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17/11/2004
Messages
posted onto the
board so far have
revolved around
two sorts of questions:
first, the domestic
policies required
to increase growth
in Africa, and
second the most
appropriate level
and form of assistance
from the West.
As regards the
former, diversification
away from exports
of primary commodities
(e.g. sugar) was
stressed by one
participant. “This
needs to be done
through national
policies…..what
could be done
would be to make
it easier to establish
new manufacturing
industries by
allowing more
use of imported
inputs (relaxing
rules of origin)”.
Another participant
argues more generally
that “the
continent should
attempt to promote
internal capitalist
development wherever
possible”,
and that “an
honest reassessment
should be undertaken
of the viability
of import-substitution
industrialisation”,
because today’s
circumstances
differ from those
prevailing in
the 1960s and
1970s: in particular,
“the internal
market is much
larger, through
the myriad of
free trade bodies”.
This is an interesting
suggestion: what
do other people
think? Another
participant that
governments need
to assist with
agricultural methods
such as irrigation,
although developed
countries should
assist in terms
of providing necessary
resources.
Another participant
links domestic
policies to the
high levels of
foreign debt experienced
by many countries
in the region.
Her view is “that
some countries
have gone into
debt because of
poor domestic
financial policies,
high levels of
corruption and
overall lack of
the rule of law
and good governance”.
She adds that
although the cancellation
of debt by the
West is advisable,
“Africa
should also understand
that it can not
keep asking for
outside assistance
without dealing
with its internal
affairs first”.
Africa
should understand
that it
can not
keep asking
for outside
assistance
without
dealing
with its
internal
affairs
first
|
As regards the
most appropriate
level and form
of assistance
from the West,
two participants
stress the importance
of attracting
more forign investment
to Africa. For
one participant,
this requires
“advertising
the improvements
in the continent’s
economy, particularly
among expatriates”.
For another, “there
needs to be a
strenuous campaign
to persuade the
populations of
wealthy western
countries that
the welfare of
Africa matters
to them…[and]
that a suitable
slogan for this
campaign would
be ‘Every
one of us is an
African’”.
Can other means
of attracting
more foreign investment
to the region
be identified?
One participant
argues that EU
sugar policy,
and proposed reforms
to it, have adverse
effects on exports
of sugar from
countries in the
region, and prevent
huge numbers of
people from people
from being lifted
out of poverty
via this route.
However, another
argues that Africa
already has high
preferential access
to developed country
markets, and that
“improving
this only for
Africa would disadvantage
other poor developing
countries”.
She argues that
the Commission
should put most
weight on improving
infrastructure
in the region.
Some participants
are critical of
past interventions
by donors and
multilateral organisations
in the region.
For one participant,
“the imposition
by the World Bank
of its own idea
of how economies
should be run
has, in the past,
created disruption
of local ways
of dealing with
local circumstances.”
Another, in considering
the question of
choosing between
grants and loans
in the deliverty
of aid to the
region, believes
in “assessing
individual country
needs and working
together to find
a solution best
suited to that
country’s
situation”.
One participant,
in a posting under
the theme of climate
change, criticises
the exporting
of finance, know-how
and technology
to Africa for
net emission reductions
under the label
of global warming,
arguing that the
main benefits
of this process
will not go to
Africans.
the
imposition
by the World
Bank of
its own
idea of
how economies
should be
run has,
in the past,
created
disruption
of local
ways of
dealing
with local
circumstances
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19/11/2004
First,
the issue was
raised as to how
African countries
can diversify
away from dependence
on primary commodities.
One participant
argued that there
is a lack of clear
alternatives to
sugar, in terms
of other exports
which can bring
substantial development
benefits: “the
question needs
to be asked, "diversification
into what?".
What product could
replace sugar
as a remunerative
cash crop? Bananas?
Rice? Coffee?”
