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1. The first meeting in the series was held on Monday
10 January 2005. The meeting was chaired by Baroness
Whitaker. The two speakers were Simon Maxwell and
Robert Archer.
2. Simon Maxwell (see presentation)
opened with two challenging questions. On one side,
if we had the MDGs, was the rights-based approach
superfluous? Or alternatively, if we had a rights-based
approach to development, could we dispense with the
MDGs ?
3. To begin answering these
questions, he referred to the last ODI meetings series
on rights, held in 1999, on the theme 'What can we do
with a rights-based approach to development?' (http://www.odi.org.uk/speeches/index.html#spr1999).
As summarised in a Briefing Paper (http://www.odi.org.uk/rights/Publications/rightsbp.pdf),
this had concluded positively that a rights-based approach
could be useful, but also identified challenges such
as:
how to balance individual and collective rights?
how to operationalise the concept of 'progressive
realisation'?
how to specify the obligations of non-state actors?
4. A key issue was that the discourse on rights
was informed by two very different positions: one
built around struggle, with rights used as a vehicle
for mobilising people; the other as fundamentally
legalistic, centering on the justiciability of rights.
5. Maxwell reviewed subsequent work by ODI's Rights
in Action programme, and also the experience of
different donor agencies. He referred especially
to an ODI review of DFID's work on human rights
(http://www.odi.org.uk/rights/Publications/DFIDRightsReview07.04.pdf),
which provided a useful compendium of practical
experiences covering both the mobilization and justiciability
approaches.
6. He then turned to the MDGs, setting these in
the context of a wider construction on poverty reduction,
and of current work by the Millennium Project in
New York, whose report was shortly to be published
(http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/html/about.shtm).
He noted that human rights were not the 'driving
motor' behind the MDGs and were relatively little
discussed in the Millennium Project task force reports
(except land and water rights and reproductive health
and HIV-AIDS issues).
7. The MDGs could be seen as oversimplified targets,
with an instrumental understanding of citizenship
and participation, and lack of clarity as to the
'right' to expect support from donors. However,
a broader view of poverty also included concerns
for inclusion and participation; these were not
simply rights-based values. Human rights were more
comprehensive than the MDGs. Did it matter that
the MDGs were selective in order to be practical?
An open-ended commitment to 'progressive realisation'
could at times be a bit 'fuzzy'. The MDGs, though
optional, relied on political leadership though
the lack of embedded accountability and obligation
was a weakness.
8. Concluding, Simon Maxwell identified complementarities
between the human rights and MDG agendas. Rights
advocates could gain from the MDGs' emphasis on
short-term targets and from approaches to contractual
partnership developed between aid donors and recipients
(e.g. Cotonou Agreement). MDG specialists could
make use of the more comprehensive normative framework
of rights-based approaches and of the notion of
legally enforceable obligations on duty-bearers.
A synthesis would benefit both sides.
9. Robert Archer agreed that it was difficult
to reconcile the historically different positions between
human rights and other disciplines. He argued (see
his presentation) that we were not well equipped to
talk across institutional and disciplinary boundaries.
This was not only because of our intellectual starting
points, but also because of organisational cultures and
disciplinary histories. In the context of human rights
and development agendas, we were still near the beginning.
10. Archer claimed no inherent conflict existed between
the MDGs and human rights but the MDGs had to be understood
in their historical context. Their precursors, the
international development targets, had been voluntarily
agreed by donors, representing the limits of the 'politically
feasible' at the time. Yet, NGOs felt uncomfortable
with governments 'stealing their values', such as
participation and ownership. The MDGs by contrast
had been adopted by all heads of states, at a time
when the UN was trying to 'mainstream human rights'.
The process was difficult because institutions were
not ready or equipped to operationalise human rights
principles.
11. The MDGs were hybrid: like the IDTs, they were
practical and political, but at the same time they
represented inadequate global aspirations, such as
to only reduce by half the number of people who are
destitute. They needed to be read alongside the Millennium
Declaration, and be seen as 'tactical ambitions, way-markers
along a road'. Their quantitative language must not
narrow our understanding of development which had
been broadened over years. The Millennium Declaration
should likewise be seen for what it was: an important
statement of consensus but imperfect and unbalanced,
failing to reflect the systematic character of the
human rights framework.
12. Archer then turned to the place of rights in poverty
reduction strategies (PRS) and the importance of the
qualitative dimensions of development. Human rights
were making a claim for intellectual leadership. There
were two schools: 'conversion' or 'convergence'. Whilst
the former considered that human rights should trump
other values, the latter emphasised the compatibility
with other policy frameworks, such as governance. A
convergence model highlighted:
the normative contribution of human rights to assess
PRSs. Its holistic framework provided a way of assessing
social policy and participation: whether decision-making
processes were participatory, inclusive, non-discriminatory
or consultative. This was done on the basis of universal,
fair and legitimate standards with legal status;
the value of human rights principles and methods
to highlight and protect the needs of marginalised individuals
or minorities. Development was a long, large, and mucky
process where some interests were progressed while others
not. The human rights framework enabled planners and
observers to do something when particular interests
or prospects suffered by requiring authorities to identify
people at risk and assess the cost and damage they had
suffered.
the core human rights principles of accountability
and transparency. As with participation, these were
shared with other approaches but the value added of
human rights lied in the importance of justiciability
(though as a subordinate one); legal precision and
authority; political and public legitimacy; and the
emphasis on fairness and equity. As a result, someone
could be held responsible or a remedy offered when
a rights violation or omission occurred.
13. Archer was also candid about three weaknesses
of human rights analysts: the emphasis on violations
in the present, rather than balancing benefits over
time; the difficulty of negotiating with other (non
legal) frameworks; and, because of the principle
of interdependence, the difficulty of choosing between
goods in a world of limited resources. Two other
criticisms were not seen as serious: that human
rights were political and normative.
14. Archer concluded there had been enormous progress
but still a long way to go. Like Maxwell, he stated
that there was still a wide gap that needed to be
bridged, with more practical testing to find out
where human rights values and methods were most
useful. What we need is more exchange of practice
not more theory.
15. During the discussion, several participants called
for a common language to be found across disciplines.
There had been progress in the integration between
human rights and development, but still opportunities
for development actors to learn to use human rights
accountability mechanisms and human rights experts
to engage in development processes. For example, the
UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies too often ignored the
MDGs. The importance of 'human rights and development'
education was noted.
16. There was agreement that human rights
held resonance with excluded groups and vulnerable minorities
because of its call for targeted frameworks, disaggregated
data, budgeting for accountability and monitoring of
spending in development. It was claimed there were in
fact a hierarchy of rights which favoured the rights
of some and not others. For example, the rights of the
elderly were not as well protected as that of children.
17. There was some discussion about the appropriate
level of obligations and how to link the global to the
local. Current development practices, for example PRS,
were putting the onus on developing countries and we
had lost our international sense of responsibility.
Donor organisations and other high level bodies, such
as the Millennium Project, were particularly singled
out. Consultations with human rights organisations as
part of the norm were suggested. Rights should also
form a serious part of discussions on donor conditionality.
18. An argument was made for looking down as well as
up, reflecting the fact that most poor people experience
problems of rights at the very local level. These tended
to be 'dependent rights' rather than the 'autonomous
rights' assumed in the conventions. Duty-bearers needed
to reach the non-poor in developing countries who also
had obligations to the poor.
