cluster’ under new UN reforms of the humanitarian system, with UNHCR identified as the global cluster lead. This increased engagement has transformed the protection landscape, both in terms of the type of protection activities undertaken, and the contexts in which it is pursued.

While protection has roots in the foundation of humanitarian activity, much of the evolution of this concept has occurred in the past 20 years (see Box 2, below). As such, for many (both humanitarians and others) it is a new sphere of work and methodologies, tools and roles are still under development. Some argue that humanitarian action has always involved the twin tenets of protection and assistance (Slim, 2001; InterAction, 2004). However, others view it as another component of the increased integration of humanitarian action with political and human rights aims, and see it as both impossible (humanitarians cannot ‘protect’) and unprincipled, as arguably it can be viewed as compromising humanitarian aims by inserting human rights objectives into humanitarian action (Rieff, 2002).

### A2.3 The role of analysis in protection work

The collection and analysis of information is the cornerstone of protection work (IASC, 2002: 49). Analysis focuses on the cause and intent of a violation, as well as the humanitarian consequences. This is used to develop a strategy for a reduction in violations, as well as to minimise the consequences for affected populations. Thus, analysis has both a functional and a substantive

#### Box A2: A chronology of key protection events

**1949:** Adoption of the four Geneva Conventions (Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; Convention III relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; Convention IV relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War)

**1959:** Adoption of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees

**1989:** Adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child

**1992:** Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *Agenda for Peace*

**1998:** Adoption of Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

**1999:** Publication of Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

**1999:** Statement by the President of the UN Security Council requesting for the first time that the Secretary-General report on recommendations for how the Council could improve the physical and legal protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict (S/PRST/1999/6)

**1999:** IASC Protection of Internally Displaced Persons Policy Note

**1999:** First peacekeeping mission with civilian protection component: UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone

**2001:** ICISS Report *The Responsibility to Protect*

**2005:** World Summit Outcome Document endorsing collective action in cases of crimes against humanity

**2005:** UNHCR designated lead of global protection cluster

**2005:** OHCHR’s budget to double over five years, chiefly to support greater field presence.

role, in that it is used both to guide the responses of humanitarian agencies, and as a tool employed by humanitarian organisations to inform and influence the protection activities of other actors

through monitoring, documenting and reporting abusive activities observed in the field.

Despite the emphasis on information and analysis in protection, there is no standard analysis tool for protection and different organisations tend to develop and use tools which coincide with their particular mandate, expertise or focus, and adapt these tools depending on the specific context. Slim and Bonwick (2005: 68) have identified the following six elements that feature in protection analysis:

1. Understanding violations, threats and perpetrators: this involves an overall situational analysis as well as a more in-depth review of the types and patterns of abuses. It also includes an examination of those responsible for the abuses and the motivations behind their actions, especially whether it is a deliberate or negligent act, a policy or an isolated event, or whether it is a consequence of lack of organisational command. Mahony (2006: 27) highlights how states and armed groups are neither monolithic nor static, and how protection actors can identify and support 'reformers' within institutions in order to support positive policies towards civilians.
2. Assessing their impact and effect on people and communities: this is a determination of those most vulnerable to the abuses, disaggregated by social distinction if relevant (age, gender, ethnic group, social status, religion, etc.). An evaluation of the primary and secondary effects of violations is required, as is an analysis of the role of protection and assistance in addressing the immediate and longer-term consequences of the violations.
3. Mapping existing community protection strategies: this involves an examination of the different response strategies employed by endangered communities confronted by abuses, as well as a determination of whether an intervention by a humanitarian organisation can complement these strategies or, in the case of strategies which endanger civilians, whether safer options can be provided.
4. Identifying relevant legal standards and responsibility: this is an evaluation of violations against a national and international legal framework, in order to determine whether a legal violation has

occurred and who is responsible for preventing, stopping, remedying and redressing the violation.