This is an important
issue. To what
extent is there
possibility to
expand non-traditional
sectors, e.g.
tourism? Alternatively,
what would enable
African countries
to ensure more
of the processing
and packaging
of primary commodities
such as sugar
is done locally?
 [T]he
issue was
raised as
to how African
countries
can diversify
away from
dependence
on primary
commodities.
|
An example of
the benefits of
preferential access
to EU markets
was given. Kilombero
Sugar Ltd., located
in a remote region
of Tanzania, provides
employment for
6,000 people directly
and up to 100,000
other people indirectly,
and provides education
facilities for
6,000 children.
However, “to
stay in business,
Kilombero Sugar
needs protection
from the ruinous
prices prevailing
on the world sugar
market, and to
foster more socio-economic
development, they
need increasing
preferential access
to the EU market
at remunerative
prices.”
Does this thereby
support the view
expressed in the
Commission’s
Consultation Document
for “continued
or enhanced preferential
access for Africa
to 2015? (Section
8.2)” Or
could countries
such as Tanzania
be compensated
in some way for
any erosion of
their trade preferences,
for instance by
increased aid?
The issue of
remittances was
raised once again.
It was argued
that an important
role for OECD
is to reduce the
costs incurred
by people wishing
to send money
back via formal
means (e.g. bank
transfers) to
their country
of origin. Successful
policy initiatives
in this area were
mentioned between
the US and Mexico.
It would be very
useful and interesting
to have some more
information on
this and other
types of initiatives,
given the particular
stress placed
on remittances
in the Commission’s
Consultation Document.
 [A]n
important
role for
the OECD
is to reduce
the costs
incurred
by people
wishing
to send
money back
via formal
means (e.g.
bank transfers)
to their
country
of origin.
|
Discussion on
the volume and
effectiveness
of aid also continued.
One participant
noted the importance
of mitigating
against corruption
in terms of increasing
aid effectiveness,
and that this
is to be achieved
through taking
“strong
stances when corrupt
practice is identified
– the West
have often stood
on the sidelines
and wished for
improvement instead
of taking strong
action”.
Another cautioned
against excessive
donor involvement
in financing small-scale
business (other
than providing
a favourable legislative
framework and
suitable infrastructures).
However, there
has been little
comment so far
on the suggestion
in the Commission’s
Consultation Document
that levels of
aid to Africa
be doubled. Tony
Killick recently
spoke on this
issue at a meeting
of the Africa
All Party Parliamentary
Group. Can
such an increase
be absorbed without
having adverse
impacts on the
macroeconomy,
corruption, and
the domestic ‘ownership’
of poverty reduction
strategies? Or,
alternatively,
is such an increase
sufficient to
meet the region’s
financing needs?
23/11/2004
Participants
argued that the
problems of low
aid effectiveness
are not purely
domestic in nature,
as is often suggested.
According to one
posting, “aid
agencies often
fail to co-ordinate
their demands,
field untrained,
inexperienced
and sometimes
incompetent staff,
and act in an
authoritarian
manner towards
soveriegn governments”.
Further problems
are caused by
“the inadequate
co-ordination
of procurement
and discursement
regimes and sloppiness
in monitoring
the final destination
of funds”.
According to another
posting, “sometimes
donors make projects
to fail by inappropriate
allocation of
resources to their
‘home’
consultants, endless
missions and visits
– with travel
costs, hotel bills
and per diem taking
60% of the grant”.
 aid
agencies
often fail
to co-ordinate
their demands,
field untrained,
inexperienced
and sometimes
incompetent
staff, and
act in an
authoritarian
manner towards
sovereign
governments
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When properly
designed, aid
can be highly
effective: “having
worked in Nigeria
for the past 15
years, I have
seen communities
transformed and
lives completely
changed with the
availability of
funds to provide
water for a community,
schools for children
and microcredit
for women groups”
was the view of
one participant.
