Introduction
Cashew is among the oldest cash crops in Kenya; introduced into East Africa by the Portuguese during the Sixteenth Century. Although cashew contributes with only 1% of Kenya's total agricultural production, it is an important crop because it is grown in an area with few other alternatives. During the peak period of the cashew industry (1980s), it was a major export earner contributing with 4% of GDP. However, mismanagement and privatization of the Kenya Cashewnut Limited in 1993 and its eventual closure in 1998 had a devastating effect on farmers whose livelihood had depended on it for years. The cashew campaign sought to draw farmers and policymaker's interest in the cashew trees, hitherto neglected.

The type and extent of policy change
The objective was to work with farmers in order to influence both the agenda setting and formulation of the Cashewnut Policy and Act. Whereas the campaign managed to draw farmers' interest in proper tree husbandry thus increasing production, little change was evident at the policy level. Neither a cashewnut policy nor Act is in place despite the efforts since 2001.

Some thoughts on the failure to achieve a policy change
The political context
The political leadership in the Coast region has always bemoaned the collapse of the cashew industry but has done little to change the situation. Nonetheless, during the 2002 election, the revitalization of the cashew industry became part of the campaign manifesto for the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), the current ruling party. Since, there have been significant reforms in the sugar, coffee and tea sub-sectors in Kenya - none of which are grown in this region. Although the Government identified cashew revitalisation as part of its Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation, there is nothing to show.

International factors
Three broad international factors need to be mentioned here. Firstly, the Bretton Woods institutions have had tremendous and negative influence in the policy formulation process in Kenya. The withdrawal of agricultural subsidies during the Structural Adjustment Programme provided the campaign with limited options amid growing poverty. Secondly, unlike the Coffee sector that has strong international organisations and lobby groups e.g. East African Fine Coffee Association, the cashew sub-sector did not have any equivalent that would help in terms of building international pressure. Thirdly, the demand for cashew has been growing tremendously the world over as a result of the liberalisation of cashew markets.

CSOs strategies for policy change
Another international factor was the influence of neighbouring Tanzania, where the cashew sub-sector is a major foreign exchange earner. Following a visit to Tanzania, a team from Bayer East Africa started a pilot programme in 2000 with Choice Humanitarian, the Coast Development Authority, KARI and the Ministry of Agriculture, in the Kikoneni Kwale district to control powdery mildew. Demonstrations held in 2001 drew the interest of the ActionAid - Malindi programme which sent farmers on an exposure visit to Tanzania. Through this collaborative arrangement, and with support from ActionAid, a spray gang concept was introduced. The positive results provided the necessary evidence to mobilise farmers.

At the regional level, ActionAid developed a strategy for a long term campaign of policy and practice change. The strategy sought to create an enabling environment for a cashew nut policy; develop the capacity of farmers, extension workers and others in the sector to take a leading role; and facilitate networking and information sharing among all stakeholders. Though shared by all campaign team members, it was not adhered to by most farmers.

In line with these objectives ActionAid Kenya played an essential facilitation role. At the community level, it mobilised the farmers in its programme areas. At the meso level, ActionAid played a crucial role by linking the farmers with input suppliers and cashew buyers. Further linkages were made with KARI and the Ministry of Agriculture to train government extension officers on tree husbandry and the introduction of high yielding varieties. At the regional/national level, ActionAid supported three national workshops sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture that were aimed at developing the cashew policy draft. Furthermore, the incorporation of three top researchers in the field contributed to the development of an evidence-based draft policy.

Through these efforts a draft policy and Articles and Memorandum of Association for the establishment of the Cashewnut council were developed, reviewed by a legal expert, and submitted to the Ministry in late September 2002 in time for the second stakeholder workshop held in February 2003. A cabinet paper was drafted by the Ministry, submitted to the Cabinet but nothing has been heard since then. In retrospect, the missing linkage was at the policy formulation level, especially at the Parliamentary level. This contributed to the collapse of the campaign and the absence of a final policy.

Nature of research based-evidence
Different types of evidence were collected and developed though different means, including case studies, academic research and a feasibility study on cashew nut production in the coastal region. Participatory rural appraisals were also carried out in different districts to identify priorities and the causes of the decline in the sector's activity. Probably most importantly, the type of evidence that kick-started the process was comparative evidence from Tanzania. The neighbouring country's experience served as a pilot project for undecided farmers and policymakers.

Conclusions and lessons learned
Whereas significant changes have been realised in term of scaling up production, little has been seen on the policy front.

Among the contributing factors for the failure, it is possible to highlight the poverty afflicting the vast majority of the farmers and the limited capacity of ActionAid and other members of the campaign to build the necessary force to push the policy agenda at the national level. Other factors include a lack of support from the political leadership and failure by the stakeholders to act in unison. The campaign was seen as an ActionAid campaign making the actors always to wait for direction from ActionAid.

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