5. Mapping political commitment to protection: this involves a determination of the capacity and willingness of national actors to meet their responsibilities to protect civilians. Where their 'compliance aptitude' (willingness and capacity) is found lacking, an assessment of their susceptibility to influence as well as the willingness and capacity of other influential actors (national and international) to pressurise them to act or substitute for their role should be undertaken.
6. Monitoring human rights and international law: this describes the consistent monitoring and documentation of rights violations in order to assess the level of threats that communities are facing, analyse patterns and trends in abuse and use this information either to inform programmatic responses, or to advocate to the responsible authorities or other international actors to take action. This is a specialist activity which requires expertise and resources; despite this, it is increasingly featuring in the work of NGOs as well as 'mandated protection agencies' (2005: 68).

While the tools of protection analysis may not be standardised, participatory approaches to analysis and strategy development are common. UNHCR's participatory assessment tool has been widely praised, and is being adapted by the protection cluster as the methodology for analysing protection gaps in IDP contexts (UNHCR, 2006). Participation is believed to be of particular relevance in protection in order to understand how different sections of the community experience abuse, and how targeted abuse may be a deliberate strategy aimed at marginalising and disadvantaging certain sections of the population. Indeed, a pilot of the tool in 14 countries highlighted how the agency had previously been conversing mainly with community leaders, and had therefore missed issues relating to sexual exploitation and prostitution (UNHCR, 2006b). Thus, UNHCR argues that protection assessments should involve women, children and older people, as well as people of diverse backgrounds, in order to focus on ways in which age and gender combine with other social, economic, physical and political factors to result in protection concerns (UNHCR, 2006: 13). This level of participation is difficult in

most settings, and particularly so in conflict environments.

Protection analysis is dynamic in that it is a constant process of information-gathering and analysis. It is multi-dimensional as it focuses on a number of different levels: the structural environment (legislation), behaviour and motivation (actions of warring or abusive parties) and community impact and response. Protection analysis is also multifaceted as a number of different sources of information can be used to build up a picture of the threats, motivations and consequences, although sources must be evaluated for accuracy, bias and judgement (Mahony, 2006).

Given the sensitive nature of protection assessments – both in terms of an analysis of the abusive strategies of belligerents, as well as their impacts on communities – they can raise a number of ethical and security considerations. Some people even view protection analysis as political, as it involves an examination of power, influence and the responsibility for attacks on civilians (Mahony, 2006: 40). This is recognised by ICRC, which claims that such political knowledge is essential to remaining neutral in politicised environments (Minear, 1999). Questioning communities about the abusive or warring strategies of different actors can thus place them and humanitarian agencies at risk, and there have been many instances of reprisals against individuals and communities as a result of discussions with humanitarian agencies (see, for instance, Pantuliano and O’Callaghan, 2006). Protection assessments also involve asking individuals or communities about deeply sensitive issues which may, at a minimum, embarrass or


draw attention to individuals, and at worst retraumatise those who have survived serious protection incidents. Questions of confidentiality and informed consent are thus critical in protection assessments, to guard against placing participants in situations of undue risk.

Despite the importance of information in protection work, many believe that agencies do not invest in the requisite amount of analysis. Time, access and security constraints can make regular and in-depth protection assessments difficult, and in many contexts the level of analysis outlined above is not achieved. Indeed, concerns have been raised about agencies adopting predetermined approaches to protection, rather than undertaking a comprehensive analysis of the context and designing their responses accordingly (Dolan and Hovil, 2006).

Monitoring and reporting can serve as both an instrument of protection analysis and a tool for protection (as it can inform advocacy towards protection actors). In the past, monitoring and reporting was undertaken mainly by ICRC, which entered into confidential dialogue with warring parties in order to encourage compliance with IHL. A large number of NGOs and UN agencies now undertake monitoring activities in order to inform their protection work as well as their advocacy, chiefly to international governments. A number also issue demarches to the authorities (for example, up to six different agencies were reporting on abuses in Darfur). While all protection work gives rise to debate in humanitarian circles, monitoring and reporting activities cause the most controversy due to concerns that humanitarian organisations are undertaking human rights or political activities.