As regards delivery
mechanisms, “there
should be a mix-bag
of funds some
of which can be
directed through
the traditional
channel of government
while another
variety could
be to a coalition
of end users which
include civil
societies and/or
communities”.
This may be true,
but does the appropriate
mix and indeed
volume of funds
vary across countries,
depending for
example on the
extent of democracy
and/or government
accountability?
Will increased
aid funding erode
the domestic ownership
of poverty reduction
strategies? Opinion
on this issue
is divided. For
one participant,
“states
which are highly
dependent on donor
funding risk losing
accountability
to their own populations.
Doubling aid and
donor-determined
priorities intensify
this risk.”
As a result, “the
Commission should
explore ways of
delivering aid
which build local
institutions,
rather than bypassing
them.” However,
another participant
was unconvinced:
“I take
it that every
country independently
develop their
Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper
(PRSP) with the
support of their
development partners….[but]
how does influx
of funds erode
the ownership
on the part of
the government
when the nation
begins to harvest
the gains of the
interventions
and indices are
showing improvement
in the lives of
the people?”
Have the dangers
of increased aid
undermining domestic
accountability
been over-estimated
perhaps?
 the
Commission
should explore
ways of
delivering
aid which
build local
institutions,
rather than
bypassing
them
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As regards opportunities
for trade, discussion
continued on the
issue of diversification
away from dependence
on primary commodities.
One participant
gave clear examples
of countries which
have achieved
this transition,
including Mauritius
(initially from
sugar into clothing,
and now into tourism
and financial
services), and
Swaziland which
has diversified
into a range of
light manufactured
products. Are
there other examples,
and are there
any policy lessons
we can learn from
them?
On issues of
trade access,
dangers to developing
an industry under
trade perferences
were noted: “it
can be precacarious
as preference
erosion would
wipe out LDC producers”,
and “countries
trying to protect
preferences can
hinder larger
liberalisation
goals which is
counter-productive
from a global
development perspective”.
Another posting
noted that, for
the case of sugar,
the amount of
revenue actually
received by countries
receiving trade
preferences is
typically less
than might be
expected (from
the value of exports)
because much of
the production
is not nationally
owned. Do these
comments imply
that trade preferences
are an inefficient
and ineffective
tool for assisting
African countries,
and that assistance
should be channelled
only through aid
(suitably delivered
and made predictable
over time) and/or
debt relief?
25/11/2004
Some
contributors criticised
the broad content
of the Commission’s
Consultative Document.
According to one,
“it looks
like the approach
is to do more
of what has been
tried in the last
20 odd years …
doesn’t
the issue of why
the Washington
consensus has
failed these countries
need to be addressed
in a meaningful
way in the Report?”
For another, “the
words ‘environment’
and ‘sustainable
development’
do not appear
once in the Document”,
and “the
whole question
of Africa’s
ability to sustainably
utilise and manage
its diverse natural
ecosystems is
missing.”
There has been
further discussion
on the issue of
debt relief. One
contributor expressed
concern about
debt relief reducing
incentives for
sound fiscal management:
“does wiping
out debt mean
countries can
begin with clean
slate to begin
borrowing again
that can possibly
lead to similar
fate in the future?
If so, what are
the new measures
that can be taken
to prevent this?”
For another, “blanket
calls for total
debt forgiveness
promote bad governance”.
Furthermore, there
is an ethical
dilemma: “it
seems unfair to,
in effect, punish
the fiscally prudent
by rewarding the
profligate and
the imprudent”.
 [for
debt forgiveness]
it seems
unfair to,
in effect,
punish the
fiscally
prudent
by rewarding
the profligate
and the
imprudent
|
On a more technical
but important
matter, one contributor
argued that the
discount rates
used to calculate
the ‘net
present value’
(NPV) of outstanding
debt owed by HIPC
countries are
too low, meaning
that the NPV is
significantly
over-estimated.
