The Indian Ocean tsunami crisis: humanitarian dimensions

This note highlights some of the humanitarian issues raised by the catastrophe in the Indian Ocean region. The earthquake that triggered the tsunamis occurred off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia, on 26 December 2004. This note, written 14 days after that date, contains some preliminary reflections on the nature of the catastrophe and the responses to it, including lessons from the past. It provides a series of links to relevant papers, websites and other sources, including research conducted by ODI(1).

1. Scale and impact
The scale of these events is vast, though not unprecedented in terms of numbers killed: compare, for example, the Bangladesh storm surge in 1970, which killed more than 300,000 people(2). Nor is it unique in the kind of damage caused. What makes it so unusual is that so many different countries and populations have been simultaneously and unexpectedly affected, and the sheer extent of the devastation along hundreds of miles of coastline. Thousands of people across the region still face acute risks to their health and well-being. Several million face years of painful and uncertain recovery, having lost breadwinners and family members, homes and livelihoods.

For analysis of the likely socio-economic impacts, see the ODI background note Making Sense of the Indian Ocean Tsunami by Dr Edward Clay http://www.odi.org.uk/tsunami.html
For information on comparable disasters, see ReliefWeb:
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/vLND
For information on evaluations of comparable disasters, see ALNAP http://www.alnap.org/lessons_tsunami.htm

2. Lessons for prevention and preparedness planning
While the occurrence of natural events is largely beyond human control, the consequences are not. Investment in protective infrastructure, early warning and response systems has been shown to have a dramatic effect in saving lives and property in natural disasters. This is all the more important in respect of recurrent natural hazards – such as floods, cyclones and storm surges – that are a feature of life in many parts of South and East Asia. These tend to disproportionately affect relatively poor coastal and riverine communities. The World Conference on Disaster Reduction, in Kobe in Japan on 18–22 January 2005, represents an opportunity to reconsider how to combat the risks arising, not just from rare events like tsunamis, but also from recurrent natural hazards.

See further:
• HPN Good Practice Review Disaster Risk Reduction: Mitigation and preparedness in development and emergency programming, by Dr John Twigg GPR http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2618
• The Asian tsunami: The implications for preparedness and contingency planning
John Twigg & Richard Choularton, http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2690
• UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction: http://www.unisdr.org
• For information on early warning for natural disasters, see ReliefWeb: http://www.reliefweb.int/resources/ewarn.html

3. The nature of needs and risks
This is not one disaster but many, each arising from the same basic event but with different features depending on context. They must be seen as such. Even within individual countries, needs vary considerably from place to place. The assessment of needs is probably best seen in terms of risk analysis: who faces what risk in what timeframe as a result of this disaster? This might range from the risk of disease in the short term to the risk of non-recovery of livelihoods in the medium to longer term. ‘Needs’ can be seen as the measures required to remove or reduce the risk for the individuals, families and communities involved.

The judgements, estimates and extrapolations on which initial responses are based will need to be checked against detailed needs and risk assessments, and responses adjusted accordingly. Given the scale of the disaster, it will take time for a more detailed picture to emerge. In the interim, the provision of basic subsistence needs and a safe living environment for survivors are key priorities. Ultimately, the performance of agencies and donors will be judged largely on the extent to which they made decisions that were appropriate in the light of the best available evidence – including previous experience in comparable disasters.

Relief and recovery efforts will need to proceed in parallel, though the immediate priority is to prevent further loss of life through public health, food, medical and shelter programmes. Large-scale welfare programmes will be needed, probably for years, for those who are unable to restore their livelihoods. Reconstruction needs are so far unquantified, but will be exceptionally large (see below).

See further:
• HPG Report 15 According to Need? Needs assessment and decision-making in the humanitarian sector, James Darcy & Charles-Antoine Hofmann http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/hpgreport15.pdf

4. International aid issues
While India has been able to date to respond to the disaster in Tamil Nadu and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands without recourse to international assistance, other countries affected are more dependent on such assistance. The financial response from donors (public and private) has been unprecedented, and reveals the extent to which ‘non-Western’ actors like China and the Arab Gulf states are emerging as prominent regional donors. However, past experience shows that it cannot be assumed that monies actually disbursed will match what has been pledged. Nor do all the pledges represent ‘new’ money: some is probably money previously committed, though how much is unclear at the time of writing. Equally concerning is the prospect that funds, human resources and political attention will be diverted away from other crises (like Darfur) where they are urgently needed. Donor and political attention is highly variable, especially in relation to chronic conflict-related crises in Africa. Extreme variations in the funding of UN Consolidated Appeals are one reflection of this. The recent commitment of donors to the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship – including funding in proportion to need – is not borne out in current funding patterns.

See further:
• On Good Donorship, http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/Good_humanitarian_donorship.htm
• On global humanitarian aid flows, and the relationship between ‘pledges’, ‘commitments’ and funds actually disbursed, Development Initiatives www.devinit.org
• For information on financial tracking by UN OCHA of funds donated, http://www.reliefweb.int/appeals/fts_tsunami.html

5. The humanitarian response
At the time of writing, it is impossible to gauge the adequacy of the humanitarian responses across the region. Some of the worst-affected areas of Aceh in Indonesia have yet to receive assistance two weeks after the event. Problems of access and logistics are formidable and are creating aid bottlenecks. The speed and coordination of the response in Aceh and elsewhere in the region are key issues, as is the extent of effective collaboration between national authorities, local actors and international actors. Evaluation of national authorities’ performance would be premature at this point. Similarly, it is too soon to say whether the UN is performing its coordination role effectively, or being allowed to do so. Programme implementation appears in some cases to be lagging behind pledges of financial support and the deployment of international staff. This may be to some extent unavoidable, but certainly many agencies appear to be struggling to define and implement programmes on which to spend the very large amounts of funding being raised.

Detailed needs assessments will need to follow the broad initial estimations. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that it will be establishing a Humanitarian Information Centre in Aceh, and strengthening its presence across the region.

See further:
• the Humanitarian Policy Group’ s work on coordinating relief assistance at http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/bilateralisation.html
• On the humanitarian information centres, see http://www.humanitarianinfo.org.