#### A2.4 What are protection activities?

Figure A2: The ‘egg framework’ of protection activities



## Figure A2: The ‘egg framework’ of protection activities

Figure A2 shows the ICRC’s ‘egg framework’, which was developed in the late 1990s to depict the relationship between patterns of abuse and the three forms of protection activities (responsive, remedial and environment-building). The ‘egg framework’ was considered appropriate to illustrate the interdependent and complementary nature of these protection interventions. The three forms of protection activity – responsive, remedial and environment-building – can be undertaken in tandem or in isolation. The egg-like shape of the framework reflects the fact that protection activities are not chronological: the three components of protection operation overlap and do not exclude or contradict one another. Some activities, such as access to justice programmes, do not fall neatly into one category and may span all three forms of activity.

According to this framework, responsive action involves any activity undertaken in order to prevent abuse resulting from violence, coercion or forced deprivation, or to alleviate its immediate effects. These activities are carried out when abuse is threatened or in its immediate aftermath, to try to mitigate effects on civilians. Activities are urgent, and are aimed at reaching a particular population suffering the immediate effects of a violation (Slim and Bonwick, 2005: 43). Action is also intended to pressure the relevant authorities, either through dialogue or public disclosure, into taking measures to stop the abuse and prevent its recurrence (ICRC, 2001). Examples of responsive action include: 1) providing direct services to victims of abuse by being present in affected areas, transferring or evacuating people out of affected areas and providing information and communications (e.g. assisting family members to contact each other); and 2) alleviating victims’ immediate suffering through the provision of emergency material, medical assistance and psychosocial care (*ibid.*).

Remedial action focuses on assisting and supporting people while they live with the effects of abuse. These activities are aimed at ensuring adequate living conditions subsequent to violence through rehabilitation, restitution, compensation and repair. These actions can be similar to responsive activities but are longer-term, and are concerned with helping people to recover and restore their dignity. Examples of remedial action include: 1) providing direct services to victims of abuse by being present in affected areas, helping

to bring about repatriation, resettlement, integration or final arrangements and establishing systems to track down missing persons and reunite families; and 2) providing appropriate material, medical and psychosocial assistance or care, promoting justice for victims and due process for perpetrators and supporting and protecting organisations working to defend rights (*ibid.*).

The third sphere of protection activity is environment-building. This relates to fostering an environment conducive to respect for the individual’s rights. It is concerned with moving society as a whole towards political, social, cultural and institutional norms that prevent or limit violations and abuse. Examples of environment-building action include promoting knowledge and respect for human rights and humanitarian principles, supporting the drafting and adoption of treaties, assisting in the implementation of international law at national levels and in the development of a fair system of justice and helping to develop and establish such organisations at national and international levels, capable of enhancing respect for human rights and international law (*ibid.*).

Different types or *modes* of protective action can be applied in responsive, remedial and environment-building work. These are set out in Figure A3. Persuasion, mobilisation and denunciation are different forms of advocacy aimed at promoting compliance and cooperation on the part of the authorities or abusive parties with their responsibilities to protect civilians. Persuasion involves convincing decision-makers through direct dialogue to fulfil their obligations and protect civilians; mobilisation means building, informing and energising a network of powerful stakeholders who in turn influence the actions of decision-makers; and denunciation is the act of shaming decision-makers into changing their ways through public exposure, private conscience or obvious interest (Caverzasio, 2001; Slim and Bonwick, 2005). Persuasion is thought to be more appropriate when there is a will within the relevant parties to limit or stop violations, and where there is a need to maintain access to at-risk populations. However, as it is undertaken in private, the result is restrictions on public disclosure of the truth. Mobilisation and denunciation are relevant where violations are deliberate and there is a need to mobilise a constituency of different stakeholders to apply pressure. However, denunciation is often believed to have negative consequences for relations with

the responsible parties, and may even result in restricted access to affected communities.


The fourth and fifth modes of protective action – capacity-building and substitution – are less about encouraging others to act. Capacity-building is appropriate where responsible authorities and communities are willing to take action but simply do not have the means. It involves provision of support, finances and/or technical expertise to authorities to assist them to act. Substitution means directly providing services or material aid to the victims of violations. It is a last resort, but will frequently be necessary when the responsible authorities are unwilling or manifestly incapable, despite support, of taking appropriate action. There are thus a number of considerations, apart from the risks which communities face, that humanitarian organisations take into account when determining their mode of action. These include the capacity and willingness of the authorities to respond; the capacity of communities to assist themselves; and the risks associated with different forms of action for the agency involved, as well as the communities they are trying to assist (Caverzasio, 2001).

