Human
Rights and Poverty Reduction Realities, controversies
and strategies
Third Meeting Report:
Monday 31January 2005
Can human rights
make aid agencies more accountable?
Speakers: Peter
Uvin, Henry J. Leir Associate Professor of International
Humanitarian Studies at the Fletcher School at Tufts University Owen Davies, QC, Joint Head of Chambers, Two Garden
Court Chambers
Chair:
Sheelagh Stewart, Head of Profession (Governance and Conflict),
Policy Division, DFID
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1.
The fourth meeting in the series was held on Monday
31 January 2005 at ODI. The meeting was chaired by Sheelagh
Stewart. The two speakers were Peter Uvin and Owen Davies.
2.
The first speaker, Peter Uvin (see
presentation (1.1MB)), described four ways of integrating
human rights in the work of development aid agencies.
He began by stressing the distinction between 'having
a right' and 'having enough of something'. Following
Henry Shue, the difference was that a right had to be
'socially guaranteed'; arrangements must exist to ensure
that all, even the powerless, were able to enjoy it.
This guarantee could be provided by the law but could
also come from other sources, such as values/norms (familial/community
arrangements) or organisations.
3.
Uvin then described how aid agencies could 'seriously'
incorporate rights within their work. First, agencies
undertook 'rhetorical repackaging': they claimed they
were already undertaking rights work. This was the most
common form of engagement but had little impact on practice
and accountability.
4.
Second, agencies used conditionality to exert pressure
on recipient governments to meet their human rights
obligations. Apart from some selectivity in terms of
choosing 'partners', this did not alter expenditure
patterns. Conditionality was largely considered a failure
for a number of reasons: (i) it was unethical; (ii)
it was not fully implemented; (iii) it did not produce
the desired results; and (iv) it destroyed that which
it sought to achieve. For Uvin, conditionality did not
work because it was a 'dream about shortcuts and absolute
power'.
5.
In addition, Uvin argued that the indeterminacy of human
rights caused difficulties: it was easier to know when
they were being violated rather than when progress was
being made. They were also too sensitive a trigger;
any leverage was removed if aid was withdrawn in response
to every human rights violation (as some had pushed
for in Rwanda). It would be more realistic to have a
less sensitive bottom-line than human rights NGOs might
wish. This would identify a level at which aid agencies
could no longer be complicit with abuses, not because
conditionality might lead to change in the recipient
country
6.
Another challenge for aid agencies was the absolutism
of human rights, making them ill-suited to the difficult
choices and trade-offs necessary in development. 'Partnership-based'
instruments, such as PRSPs or Memorandums of Understanding,
might provide a more promising way of conducting a human
rights dialogue. In practice, this would be undermined
by the amount of political capital required to make
these relationships work; agencies might be reticent
about enforcing conditionality.
7.
Third, agencies could integrate human rights into their
work by providing 'positive support' and actually spending
money on human rights-related programming.
8.
Fourth, agencies could adopt a 'rights-based approach'
to their work. This was a radical change: development
and human rights became aspects of the same process.
Both agencies' aims (the shift from charity to obligation)
and processes used to reach those aims had to be redefined.
9.
Uvin then outlined the value-added of utilising human
rights in development practice. First, they provided
tools for creating institutions which was the core function
of development but also the most difficult to achieve.
He drew on his recent experience in Burundi to suggest
that it was the institutional set-up in developing countries
that produced sub-optimal outcomes, for instance by
failing to foster trust in the system and by not providing
incentives to do things 'by the book'. Seeing development
as about institutions had implications in terms of communication,
strategy, tactics and ethics. He suggested that human
rights allowed us to deal with these issues from above
(legal aspect), from below (social mobilisation) and
from within (accountability focus).
10.
Second, human rights provided a heuristic device to
change ways of seeing and talking. By allowing agencies
to look at situations differently, they elicited a different
language, which was political without being too interventionist.
They had value as tools for analysis as well as for
making claims.
11.
Third, process was everything and human rights provided
a framework for getting the process right. Agencies
were unlikely to achieve much in terms of outcomes/solutions
but could influence processes. Human rights allowed
them to do this more intelligently.
12.