This could have
dramatic PR
results: “if
the western public
and elites read
reports saying
the NPV of HIPC
debts is a total
of $10-$15bn and
not the currently
stated $80bn there
could be a effect
on the political
will to cancel
debts”.
The decline of
the US dollar
relative to other
currencies also
“pushes
up the headline
cost of the debts”.
“The Commission
should ensure
that it adequately
investigates the
interest rate
and FX [foreign
exchange] assumptions
in any debt reduction
initiative”.
There has also
been discussion
about how to increase
investment in
Africa. It is
recognised that
investment is
currently limited
by a heterogeneous
market, coupled
with infrastructure
and political
problems. One
contributor advocated
setting up “mini-commissions
in every country
whose primary
objective is to
create a homogenous
market”,
although for another
“this wouldn’t
be efficient”
and instead the
priority lies
in “providing
potential borrowers
with more information
and making easier
the access to
the source of
capital for investment”.
For another, there
are lessons to
be learnt from
other developing
countries which
have increased
investment: “we
need to learn
from the Asian
countries!”
On investment
priorities, one
contributor argued
that “there
is little point
spending on infrastructure
if the population
is poorly educated
and ill, so unable
to make use of
the capital equipment”,
although infrastructure
that enables important
services to be
delivered cheaply
are important.
 there
is little
point spending
on infrastructure
if the population
is poorly
educated
and ill,
so unable
to make
use of the
capital
equipment
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Under the topic
of ‘Financing
for Development
in Africa’,
one contributor
wished to stress
the important
role which can
be played by the
micro-finance
movement: “in
the interest of
the insiders and
readers this should
be treated as
a new topic or
at least to be
highlighted in
the moderator’s
report”.
In an earlier
contribution,
it was argued
that the “micro-finance
is a very appealing
tool to tackle
both poverty and
small enterprise
development, on
conditional that
we know how to
use it or to distinguish
both interventions”,
and that “the
banking system
should do their
best to reach
the thousands
of micro-business
realities through
the micro-financial
providers (microfinance)”.
There has also
been more debate
on diversification
and trade preferences.
It was noted that
although Mauritius
has diversified
into activities
such as textiles
and financial
services, “these
activities could
not and have not
replace sugar
in the rural parts
of that beautiful
island”.
Furthermore, “Swaziland’s
light industry
…. is now
facing irresistible
competition from
South Africa and
also from Europe”.
It is argued on
this basis that
“sugar industries
in poor countries
need a leg up
in the form of
trade preferences
which should last
for as long as
they remain so
abjectly poor”,
and that current
proposals on the
reform of the
EU sugar regime
will be hugely
damaging. Other
advantages of
sugar industries
were mentioned:
“all cane
sugar industries
in Africa participate
in the construction
and maintenance
of roads, bridges,
dams, port facilities,
etc.” and
“sugar industries
are nearly always
located in rural
areas, and this
they alleviate
the drift towards
cities in Africa”.
Finally, under
natural resources,
“there are
many good examples
of communities
whose income and
quality of life
has greatly improved
as a result of
carefully developed
eco-tourism ventures,
such as the Mwaluganje
Community-run
Elephant sanctuary
near Mombassa,
Kenya….and
the Dian Fosset
Gorilla Fund initiative
in eastern DRC”.
Tourism can also
play a role in
terms of presenting
a more positive
image of the continent
among people of
the developed
world. However,
eco-tourist businesses
should be “owned
and managed by
the indigenous
population rather
than the traditional,
wealthy corporations”.
One useful suggestion
was to channel
financing through
“secured
loans to land-owners
with preference
given to enterprises
where land is
owned by co-operatives”.
 [eco-tourist
businesses
should be]
owned and
managed
by the indigenous
population
rather than
the traditional,
wealthy
corporations
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26/11/2004
The
view has again
been expressed
that the Commission’s
Consultation Document
does not pay sufficient
attention to natural
resource issues.
