The space to which the framework refers is the living space, surrounded by both physical and virtual boundaries. In the realm of networks, the virtual spaces become more relevant and extend beyond the physical space. A boy's room, for instance, can extend throughout the world via the internet. Through ties of kinship or friendship, people living in the developing would can access the space of the developed world and enjoy their goods and services without the need to physically enter that space.

In the process of overlapping and evolving spaces, identities are formed. As the boy's space grows beyond the limits of his bedroom, his identity is transformed. He may access the virtual space of train enthusiasts and become one; or he might meet other people in chat room and become a username. The identities and the shape of the space, however, are controlled by relations of power within that space. An Ethiopian living in the UK controls the goods and services that his relatives in Ethiopia can enjoy. His remittances provide his family with an invaluable lifeline and this constitutes an important source of power. However, in the family virtual space, this man might be a son, bound by stronger socio-cultural forces that award power to his father back in Ethiopia. As the space in which he lives extends into the western socio-cultural space, and his identity becomes increasingly westernised, the relations of power in his family space change. The effects of exogenous variables such as western influences can hence have an effect on the power structure that governs the identities and shape of a space.

In the analysis of networks, this framework is useful. Networks are made up of members that can be described as individual or group identities. Networks them selves are virtual and physical spaces defined by their members and the power relations that exist between them. However, it is still necessary to understand how power can flow with a network from one member to another? This is important because it can help explain the issue of legitimacy within a network.

Networks are not necessarily horizontal structures in which power is equally distributed among its members. Many networks have marked hierarchies with clear concentrations of power. This phenomenon is also described by Bouchaud and Mezard's work on a simple model that describes the economy as a network (Buchabab 2003).

Bouchaud and Mezard explain the economy as a network ruled by two basic forces:

• Transactions: have a redistributive effect; and
  
• Investments: have a concentrating effect

They find that (even when initial wealth among the network members is equal) after a small period of transactions and investments (with random returns and after correcting for the effects of vulnerability and risk among the poor -or those with less wealth), wealth tends to follow Pareto's observation and flows towards a few members; those that were consistently 'luckier' in their initial investments and increased their stock of wealth. Furthermore, if the volatility of investment is grater, the Investment effect can totally undermine the Transaction effect.

Can power flow in the same manner as wealth within Policy networks?

The ISPG framework suggests that mobility is a source of power. For instance, in the context of a household, where the husband works outside the home while the wife stays in, the husband's mobility provides him with power over his wife. He can leave, while she has to stay. In extreme cases, her homebound situation can be stressed by cultural or religious norms. In the space of the household the identity of the husband is strengthened by his mobility. His identity commands more power.

This situation would change, for instance, if the husband lost his job and had to stay home while the wife carried out petty jobs to keep the household afloat. In this case, a new space would be constructed with different identities (unemployed husband, employed wife) and a clearly different power structure -partly based on the wife's newly acquired mobility.

In our simple network we initially assume that all members are coming together under equal conditions. In the context of the network, the two forces presented by Bouchaud and Mezard could be sharing (transactions) and outside links (investment).

In a horizontal network, transactions between members should yield equal outcomes for each. Therefore, the sharing of information, tools, skills, contacts, etc. between members would have a redistributive effect; members with little information could share their skills in return for access to data with other partners.

However, as in most networks, individual members are free to bridge out and invest in outside links with other networks or individual (people or groups). These investments can lead to failed links or successful networks.

So, if A (in the diagram below), successfully invests in a link to another network, Z, A gains the capability to move, or to exit the original network. A mobile A can ask the network -or individual members- for more in return for less: It can demand information obtained by one member and refuse to share its skills. If the network - or, say, B - declines this request, A can always threaten to exit, or simply exit, without loosing anything in the process. It could also be the case that the network, or B, needs A more than A needs B and are willing to give in to A's demands. This acquired mobility has provided A with more power over the rest of the network members. With more power, A can leverage more and stronger outside links that will award him even more power within the network.

This is easily observed in reality. Policy networks are not made up of people with any ties to others. Members of networks come together without renouncing to their memberships to other networks (formal or informal). Similarly, some members of the network have grater mobility than others.

For instance, in North - South research networks, southern members' mobility is limited by Visa requirements and relatively higher costs of travel (fewer travel operators, exchange rate, etc.). Northern members, on the other hand, are free to travel to most countries, and relatively cheaply, too. Similarly, northern researchers have access to better ICT that allow them to "be" in more places and "reach" more people that southern researchers (virtual mobility?).

Also, in North - South research networks, funds are often channelled from the North to the South. Control over funds or membership of policy and funding networks in the North awards northern researchers additional power over their counterparts in the south. Not surprisingly the relations that develop are not horizontal but rather vertical. Southern partners compete among each other for funds and stronger ties with the northern researchers. They often provide more information about their own work that they might receive about the work of northern institutions. They distribute the books and papers of northern researchers in their own countries while they struggle to position theirs in the north. Southern researchers could even change their positions, structures and way of thinking to match those of the northern researchers as a way of securing their attention and funds.

In the south a grassroots networks can fall under the same dynamic. For example, neighbourhood associations such as soup kitchens of women's federations or associations. Among the members of a soup kitchen network, some women work outside the home while others inside. Women working in local markets, for instance, participate of associations within the market. Other women members, their husbands, or relatives are civil servants or members of local political parties. Some have direct links with national and international NGOs working in their community. These overlapping links provide some of them a degree of mobility that others do not have and as a consequence awards them higher relative power within the soup kitchen association.

These women, connected to market associations, local politicians or civil servants can use these links to gain power within the network. (The arguments: "I can get us better deals in the market", "My husband can get us more money form the council", "My brother can get the wage disposal petition through to the major", etc...) This might get them elected to the soup kitchen directory with the power to manage the budget and procurement of the small association. It can also give the power over who benefits from the services provided by the soup kitchen, thus promoting clientelism and reinforcing their power.

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