The activities outlined above are mainly undertaken by experienced protection organisations, whether mandated or not. However, many organisations new to protection do not have the skills, experience or mandate to develop these ‘stand-alone’ protection activities, and have instead focused on incorporating protection approaches into their ongoing assistance activities. ‘Mainstreaming protection’ is the term which describes humanitarian programming (such as food, shelter or healthcare) which also helps mitigate or prevent harm to civilians related to the

induced deprivation which often accompanies conflict or abusive situations. However, the delivery of assistance does not necessarily have a protective benefit unless careful consideration is given to analysing threats and risks, the role of humanitarian programming in mitigating harm and the potential negative impacts of humanitarian assistance, including on people’s protection. This means that protection considerations must be purposefully integrated into the design and implementation of assistance programmes from the outset (InterAction 2004: 8). Protection can thus be considered ‘as much as an orientation and a way of approaching one’s humanitarian work as it is a set of particular activities’ (*ibid*: 4). This is similar to Do No Harm approaches to programming (Andersen, 1999). However, rather than focusing solely on the negative consequences of assistance protection mainstreaming goes further and involves purposefully using assistance to help keep people safe.

There are no clearly defined protection principles. However, those outlined below tend to be emphasised in protection work. Protection, arguably, has become an umbrella category for quality programming and principled approaches to humanitarian action. This is in part due to the lack of clarity in protection, the fact that it tends to emphasise elements of Do No Harm and certain humanitarian principles (in particular non-discrimination/impartiality), and as a consequence of protection being used by some organisations as a means to incorporate rights-based approaches into their work (for example, WFP). However, as outlined above, protection involves more than simply a principled approach to humanitarian assistance, and incorporates a large variety of activities and interventions.

Figure A3: Different types or modes of protective action



Source: Slim and Bonwick 2005: 83, adapted from Bonard (1999).

### Box A3: Protection principles

**Non-discrimination:** Assistance should be provided on an impartial basis without consideration to race, religion, ethnicity or social grouping. Protection activities should seek to ensure equal access to assistance and information (Giossi Caverzasio, 2001: 19; World Vision, 2007).

**Participation:** People should be involved in and where possible be active participants in decision-making. Participation should include all ethnic, racial, religious and social groups as well as all vulnerable groups including women, children, the elderly and the disabled (World Vision, 2007; UNHCR, 2006: 12; Slim and Bonwick, 2005).

**Rights-based approach:** Civilians have rights to protection and assistance and these rights impose a corresponding obligation to act on duty-bearers including governments, non-state actors and individuals. While some organisations may not use legal language in protection, their actions are reinforced by this legal framework (Slim and Bonwick, 2005: 33).

**State as primary protection actor:** The duty to protect civilians is first and foremost a state responsibility. Substitution by other actors should be a last resort (Giossi Caverzasio, 2001: 9; IASC, 1999).

**Collective and complementary action:** No single organisation is able to meet the diversity of protection needs. Protection activities should take advantage of different skills and capabilities in order to undertake combined efforts to protect civilians. Where appropriate, precedence should be given to mandated agencies. Care needs to be taken not to compromise the protection strategies of other agencies (Slim and Bonwick, 2005: 116; ICRC, 2001: 28).

### A2.5 What protection activities are undertaken in conflict?

The main distinction between conflict and non-conflict situations is the application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Different laws apply in conflicts of an international character and in non-international conflicts.<sup>5</sup> However, Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions applies in both situations and sets out a minimum of level of safety (prohibition of attacks against civilians and objects indispensable to their survival) and a basis for subsistence (entitlement to assistance and medical care) for civilians in conflict. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement may also be relevant in situations where people have been displaced from their homes. Human rights law also

<sup>5</sup> The Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions apply in international conflicts and Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions applies in non-international conflicts.

elaborates a minimum set of ‘non-derogable rights’ which apply both in conflict and in peacetime. This legal framework serves as a backdrop for all protection activities undertaken in conflict.