For example, according
to one participant
“it is a
serious oversight
that the CFA’s
Consultation Document
does not mention
the need for improved
natural resource
management as
a condition for
economic growth
and human development
in Africa”.
Instead, “the
challenge that
the CFA should
be confronting
is how to address
the short-term
needs of [rural]
people while at
the same time
safeguarding their
interests in the
longer term by
making sure that
natural resources
are managed sustainably
now”. An
example of improved
natural resource
management combined
with poverty alleviation
is the Zambian
COMACO project.
On a related topic,
another participant
expressed the
view that “if
climate change
is not put at
the heart of the
Commission’s
proposals and
activities, its
effectiveness
will be severely
limited.”
 the
challenge
... is how
to address
the short-term
needs of
[rural]
people while
at the same
time safeguarding
their interests
in the longer
term by
making sure
that natural
resources
are managed
sustainably
now
|
 if
climate
change is
not put
at the heart
of the Commission’s
proposals
and activities,
its effectiveness
will be
severely
limited
|
There has also
been more on the
sugar debate.
One contributor
took the view
that the relevance
of the EU sugar
quota has been
over-emphasised,
citing the case
of Zambia where
“both the
production of
sugar and utilisation
of the EU market
is controlled
by a multinational
company which
has only limited
local linkages”
and that “local
cane producers
claim that they
are not getting
any extra benefit
from the higher
EU quota prices.”
The contributor
suggests looking
at the matter
more closely before
coming to a firm
conclusion.
Debate has continued
on the question
of debt relief.
One contributor
argued that “the
Commission should
consider lobbying
against any Paris-Club
creditor selling
its debts to commercial
concerns, which
would probably
increase the likelihood
of that debt not
being relieved.”
There has also
been more discussion
on infrastructure,
with one contributor
agreeing with
a message posted
last week suggesting
that the Commission
place particular
importance on
promoting infrastructure
development. A
seven-country
study by CUTS
International
called ‘Investment
for Development’
shows that infrastructure
is a key determinant
of the amount
of foreign direct
investment (FDI)
which countries
receive, and more
important than
the extent of
financial incentives
offered by host
governments. Investments
in new communication
technology, including
Voice over Internet
Protocol (VOIP)
and WIFI were
considered by
one contributor
to be particularly
relevant for Africa,
given that the
cost of terrestrial
connectivity had
become “astronomically
expensive in view
of the monopoly
that national
telecommunication
services provide.”
Finally, there
have been several
messages on the
topic of the volume
and effectiveness
of aid. One contributor
criticises the
Consultation Document
for giving “scant
attention to agriculture
at a time when
international
support to agriculture
is also at an
all time low”,
and that “this
sector requires
priority attention
at all intervention
levels”.
Do other people
share the view
that too much
aid in the region
is either channelled
to ‘social
infrastructure’
(e.g. health and
education projects),
or provided in
the form of programme
assistance, at
the expense of
support to agricultural
projects?
Another contributor
noted the fact
that many African
countries restrict
NGO participation
in development
projects, and
that “unless
these laws are
changed aid is
more likely to
be diverted to
‘leaders’
through corruption.”
The adverse effects
of corruption
on aid effectiveness
were also noted,
and that “donors
should make sure
that countries
enjoying more
aid are applying
democratic constitutional
changes as well
as active pursuit
of corruption
through independent
bodies.”
Another participant
argued however
that there is
a danger of “aid
dependency…which
reverses the very
idea behind aid
as a temporary
engine to foster
economic development”.
This may be true,
but at what level
of aid, as a proportion
of GNP for example,
does dependency
become an issue?
Can case study
evidence or statistical
evidence help
us in this regard?
Remember that
the Consultation
Document proposes
doubling aid to
Africa, from 2004
levels (section
9.1), and that
the final report
will "provide
evidence that
Africa is able
to make good use
of increased resources
of the magnitude
suggested".
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