Owen Davies QC (see paper)
described his aim as increasing awareness of the possibility
of using the courts for legal accountability within
the development arena. There had been instances where
organisations had been able to use legal challenges
to produce dramatic results, for example Greenpeace.
Davies had himself been involved in the Pergau Dam case
in which the World Development Movement had successful
challenged the use of British aid in Malaysia. This
was the only case in the UK where the courts had been
successfully used to challenge the proposed use of aid
in another state.
13.
Davies suggested legal approaches might not always be
the most appropriate or effective method for holding
aid agencies to account. There were alternative means
of conducting a human rights challenge than by utilising
human rights law.
He highlighted the potential limits of human rights
and the care in which a human rights argument ought
to be adopted. He pointed to the potential conflict
between different human rights, for example how to balance
the proportion of resources to be spent protecting civil
and political rights (e.g. elections in Iraq) vs the
economic and social rights of the poorest in Africa.
14.
Davies then set out some issues that needed to be taken
into consideration when talking about human rights and
accountability. First, there was a distinction between
hard and soft law. The former referred to law that was
enforceable through the UK courts. The latter, which
included international agreements, might influence UK
law but was not itself directly enforceable. It was
much easier to apply hard law and, since the Human Rights
Act (1998), the European Convention on Human Rights
had been incorporated into domestic law. Despite this,
Davies argued that the usefulness of the ECHR in relation
to development was limited because its first Article
restricted its territorial jurisdiction and the Convention
referred mainly to negative, rather than positive, rights.
This meant that soft law had to be relied upon to try
to enforce individual's positive rights outside of the
UK
15.
Davies suggested there were other, more effective, challenges
than ones based on human rights, described as 'tangential
attacks'. The Pergau Dam case had been a straightforward
statutory construction case based on the 1980 Overseas
Development and Cooperation Act. A statement by the
then Permanent Secretary had described the project as
not consistent with policy statements about the objective
of the aid programme. It had not been a human rights
challenge regarding the positive rights of Malaysians.
The case had also importantly established that non-governmental
organisations were able to bring such cases.
16.
In conclusion, lawyers now had hard law in the form
of the Human Rights Act, but they could continue to
refer to other soft law to interpret what development
meant.
17.
The discussion covered both policy and legal arguments
about the value of human rights to hold agencies to
account. Conditionality was seen as sometimes working,
for example, the cessation of aid to Kenya until they
held multi-party elections. Donors were also accountable
to their own citizens and therefore had to listen to
public opinion. However, if process was everything,
was it not contradictory to suggest agencies could use
the power of their money to get results? A purist approach
would see this as going against human rights principles.
In reality, agencies had de facto power and implicitly
exercised this. Power could be used more explicitly
to create mechanisms of accountability.
18.
There was agreement that establishing good processes
and building institutions was the priority in the poorest
African countries. What basis was there for suggesting
that human rights were particularly suited to this endeavour?
This view was not grounded in history, but human rights
could provide a common tool and language to guide agencies
when working with partners and engaging in processes.
Religion could also provide such a framework.
19.
For some, the accountability processes that were most
relevant were those within the recipient country. A
rights-based approach stressed not only legal enforceability
but also the need to multiply channels of information
and establishing mechanisms for redress in order to
bring about change. It could also foster inward accountability
within aid agencies by, for instance, creating mechanisms
for internal debate about human rights or regular human
rights scrutinising.
20.
The legal value of human right was also discussed. Could
it be established that aid agencies were duty-bearers
in respect of the rights of the poorest in developing
countries? Historically states only had obligations to
their own citizens, however international accountability
mechanisms now existed as states had obligations to other
states and not just to their own citizens. Could soft
law be used to increase the level of duty held by international
aid agencies and, if so, which bit of soft law?. Would
it be possibly to use judicial review if a state signed
up to a right but did not make sufficient resources available,
for example through its aid programme? The good humanitarian
donorship agenda had highlighted the importance of making
agencies accountable for respecting soft low. At the international
level, there could perhaps be human rights 'audits' of
aid agencies through UN mechanisms.
21.
Finally, a number of other legal strategies to hold
agencies to account were described. For example, the
Freedom of Information Act could provide ammunition.
An attempt had also been made to bring a case based
on the arms export regime.