As described above, the three forms of protection activity – responsive, remedial and environment-building – are relevant at all times, and thus all three can be applied in situations of conflict. However, in practice their relevance depends on timing, as well as on the nature and gravity of the pattern of abuse (IASC, 2001: 43). In situations of active conflict, responsive activities which are aimed at preventing or putting a stop to violations, as well as dealing with the most urgent effects, will be prioritised. While responsive activities are also important in situations of protracted crisis, there will also be an emphasis on remedial actions which assist affected populations while they live with the effects of the abuse. As environment-building is a longer-term endeavour this will tend to feature less during crisis. In Darfur, for example, ICRC and others are educating and directly engaging warring parties on their wartime responsibilities; many NGOs have established medical and psychosocial care to assist survivors of sexual violence and there has been a large amount of public and private lobbying of international actors. All of these are responsive activities. Remedial activities have included the provision of legal advice and access to justice programmes, while environment-building activities have included support to state committees on combating sexual violence (Pantuliano and O’Callaghan, 2006: 10). Concerns have been raised in Darfur and in other high-intensity conflicts that agencies tend to prioritise predetermined categories of vulnerability (women, children, IDPs) rather than focusing on the civilian population as a whole (Aeschilmann, 2005). Some analysts have also raised concerns about the prioritisation of specific categories of risk, in particular sexual and gender-based violence.

The other feature of protection programming in conflict is the degree of ‘substitution’ which occurs. This is described as third parties substituting for the protective role of national duty-bearers. When related to humanitarian response, this involves either the provision of assistance or protection services (substitution can also take place by other actors, for example when peacekeepers substitute for the state’s role in providing security for its civilians). While substitution is a feature of all emergency programming due to the urgent nature of the

response, it is particularly problematic in protection work, which is designed to promote accountability by the responsible duty-bearers. Substitution is generally less a feature of UN or mandated agencies' responses due to their formalised relationships with authorities and their ability to engage with warring parties; however, such collaboration can be difficult for operational agencies, which may not necessarily have the relationship or mandate to engage. Thus,

operational agencies tend to work more closely with communities in conflict to reduce their exposure or vulnerability to threats. Mandated/UN agencies may work to both reduce the *level of threat* as well as communities' *vulnerability to threat*. Particularly in situations where the government is a party to the conflict, aid organisations may focus more on reducing civilian vulnerability to threats due to concerns about the sensitivity of protection programming.

## Annex 3: Organisations and people interviewed

**Action Contre la Faim (ACF):** Hannah Mattinen (Food Aid Advisor)

**FAO:** Richard China, Florence Egal (Emergencies and Rehabilitation Division)

**ICRC:** Laurent Sagny (Protection Adviser, Horn of Africa), Alain Mourey (Economic Security Adviser), Cathy Huser (Protection Adviser)

**IRC:** Karri Goeldner (Economic Recovery and Development), Marguerite Garling (Technical Advisor – Protection and Rule of Law).

**Oxfam-GB:** Rachel Hastie (Protection Advisor), Chris Leather (Head of Emergency Food Security and Livelihoods Team), Ed Cairns (Senior Policy Advisor), Laura Phelps (Emergency Food Security and Livelihoods Advisor), Pantaleo Creti (Emergency Food Security and Livelihoods Advisor), Jane Cocking (Deputy Humanitarian Director).

**SC-UK:** Michael O'Donnell (Emergency Livelihoods Advisor), Johanna McVeigh (Emergency Protection Advisor)

**UNHCR:** Mireille Girard (Chief of Section, Protection Capacity Section), Emilie Irwin, Pablo Mateu (Chief of Section, Peace Building, Livelihood and Partnership Section), Miriam Udra (Senior Rural Development Advisor)

**UNICEF:** Annalies Borrel (Head of Humanitarian Policy and Advocacy Unit), Rebecca Symington (Child Protection Advisor).

**WFP:** Gina Patugalan (Policy and Programme Support Division)

**Researchers/academics:** Paul Harvey (ODI), Helen Young (Feinstein Famine Center, Tufts University, Medford, MA), David Keen (LSE).



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